

ISSN 1563-0285; eISSN 2618-1215

ӘЛ-ФАРАБИ атындағы ҚАЗАҚ ҰЛТТЫҚ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ

# ХАБАРШЫ

Халықаралық қатынастар және халықаралық құқық сериясы

---

КАЗАХСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ имени АЛЬ-ФАРАБИ

# ВЕСТНИК

Серия международные отношения и международное право

---

AL-FARABI KAZAKH NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

# INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

---

№4 (108)

Алматы  
«Қазақ университеті»  
2024



KazNU Science • ҚазҰУ Ғылымы • Наука КазНУ

# ХАБАРШЫ

ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР ЖӘНЕ  
ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚҰҚЫҚ СЕРИЯСЫ №4 (108) желтоқсан



04.05.2017 ж. Қазақстан Республикасының Ақпарат және коммуникация министрлігінде тіркелген

Күәлік № 16503-Ж

*Журнал жылына 4 рет жарыққа шығады  
(наурыз, маусым, қыркүйек, желтоқсан)*

## ЖАУАПТЫ РЕДАКТОР:

Байкушикова Г.С., Ph.D. (Қазақстан)  
E-mail: baikushikova.gulnara@kaznu.kz

## РЕДАКЦИЯ АЛҚАСЫ:

Жекенов Д.К., PhD, қауымд. профессор – ғылыми редактор (Қазақстан)

Губайдуллина М.Ш., т.ғ.д., профессор – ғылыми редактордың орынбасары (Қазақстан)

Байзакова К.И., т.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

Күкеева Ф.Т., т.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

Ауған М.Ә., т.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

Айдарбаев С.Ж., з.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

Чукубаев Е.С., т.ғ.к., доцент (Қазақстан)

Сайрамбаева Ж.Т., з.ғ.к., доцент (Қазақстан)

Грегори Глиссен (Gregory Gleason), Ph.D., профессор (АҚШ)

Аджай Кумар Патнайк (Aja Kumar Patnaik), саяс.ғ.д., профессор (Үндістан)

Торстен Бонаккер (Thorsten Bonacker), саяс.ғ.д., профессор (Германия)

Пьер Шабаль (Pierre Chabal), саяс.ғ.д., профессор (Франция)

Курылев К.П., т.ғ.д., профессор (Ресей)

Абдежалил Аккари (Abdeljalil Akkari), профессор (Швейцария)

Себ Берни (Sebe Berny Christophe Hubert), Ph.D., профессор (Ұлыбритания)

Дадабаев Т., Ph.D., профессор (Жапония)

Рязанцев С.В., э.ғ.д., профессор (Ресей)

Чунг Тайик (Chung Tayik), профессор (Корея)

Шрикант Кондапалли (Srikanth Kondapalli), Ph.D., профессор (Нью-Дели, Үндістан)

Пол Фрайер (Paul J. Fryer), Ph.D., доцент (Йоэнсуу, Финляндия)

Фабьен Боссайт (Fabienne Bossuyt), Ph.D., қауымд. профессор (Гент, Бельгия)

Молчанов М.А., профессор (Саламанка, Испания)

## ТЕХНИКАЛЫҚ РЕДАКТОР:

Парпиев С.М., Ph.D. (Қазақстан)

Халықаралық қатынастар және халықаралық құқық сериясында қазіргі кездегі халықаралық қатынастар мәселелері, әлемдік интеграциялық үдерістер, халықаралық қауіпсіздік мәселелері, халықаралық қатынастар және сыртқы саясат тарихы, халықаралық құқықтың өзекті мәселелері, мемлекетшілік құқық, халықаралық экономикалық қатынастар бағыттары бойынша мақалалар жарияланады.



Қазақстан Республикасының Білім және Ғылым Министрлігі



РОССИЙСКИЙ ИНДЕКС  
НАУЧНОГО ЦИТИРОВАНИЯ  
Science Index

DOAJ DIRECTORY OF  
OPEN ACCESS  
JOURNALS



## Жоба менеджері

Гульмира Шаккозова

Телефон: +7 701 724 2911

E-mail: Gulmira.Shakkozova@kaznu.kz

Пішімі 60x84/8. Көлемі 7.6 б.т.

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің  
«Қазақ университеті» баспа үйі.

050040, Алматы қаласы, әл-Фараби даңғылы, 71.

1-бөлім

**ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР  
ЖӘНЕ ДИПЛОМАТИЯНЫҢ  
ӨЗЕКТІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

---

Section 1

**CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS  
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
AND DIPLOMACY**

---

Раздел 1

**АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ  
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ  
И ДИПЛОМАТИИ**

**D.A. Tumanshiyev** , **L.T. Issova\*** , **M.A. Abduali** 

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: tanirbergenlaura@gmail.com

## THE GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KAZAKHSTAN'S URANIUM RESERVES IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY

The article describes the role of the Kazakhstan as one of the largest uranium producers and producers and exporters in the world and its impact on global security. With its extensive uranium reserves, Kazakhstan plays a key role in meeting the world's needs for nuclear energy, which significantly enhance its geopolitical importance. The article analyzes key aspects of Kazakhstan's uranium diplomacy, including its participation in international non-proliferation initiatives, as well as the development of strategic partnerships with countries such as Russia, China, the United States and the European Union. Particular attention is paid to how Kazakhstan uses its uranium resources to strengthen its position in world politics, balancing the interests of the world's largest powers and ensuring energy security. The article also touches upon the challenges and prospects in the field of uranium resource management, including issues of ensuring environment and population. Kazakhstan's uranium resources can become an important tool for strengthening national security, stability and enhancing the country's international authority in nuclear diplomacy and energy cooperation.

**Key words:** global security, nuclear energy, uranium reserves, strategic partnerships, world politics, diplomacy.

Д.А. Туманшиев, Л.Т. Исова\*, М.А. Абдуали

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: tanirbergenlaura@gmail.com

### Қазақстанның уран резервтерінің жаһандық қауіпсіздік жүйесіндегі геосаяси маңызы

Мақала Қазақстанның әлемдегі ең ірі уран өндіруші және экспорттаушы елдердің бірі ретіндегі рөлін және жаһандық қауіпсіздік жүйесіне ықпалын зерттейді. Қазақстанның кең уран резервтері әлемнің ядролық энергия қажеттіліктерін қамтамасыз етуде маңызды рөл атқарады, бұл оның геосаяси маңыздылығын арттырады. Сонымен қатар, мақала Қазақстанның уран дипломатиясының негізгі аспектілерін, оның халықаралық ядролық қаруды таратпау бастамаларындағы үлесін, сонымен қатар Ресей, Қытай, АҚШ және Еуропалық Одақ секілді маңызды елдермен стратегиялық серіктестік қатынастарын талқылайды. Қазақстанның уран ресурстарын жаһандық саясаттағы орнын нығайту үшін қаншалықты тиімді пайдаланатыны, әлемнің ең ірі державаларының мүдделерін теңестіре отырып, ерекше назарға алынады. Уран ресурстарын басқарудағы қиындықтар мен перспективалар, сонымен қатар экологиялық қауіпсіздік пен тұрақты дамуды қамтамасыз ету мәселелері де талқыланады. Қазақстан уранды өндіру және экспорттау процесі экологиялық жағынан тиімді болуы керек, өйткені тұрақты даму мен экологиялық қауіпсіздік маңызды орын алады. Мақала уран резервтерін стратегиялық тұрғыда пайдаланудың маңыздылығы мен қажеттілін, ұлттық қауіпсіздікті нығайту мен елдің ядролық дипломатиядағы халықаралық беделін арттыру қажеттілігін атап көрсетеді. Қазақстанның уранға қатысты саясаты жаһандық қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етуде маңызды фактор болып табылады, әрі оның геосаяси маңызы арта түсуде.

**Түйін сөздер:** жаһандық қауіпсіздік, атом энергетикасы, уран қорлары, стратегиялық әріптестік, әлемдік саясат, дипломатия.

Д.А. Туманшиев, Л.Т. Исова\*, М.А. Абдуали

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: tanirbergenlaura@gmail.com

### Геополитическое значение урановых резервов Казахстана в системе глобальной безопасности

В статье исследуется роль Казахстана как одного из крупнейших в мире производителей и экспортеров урана, и его влияние на глобальную систему безопасности. Огромные запасы урана Казахстана играют важную роль в удовлетворении мировых потребностей в атомной энергетике, что повышает его геополитическое значение. Кроме того, в статье рассматриваются основные аспекты урановой дипломатии Казахстана, ее вклад в международные инициативы по нераспространению ядерного оружия, а также отношения стратегического партнерства с такими важными странами, как Россия, Китай, США и Европейский Союз. Особое внимание будет уделяться тому, насколько эффективно Казахстан использует урановые ресурсы для укрепления своих позиций в глобальной политике, одновременно балансируя интересы крупнейших мировых держав. Также обсуждаются проблемы и перспективы управления урановыми ресурсами, а также вопросы обеспечения экологической безопасности и устойчивого развития. Процесс производства и экспорта урана в Казахстане должен быть экологически эффективным, поскольку устойчивое развитие и экологическая безопасность важны. В статье подчеркивается важность и необходимость стратегического использования запасов урана, необходимость укрепления национальной безопасности и повышения международной репутации страны в ядерной дипломатии. Урановая политика Казахстана является важным фактором обеспечения глобальной безопасности, и ее геополитическое значение возрастает.

**Ключевые слова:** глобальная безопасность, ядерная энергетика, запасы урана, стратегическое партнерство, мировая политика, дипломатия.

#### Introduction

The relevance of the study of the topic “The geopolitical significance of Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves in the global security system” is due to a number of factors influencing modern international and energy policy. Kazakhstan is one of the largest uranium producers in the world, which automatically makes it a key player in the field of global nuclear energy and security. In the context of growing demand for clean energy sources, uranium as the main element for the production of nuclear energy is becoming a strategic resource for many countries, including the United States, China, Russia and the European Union. Global political instability, changes in international relations and growing tensions around energy resources emphasize the importance of Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves. An important aspect is Kazakhstan’s participation in international initiatives on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its role in ensuring energy security through uranium resources. In the context of changing global energy balance and geopolitical challenges, it is relevant to study the opportunities and risks associated with Kazakhstan’s uranium resources to strengthen its position on the world stage and ensure internal stability.

The *target* of the article is to analyze the geopolitical significance of Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves in the global security system. The study is

aimed at identifying the role of the country’s uranium resources in international energy and political processes, as well as assessing their impact on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy.

*Objectives* of the article:

To study Kazakhstan’s current uranium reserves and assess their place in the global economy.

- To analyze Kazakhstan’s role in the global uranium market, identify its key partners and competitors.

- To consider Kazakhstan’s participation in international initiatives on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its contribution to global security.

- To assess possible geopolitical risks and prospects associated with the exploitation of uranium resources.

- To develop recommendations for the effective use of uranium reserves to strengthen the country’s foreign policy positions.

Since independence, Kazakhstan has followed a unique path, advancing nuclear disarmament while capitalizing on its uranium resources for economic growth. By hosting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank and actively advocating for nuclear non-proliferation, Kazakhstan has taken a leadership role in promoting global security. The country’s strategic location as a bridge between East and West, coupled with its uranium wealth, makes it a significant play-

er in shaping the future of nuclear diplomacy and energy security. This article examines the geopolitical significance of Kazakhstan's uranium reserves, focusing on their impact on the global security system. It will examine how Kazakhstan's policies contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, energy security, and international diplomacy, highlighting the delicate balance the country maintains on the world stage.

### Theoretical-methodological base

In this part of research authors use geopolitical theory as the main theoretical methodology of the research work, including classical geopolitics (Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Speakman): This theory provides a basic understanding of how geographic factors affect international power dynamics. Mackinder's "Heartland Theory" can be used to explain Kazakhstan's strategic position in Central Asia and its control over important natural resources such as uranium. Also among the classical schools, Neo-realism (Kenneth Waltz): Neo-realism emphasizes the importance of the existence and power of the state in an anarchic international system. Kazakhstan's uranium reserves can be analyzed in terms of national security and how states use natural resources for international influence and protection.

As the main part of foreign policy, we use resource geopolitics, which is often considered nowadays. This theory focuses on how the domestic sphere's control of natural resources, especially important minerals such as uranium, shapes international relations and power balances. Kazakhstan's enormous uranium reserves make it a key player in energy security and nuclear proliferation issues.

*World uranium energy security is being discussed*

Using the theory of energy security allows us to consider how important resources are. This theory focuses on accessibility, affordability and political stability surrounding energy resources. Uranium is essential for nuclear power generation and non-renewable energy sources, which makes Kazakhstan's uranium reserves very relevant in the global debate on energy security and stability.

The following security dilemma (Herbert Butterfield, John Hertz) is important in considering uranium security. The security dilemma suggests that when one state tries to increase its security (for example, by securing uranium for nuclear energy or weapons), it may lead to an arms race or increased tensions with other states. It is related to how coun-

tries view Kazakhstan's uranium reserves and nuclear ambitions.

*International Political Economy (IPE):*

It also helps in analyzing uranium's flow to other countries, especially with regards to their global trade as well as supply chains, and energy and security alliances. Global Commodity Chains (Gary Gereffi): Global Commodity Chain Theory, it's utility in consideration of an analysis on the flow of uranium to countries besides Kazakhstan.

Dependency Theory is the theory which can analyze the developing of Kazakhstan resource-rich state depend all on the foreign markets or on international entities for production and also sale of its uranium. There can be evaluated careful attention on the involvement of multinationals and foreign countries (for example Russia, China and USA) in Kazakhstan's uranium sector. It needs to use a combining of quantitative and qualitative methods as a methodological basis.

*Qualitative Methodology:*

Case Study methods: The research provides a very detailed case study concerning the uranium sector in Kazakhstan that demonstrates this sector's role within the broader global geopolitical field. It examines specific events, policies, and international treaties that signal the geopolitical importance of uranium production in Kazakhstan. Process monitoring: This method is used to monitor how Kazakhstan's uranium reserves have historically influenced its foreign policy and relations with major global powers such as Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union.

*Quantitative analysis:* Collection of Data and Analysis: A statistical analysis of the trends in Kazakhstan's uranium production and exports, as well as its contribution to the global uranium supply chain, could provide insights into the present geopolitical importance of this resource. It would also be beneficial if Kazakhstan's uranium production could be compared with that of important producers such as Canada and Australia in order to develop it.

*Security Indicators:* Employing international security indices, the extent to which the strategic value of uranium coincides with the geopolitical stability and influence of Kazakhstan in its international forums (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UN Security Council), will be measured in the study.

It enables one to comprehend the extent to which the reserves of Kazakhstan differ from those in major uranium-producing nations (like Canada, Australia, Niger etc.) with different geopolitical footprints. On the one side, Kazakhstan has conclusively laid

out before the common on the unique position of the country in terms of geographies, political stability and foreign relations. It will be compared with this study other countries in their roles concerning nuclear non-proliferation agreements like NPT, international sanctions regimes, etc. for one to conclude on Kazakhstan's position in the debate on regional nuclear security in the international arena.

This theoretical-methodological background will help the full consideration of Kazakhstan's uranium reserves as a major geopolitical problem affecting global security, as well as the respective nuclear non-proliferation policy and world energy markets. Thus, integrating geopolitical theory, energy security dimensions, and qualitative and quantitative research methods, the article would make a deep analysis of Kazakhstan's role in global security.

### Literature survey

#### *Geopolitical value of natural resources*

The geopolitical importance of natural resources had been on the table long back in international relations literature. Scholars like Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Speakman have maintained that control over the life resources, particularly energy, is a major determining factor of the geopolitical power (Mackinder, 1904; Speakman, 1942). Current research in resource geopolitics (Klare, 2008) suggests that access to essential mineral types like uranium is increasingly shaping the global security and power architecture. According to Clare (2001), countries that possess these resources may, using them, become dominant actors in international relations with the capacity to influence world politics, shifting the regional and global balance of power. Kazakhstan's huge uranium reserves make it a major player in this field. Kasenova (2010) points out that the country's control of more than 40% of the world's uranium supply gives it an important strategic value in the field of regional and global nuclear energy in Central Asia. Newnham (2012) argues that countries with abundant natural resources, especially important for energy production, often face both economic opportunities and political challenges due to their strategic importance. Kazakhstan's ability to influence the global nuclear energy market makes it a country of growing geopolitical relevance, especially in its relations with major powers such as Russia, China and the United States.

In the context of global security, uranium is a dual-use resource, important for both civilian nuclear power generation and nuclear weapons devel-

opment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and scholars such as Paul (2000) and Sagan (1996) have focused on the non-proliferation aspects of uranium, noting that control of uranium stockpiles is a crucial factor for global nuclear stability. Sagan and Waltz (2003) debate whether the proliferation of nuclear capabilities (through access to uranium) promotes security (through deterrence) or security (through proliferation risks). Kazakhstan's role as a major uranium exporter and its commitment to non-proliferation are central to these discussions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the status of Kazakhstan's nuclear disarmament has been praised in several studies (Spektor, 1994; Kasenova, 2013). The country voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union and established itself as a champion of nuclear disarmament. Kasenova (2014) further explores how Kazakhstan's leadership in nuclear non-proliferation through hosting the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank strengthens its diplomatic standing in global security forums. However, scholars such as Down (2016) warn that Kazakhstan's dependence on uranium exports, especially to nuclear-weapon states, complicates its role as a non-nuclear actor. The emergence of Kazakhstan as the world's largest uranium producer attracted the attention of scientists. According to Blackwill and O'Sullivan (2016), countries with a dominant share of primary energy resources have disproportionate power in shaping global energy policy. This is especially true for nuclear power, where uranium remains the main raw material for energy production. Studies by Luciani (2012) and Victor, Hults, and Thurber (2011) show that uranium-producing countries such as Kazakhstan can use their market position to influence global energy policy, particularly through bilateral agreements with major energy consumers such as China and the European Union.

Karatnitskyi (2011) notes that Kazakhstan's uranium exports are not just economic deals, but diplomatic relations. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which Kazakhstan is a key partner, has promoted energy cooperation between the two countries, especially in the uranium supply chain (Wu & Zhang, 2018). Umbach (2014) also examines the European Union's growing dependence on Kazakhstan for nuclear fuel and suggests that Kazakhstan's uranium reserves are crucial for Europe's energy diversification strategy. In the case of Kazakhstan, studies by Pomfret (2010) and Ohashi (2018) explore how its economic dependence on uranium and other natural resources has shaped its domestic politics and foreign relations.

Despite these risks, Bely (2012) argues that Kazakhstan has effectively used its resource wealth to strengthen its geopolitical influence, particularly through multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Similarly, Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard (2009) point out that Kazakhstan managed to avoid some of the negative effects of the resource curse by diversifying its economy and maintaining political stability. However, they warn that continued dependence on uranium could leave Kazakhstan vulnerable to external shocks, particularly global energy markets.

The geopolitical importance of Kazakhstan in Central Asia is a recurring theme in the literature of regional studies. Cooley (2012) and Laruelle (2018) emphasize Kazakhstan's role as a stabilizing force in the region, often using natural resources to maintain influence over neighboring countries. Kazakhstan's uranium reserves, in particular, give it considerable diplomatic leverage over other Central Asian republics, many of which rely on Kazakhstan for energy supplies and infrastructure. Spechler (2009) also notes the importance of Kazakhstan's uranium in its relations with major powers such as Russia and China, noting that the country's ability to balance these relations is critical to its regional leadership.


Kazakhstan's cooperation with Russia in the nuclear sector through the cooperation of Kazatomprom and Rosatom is often discussed in academic and political literature (Baev, 2013). This partner-

ship reflects a broader trend of resource-based diplomacy in which Kazakhstan uses its uranium reserves to secure favorable political and economic terms from its neighbors.

## Results and discussions

Kazakhstan is a major global supplier of uranium, holding the second-largest proven reserves in the world. About 14% of the total known uranium resources in the world are located in the territory of Kazakhstan. Explored uranium resources in the country are estimated to exceed 700,000 tons (ME RK 2024).

Kazakhstan has 12% of the world's uranium reserves and produced about 21100 tons of U in 2023. In 2009 it became the world's largest producer of uranium, with almost 28% of global production. In 2022 Kazakhstan produces 43% of world's uranium. A single Russian nuclear reactor operated from 1972 to 1999, producing electricity and desalination of water. Kazakhstan has a large plant to produce nuclear fuels pellets and eventually aims to sell value-added fuels instead of uranium alone. A fuel plant is being built with 49% Chinese capital. The country plans to build a new nuclear power plant, with referendum expected in 2024. The National Atomic Corporation of Kazakhstan, emphasizing its central role in uranium exploration and exploitation and other nuclear activities.



Source: Composed by authors

**Diagram 1** – Uranium production of countries

As mentioned, Kazakhstan had the highest uranium production in the world in 2022. In fact, the country's total production of 21,277 tonnes represents 46 percent of the world's uranium supply. At the last record in 2021, Kazakhstan had 815,200 tonnes of recoverable uranium resources, second only to Australia. Most of the country's uranium is mined through the insitu leaching method. Kazatprom (LSE:KAP, OTC Pink: NATKY), the country's national uranium mining company, is the world's largest producer, with projects and partnerships in several jurisdictions. The announcement that the largest uranium producer may not meet its production plans for 2024 and 2025 was a major reason why uranium prices surpassed the US\$100 mark this year (World Nuclear Association, 2024). According to GlobalData, Kazakhstan will become the world's largest uranium producer in 2023, with production falling 5.13% compared to 2022, 9% between 2023 and 2027 (GlobalData2024).

There are three vital aspects of the analysis: the formation and control of Kazatprom, the legal dispute with a Canadian company, and its partial privatization.

- *Control and Changing*: Kazatprom was established in 1997 by the Kazakh government, which still owns it. As such, the company monopolizes uranium exploration and mining in the country, while it also handles nuclear material imports and exports. This directly reflects the control that Kazakhstan wishes to exercise over its enormous uranium resources. There are both constitute a backbone to the economy and also represent a geopolitical element

for Kazakhstan as the leading processor of uranium in the world.

- *Legal Dispute with World-Wide Minerals (WWM)*: There had been prior deals regarding uranium development by Kazakhstan with foreign companies, including WWM which was Canadian-based. WWM had made considerable investments in upgrading and operating uranium facilities in Stepnogorsk and had developed new mines during the mid-1990s. The company later complained that the Kazakh government was blocking its operations resulting in losses of over \$50 million. This resulted in a dispute attracting investor-state arbitration where WWM won initially in 2019 but later, the award was set aside by the English High Court in 2020. The case illustrates the risks that foreign investors are likely to face when operating in resource-rich countries such as Kazakhstan, where government decisions can highly determine the investment outcome.

- *Partial privatization*: Kazatprom transformed from a wholly state-owned into a partially privatized enterprise in 2018. This included listing 15% of its shares at the Astana International Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. The action indicates the intention of Kazakhstan to draw in international investment and to modernize state companies while keeping the strategic control by majority ownership from the national wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, over its nuclear assets. This partial privatization sets the larger trends towards such movement in the post-Soviet economy, with the policies that have been put forth in search of balancing between the states and market-based reforms (Baev, P.2013).

**Table 1** – Kazatprom's International Collaborations

| Country            | Collaborations                                                         | Key Agreements & Projects                                                 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Russia</b>      | Joint ventures in nuclear reactors, uranium production, and enrichment | JV Atomniye Stantsii for reactors (VBER-300)                              |
|                    |                                                                        | Enrichment plant at Angarsk (Kazatprom owns 10%)                          |
|                    |                                                                        | Uranium mining (Budenovskoye, Zarechnoye, Akbastau, Karatau)              |
|                    |                                                                        | 2014 agreement for a nuclear power plant with VVER reactors               |
| <b>Japan</b>       | Uranium supply, fuel cycle technology, and nuclear reactor development | 2007 energy cooperation agreements                                        |
|                    |                                                                        | Japanese involvement in Kharasan mine (Energy Asia consortium)            |
|                    |                                                                        | Ulba fuel fabrication plant upgrade and nuclear energy R&D collaborations |
| <b>China</b>       | Strategic cooperation in uranium mining and nuclear fuel supply        | 2006 agreement with CGN (uranium supply and nuclear fuel fabrication)     |
|                    |                                                                        | 2015 agreement for Ulba-FA fuel fabrication plant (completed in 2020)     |
| <b>India</b>       | Uranium supply                                                         | 2009 agreement to supply 2100 tonnes of uranium                           |
|                    |                                                                        | 2015 agreement to supply 5000 tU over 5 years                             |
| <b>South Korea</b> | Nuclear power and uranium mining cooperation                           | 2010 agreement for uranium exports and potential nuclear reactor projects |

Continuation of the table

| Country               | Collaborations                                               | Key Agreements & Projects                                                                         |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Toshiba</b>        | Corporate collaboration on nuclear energy institute          | 2007 purchase of 10% share in Westinghouse (sold back in 2017)                                    |
| <b>Canada</b>         | Uranium production and fuel cycle developments               | 2007 Cameco partnership (Inkai mine)                                                              |
|                       |                                                              | 2016 restructuring of Inkai JV                                                                    |
| <b>USA</b>            | Marketing alliances and nuclear security                     | 2015 agreement with Centrus Energy for uranium marketing in the USA                               |
| <b>France (Areva)</b> | Uranium mining, fuel fabrication, and fuel cycle development | Expansion of Katco JV (from 1500 tU to 4000 tU/year)                                              |
|                       |                                                              | Joint venture for a 400 t/yr fuel fabrication plant at Ulba                                       |
| <b>Iran</b>           | Uranium supply                                               | In 2017 contract to supply 950 t of uranium concentrate (subject to UN Security council approval) |

Source: Composed by authors

This table summarizes Kazatomprom's international partnerships, emphasizing nuclear collaboration, uranium supply, and fuel cycle developments with major global players like Russia, Japan, China, and others.

*Kazatomprom's Trading Subsidiary and Market Strategy:*

- In April 2017, Kazatomprom established a Swiss-based subsidiary, TH Kazatkom, to engage in uranium trading on the spot market. The subsidiary aims to enhance market liquidity and align its pricing strategies with customer preferences, particularly targeting the European and U.S. markets.

Trans – Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR):

- The TCITR was introduced in 2018 as an alternative to routes passing through Russia, due to temporary restrictions in St. Petersburg during the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

- This route avoids Russian territory and operates via Azerbaijan and Georgia, adhering to local nuclear transit regulations.

- In early 2022, Cameco suspended uranium shipments reliant on Russian transit routes, emphasizing the importance of alternative pathways.

First Shipment via TCITR:

- In September 2022, Kazatomprom successfully transported uranium to Cameco using the TCITR for delivery to Canada.

- This consignment cleared and arrived in Canada by December 2022 – a significant further proof of how well the alternative route works.

The following table presents the essential changes made by Kazatomprom in its uranium trading: it's the geographical and geopolitical adaptation of the company's strategic actions. Such research shows that indeed Kazakhstan's strategic alliances go beyond merely economic and industrial cooperation but also reflect some diplomatic position.

Table 2 – Summary uranium cooperation

| Year                  | Advancement                                        | Characteristics                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>2017</b>           | The new establishment of TH Kazatom                | The new establishment of TH Kazatom is designed with the purpose of setting up a trading subsidiary in Zurich, Switzerland, in order to enhance liquidity by price-points more aligned to European and US customers. |
| <b>2018</b>           | Trans-Caspian International Shipping Route (TCITR) | Trans-Caspian International Shipping Route (TCITR)<br>Construed as an alternate to Russian routes during the FIFA World Cup, the route passes through Azerbaijan and Georgia.                                        |
| <b>2022</b>           | Cameco Stops Deliveries via Russian Route          | Cameco Stops Deliveries via Russian Route<br>cameco suspends the delivery of goods through Russian transit routes while seeking alternative routes for delivery.                                                     |
| <b>2022 (Sep-Dec)</b> | First Uranium Delivery via the TCITR               | First Uranium Delivery via the TCITR, Successful uranium transfer to Canada through the TCITR.                                                                                                                       |

Source: Composed by authors

As a premier supplier to both the West and the East, Kazakhstan crosses the contours of great power rivalries, particularly that between the United States and China and Russia. This flexibility underscores the country's strategic position as a neutral but highly influential actor in the world security landscape.

#### ***Diversification of export routes: mitigating geopolitical risk***

The analysis describes that Kazakhstan strategically diversified its pathways for uranium export to conquer geopolitical risk. One of these illusions is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR), which lies outside the purview of Russian territory. This alternative corridor would allow Kazakhstan's uranium exports to proceed even when there are political problems, sanctions against Russia, or both; by Using TCITR to transport uranium to Canada for Cameco, Kazakhstan showed its agility in coping with changing geopolitical realities (World Nuclear Association, 2023). Diversification could weaken a country's susceptibility to such interruptions due to trade or any form of economic sanction while providing adequate uranium supply to sustain a steady stream of supply, ultimately consolidating Kazakhstan's role as a key player in the international nuclear security arena.

#### ***Kazakhstan's vital Role in Contributing Towards Global Non-Proliferation Initiatives***

On account of being one among the major uranium-exporting countries. Kazakhstan stands as one crucial global nuclear non-proliferation state. This country provides the territory for the established Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2024): Kazakhstan is therefore in the vanguard of leadership-upon the advancement of nuclear safety and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Also, an LEU bank provides a secure and internationally-monitored supply of uranium for peaceful nuclear energy undertaking states, thereby minimizing the necessity for countries to develop uranium enrichment capacities that might be diverted into weapons production. Thus, it simultaneously shows Kazakhstan's position as an indispensable supplier of important nuclear resources and a proponent for nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, through the economic appetites and dedication to global progress, this gets Kazakhstan a valuable geopolitical advantage at the regional and international levels.

#### ***Geopolitical Implications on Energy Security***

The abundant uranium reserves of Kazakhstan repeat the same roles of energy security for nations within the region and the wider scheme of energy stability in the world at large. With the adoption of low-carbon energy alternatives, nuclear energy has become necessary for the global strategy to mitigate the effects of climate change. Kazakhstan uranium deposits are integral to nuclear power plants worldwide thus, becoming a key actor in shaping the future global agenda on energy. Studies indicate that Kazakhstan's success in such supplies will be imperative in the years to come, especially as global geopolitical conflicts loom over competition for energy resources. Kazakhstan's strategic position in the nuclear energy supply chain provides it with a degree of leverage in international affairs and more power to influence energy policies and engage in deeper geopolitical dialogues (Kazakhstan's Uranium Diplomacy, The Diplomat, 2023).

Director, Ms. Helen Smith, for International Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyz Republic. Delivering his remarks during the 'Building energy geopolitics in CAREC region' discussion.

Kazakhstan, therefore, is in history now, as it approved the establishment of a nuclear power plant according to the final results of the Central Referendum Commission: indeed, for the nation, it is a crucial event in its energy policy. The votes' conduct towards the proposal reveals that 71.12 percent of the people's vote supports it; therefore, the referendum will go down as evidence that the government is committed to this ambitious energy project. Indeed, the national vote on October 6 asked whether the people agree to the establishment of a nuclear facility in the country.

The main purpose of the government government is to keep a stable and sustainable energy supply, causing diminished reliance on coal and imported electricity. Nuclear energy is considered an elemental diversification of renewable sources. Another important point is that such a nuclear plant must boost economic growth since it will create jobs and will be benefit to the economy during construction and its operation.

Nuclear-rich Kazakhstan can immensely involve the whole world in acquiring the technical know-how of nuclear accidents and the challenges faced in managing radioactive waste. Kazakhstan's history as a site of Soviet-era environmental testing and atmospheric nuclear bomb testing only compounds

these fears. Besides, the geopolitical implications are considerable. Firstly, Kazakhstan is strengthening ties with Russia through the role of Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear agency. One might ask, what are the implications for Kazakhstan's autonomy and geopolitical strategy in balancing relations with its powerful neighbour?

Although the project was backed overwhelmingly in the referendum it faces many challenges. Public opinion is still divided, and many citizens are anxious about the safety and environmental effects of nuclear energy. Building and operating such a facility is an inherent hurdle to the other financing required, particularly in the global economic uncertainty prevailing today.

Apart from this, Kazakhstan has sufficient reserves of uranium, but there is no domestic know-how to begin developing nuclear power independently. The much-needed dependency on other partners, more so Russia, may compromise the independence of the state while enhancing the geopolitical risks. It will also mean a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure safety and security, which will require substantial investment in infrastructure and skilled personnel.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan's decision to pursue nuclear energy holds both great promise and notable risks. The government must thoroughly address these factors, ensuring the projects adheres to the highest standards of safety, environmental protection, and geopolitical stability. International collaboration and strong regulatory measures will be critical for the long-term success of this initiative.

## Conclusion

Hence, the role of Kazakhstan as a global leader in uranium supply is indispensable, not merely in economic terms, but as well for global nuclear security and energy stability. With reserves of uranium that are the second largest proven reserves in the world and a major contributor in terms of global production, also Kazakhstan has a significant part to play in the nuclear energy supply chain, which in addition becomes acuter in the war against cli-

mate change. Part of Kazakhstan's diversification routes for export is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, a demonstration of the country's proactive measures against geopolitical risks. In this case, Kazakhstan is very much closer to European and Asian markets and is becoming a strong regional transit hub. Besides, Kazakhstan's actions toward non-proliferation, such as the setting up of the Low Enriched Uranium Bank, give it an additional collective geopolitical value. The facility itself covers the safe supply of nuclear fuel to countries while showcasing Kazakhstan as a leader in responsible nuclear governance. All these are in line with international initiatives toward the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their peaceful use in technology. Reasonably, the recent approvals for nuclear power plants are bold steps in the making for sustainable energy futures, even if in the short run they might be overshadowed by the environmental and security concerns raised by nuclear energy itself. However, as Kazakhstan strides toward this ambitious agenda, it also needs to ensure high safety standards for it and invest in cutting-edge technology to mitigate the risks that arise. It is very obedient to balance these issues with the economic and technological benefits as Kazakhstan develops links with Russia, China, and Western countries concerning this initiative. With the increasing global demand for clean energy, Kazakhstan's uranium production will gain greater interest in the energy transition. Kazakhstan has the option not only to supply uranium but also work together with other countries on developing nuclear technology and infrastructures.

Kazakhstan will improve its stature internationally by positioning itself as a center of nuclear innovation and education. In the future, Kazakhstan's reputation as a world's top uranium supplier will define its domestic politics as well as determine how it will be taken into account in global energy strategies. Economic interests will depend on a balance between international relations and environmental factors, which will determine Kazakhstan's future as it attempts to harness its much-loved natural resources into a secure and sustainable global energy landscape.

## References

- Baev, P. (2013). Kazakhstan's nuclear cooperation with Russia: A resource-based diplomacy. *International Affairs Review*, 45-67.
- Bely, I. (2012). Kazakhstan's resource wealth and geopolitical influence. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 123-145.
- Blackwill, R., & O'Sullivan, M. (2016). The geopolitics of natural resources: Kazakhstan's strategic position. *Harvard Kennedy School Discussion Paper*, 1-28.

- Clare, A. (2001). Natural resources and the global balance of power. *Global Affairs*, 89-112.
- Cooley, A. (2012). Great power rivalry in Central Asia: Kazakhstan's strategic positioning. *Journal of International Relations*, 34-58.
- Down, A. (2016). Nuclear dependencies: Kazakhstan's role in global non-proliferation. *Central Asian Survey*, 210-225.
- IAEA. (2024). Low enriched uranium bank: Kazakhstan's commitment to non-proliferation. *International Atomic Energy Agency Report*, 15-30.
- Karatnitskyi, S. (2011). Kazakhstan's uranium exports: Beyond economics. *Asia Europe Journal*, 74-88.
- Klare, M. (2008). The resource curse: A geopolitical analysis. *New Left Review*, 23-45.
- Kalyuzhnova, Y., & Nygaard, C. (2009). Kazakhstan: Diversifying away from the resource curse. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 140-165.
- Kasenova, A. (2010). Uranium in Kazakhstan: A geopolitical asset. *Eurasian Economic Review*, 99-120.
- Kasenova, A. (2013). Kazakhstan's nuclear disarmament and its global standing. *International Security Studies*, 7-22.
- Kasenova, A. (2014). Kazakhstan as a leader in nuclear non-proliferation. *Nuclear Policy Journal*, 33-50.
- Laruelle, M. (2018). Kazakhstan's role in Central Asian stability. *Central Asian Affairs*, 56-78.
- Luciani, G. (2012). Energy resources and geopolitical strategies: The case of Kazakhstan. *Middle East Journal*, 44-60.
- Mackinder, H. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. *The Geographical Journal*, 421-437.
- ME RK. (2024). Kazakhstan's uranium resource assessment. *Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 5-20.
- Newnham, J. (2012). The political economy of natural resources: Kazakhstan's challenges. *Journal of Resource Economics*, 77-94.
- Ohashi, K. (2018). Natural resource management in Kazakhstan: The role of uranium. *Resource Policy*, 118-132.
- Paul, T. (2000). The non-proliferation treaty: Current issues and future prospects. *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review*, 33-56.
- Pomfret, R. (2010). Kazakhstan's economic dependence on natural resources. *Post-Soviet Economies*, 15-30.
- Sagan, S. (1996). The perils of proliferation: Organization, collective action, and the non-proliferation treaty. *International Security*, 86-112.
- Sagan, S., & Waltz, K. (2003). The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate renewed. *W.W. Norton & Company*, 3-25.
- Speakman, N. (1942). Energy resources and global strategy. *Journal of International Affairs*, 12-29.
- Spechler, D. (2009). Kazakhstan's geopolitical balancing act. *Journal of Central Asian Studies*, 145-160.
- Umbach, F. (2014). Energy security in Europe: Kazakhstan's role. *European Energy Journal*, 50-66.
- Victor, D., Hults, D., & Thurber, M. (2011). Resource management and global energy policy: Kazakhstan's position. *Energy Policy*, 105-120.
- Wu, X., & Zhang, Y. (2018). China's Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for Kazakhstan's energy sector. *China Quarterly*, 233-250.
- World Nuclear Association. (2024). World uranium mining production. *World Nuclear Association Report*, 22-38.

#### **Information about authors:**

*Tumanshiyev Darkhan – 3<sup>rd</sup> year PhD student at the Faculty of International relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: tumanshiyev.darkhan@gmail.com)*

*Issova Laura (corresponding author) – Candidate of historical science, Associate Professor, Faculty of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Kazakhstan, Almaty, e-mail: tanirbergenlaura@gmail.com)*

*Abduali Madina – 1st year PhD student at the Faculty of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: abdualimadina5@gmail.com)*

#### **Авторлар туралы ақпарат:**

*Туманишев Дархан – Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің халықаралық қатынастар факультетінің 3-курс докторанты (Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail: tumanshiyev.darkhan@gmail.com)*

*Исова Лаура (корреспондент автор) – тарих ғылымдарының кандидаты, Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің халықаралық қатынастар факультетінің доценті (Қазақстан, Алматы, e-mail: tanirbergenlaura@gmail.com)*

*Абдуали Мадина – Әл-Фараби атындағы қазақ Ұлттық Университетінің Халықаралық қатынастар факультетінің 1-курс докторанты (Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail: abdualimadina5@gmail.com)*

#### **Информация об авторах:**

*Туманишев Дархан – докторант 3-курса факультета международных отношений Казахского национального университета имени аль-Фараби (Алматы, Казахстан, e-mail: tumanshiyev.darkhan@gmail.com)*

*Исова Лаура (корреспондентный автор) – кандидат исторических наук, доцент факультета международных отношений Казахского национального университета имени аль-Фараби (Казахстан, Алматы, e-mail: tanirbergenlaura@gmail.com)*

*Абдуали Мадина – докторант 1-курса факультета международных отношений Казахского Национального университета имени Аль-Фараби (Алматы, Казахстан, e-mail: abdualimadina5@gmail.com)*

*Previously sent September 27, 2024.*

*Re-registered October 30, 2024.*

*Accepted December 3, 2024.*

**G.B. Zhumatay\*** , **A.S. Yskak** 

Narxoz University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: gabit.zhumatay@narxoz.kz

## KEY DISCOURSES OF TURKISH EURASIANISM AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

The paper sheds light on Turkish Eurasianism (Avrasyacılık), identifying various versions and traditions of Eurasianism in Turkey. Analyzing conceptual, theoretical, and ideological underpinnings of different varieties of Turkish Eurasianism, we will look into how they affect Turkey's foreign policy course, especially in steering the country away from the conventional unidimensional pro-Western orientation and shifting it towards greater Eurasia through building a strategic alliance with states in Eurasia. The results of our research have shown that all varieties of Turkish Eurasianism to a certain extent are anti-imperialist, anti-Western and counter-hegemonic discourses, which place greater emphasis upon Turkey's strategic independence from the West and its shift towards Eurasia. Yet it has been also revealed that despite their forceful advocacy for a deep paradigm shift and foreign policy change by reorienting from pro-Western to pro-Eurasian policy, as political forces Turkish Eurasianists are not powerful and their influence in informing and guiding Turkish foreign policy is rather marginal and limited. It is evident that despite the ruling AKP and its leaders occasionally ally themselves with Turkish Eurasianists, Turkey's foreign policy is based on realism and pragmatism, rather than sentimentalism and ideology. From this standpoint, it would be premature to talk about the Turkish disengagement from the West and its pivot to Eurasia, as Ankara's security and foreign policy are closely intertwined with the West and deeply embedded within the Western security system.

**Key words:** turkish eurasianism, kemalism, nationalism, neo-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, islamism, Turkey, West, Eurasia.

Ғ.Б. Жұматай\*, А.С. Ысқақ

Нархоз Университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: gabit.zhumatay@narxoz.edu

### Түрік еуразияшылдығының негізгі дискурстары және олардың Түркияның сыртқы саясатына ықпалы

Бұл мақалада түрік еуразияшылдығының (Avrasyacılık) түрлі нұсқалары мен дәстүрлерінің саяси және идеологиялық мәні ашылып көрсетіледі. Түрік еуразияшылдығының концептуалдық, теориялық және идеологиялық негіздерін талдай отырып, біз олардың Түркияның сыртқы саясатына қаншалықты ықпал ететінін ашып көрсетеміз. Түрік еуразияшылдары Түркияның Батыспен ара қатынасын үзіп, Еуразия құрлығындағы елдермен одақтасуына басымдық береді. Зерттеудің нәтижелері түрік еуразияшылдығының барлық түрлері белгілі бір дәрежеде антиимпериалистік, Батысқа қарсы бағытталған анти-гегемониялық дискурстар екенін көрсетті. Олардың барлығы Түркияның сыртқы саясаттағы стратегиялық дербестігіне және Еуразияға қарай ойысуына басымдық береді. Бұған қоса түрік еуразияшылдарының елдің сыртқы саясатында терең парадигмалық өзгерістерді талап еткеніне қарамастан, олардың жеткілікті ықпалға ие емес екені, сондай-ақ олардың Түркияның сыртқы саясатына ықпалының айтарлықтай шектеулі екені айқындалды. Биліктегі Әділет және даму партиясының (АК партия) және оның жетекшілерінің түрік еуразияшылдарымен одақ құруына қарамастан, Түркияның сыртқы саясаты сентиментализм мен идеологияға емес, ең алдымен реализм мен прагматизмге негізделгені анықталды. Осы тұрғыдан келгенде, Түркияның Батыстан біржолата алшақтауы мен оның Еуразияға бағытына қарай толық ойысуы туралы тұжырым жасау тым ерте, өйткені Анкараның қауіпсіздігі мен сыртқы саясаты Батыспен етене тығыз байланысты.

**Түйін сөздер:** түрік еуразияшылдығы, кемализм, ұлтшылдық, неоосманизм, пантүркизм, исламшылдық, Түркия, Батыс, Еуразия.

Ғ.Б. Жұматай\*, А.С. Ысқақ  
Университет Нархоз, г. Алматы, Казахстан  
\*e-mail: gabit.zhumatay@narхоз.edu

### Основные дискурсы турецкого евразийства и их влияние на внешнюю политику Турции

В статье рассматривается турецкое евразийство (Avrasyacılık) и выявляются различные версии и традиции евразийства в Турции. На основе анализа концептуальных, теоретических и идеологических основ различных вариантов турецкого евразийства выявлены их влияние на внешнеполитический курс Турции в контексте отхода страны от традиционной одно векторной прозападной ориентации и смещения ее в сторону Евразии, путем образования стратегического союза с государствами Евразии. Результат исследования показал, что все разновидности турецкого евразийства в определенной степени антиимпериалистические, антизападные и контр-гегемонистские дискурсы, в которых основной упор делается на стратегическую независимость Турции от Запада и ее сдвиг в сторону Евразии. Также выяснилось, что, несмотря на их решительную борьбу глубокой смены парадигмы и изменения внешней политики путем переориентации с прозападной на проевразийскую политику, турецкие евразийцы как политические силы не являются достаточно влиятельными, и их влияние на внешнюю политику Турции достаточно ограничено. Очевидно, несмотря на это, правящая ПСР и ее лидеры время от времени вступают в союз с турецкими евразийцами. Тем не менее, внешняя политика Турции основана на реализме и прагматизме, а не на сентиментализме и идеологии. С этой точки зрения было бы преждевременно полагать об отходе Турции от Запада и ее переориентации к Евразии, поскольку безопасность и внешняя политика Анкары тесно переплетены с Западом и глубоко укоренены в западной системе безопасности.

**Ключевые слова:** турецкое евразийство, кемализм, национализм, неоосманизм, пантюркизм, исламизм, Турция, Запад, Евразия.

### Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the outset of a new global order Turkey's traditional unidimensional Western security and foreign policy experienced a deep crisis. Turkish intellectuals, political and military figures as well as diverse political groups have engaged in heated debates and discussions about defining and designing a new foreign policy course for Turkey. A central question in these debates has been an issue of gaining strategic autonomy for Turkey from the West in dealing with its own security concerns and foreign policy issues. The end of the Cold War and emergence of a new balance of power in Eurasia prompted a deep paradigm shift in Turkey's foreign policy, which induced Turkey to pursue a more ambitious foreign policy with greater autonomy. Previously, Turkey had been considered the Western frontier in the Middle East, yet this social construct collapsed during the 1980s and 1990s. This paradigm shift opened up borders, providing opportunities for Turkey to extend its influence over regions of Eurasia that had been beyond its reach before. Policy debates in Turkey showed the need to move from the conventional unidimensional pro-Western foreign policy during the Cold War to more independent multidimensional foreign policy (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014). The collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of sovereign Turkic states in

its ruins provided Turkey with the opportunity to expand its outreach into the untapped regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus. A remerged discourse of pan-Turkism informed and guided Turgut Özal's new multidimensional foreign policy agenda, who dreamed of a Turkey stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. This policy was informed by Turkish Eurasianism (Balci & Liles, 2018, p. 13; Landau 1995; Tüysüzoğlu, 2014, p. 97).

Turkish Eurasianism has been behind a profound foreign policy shift from pro-Western orientation to Eurasian pivot. The emergence and evolution of Turkish Eurasianism has been increasingly influenced by Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, pan-Turanism, and Islamism (Tufekci, 2017a). That is why, Turkish Eurasianism is not a homogeneous monolithic rigid perspective, rather it is a heterogeneous fluid paradigm, consisting of multiple diverse traditions and versions. Turkish Eurasianism was at the center of intellectual and political debate on foreign policy in Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s when Turkey redefined its role in international relations as a 'bridge' between the West and the East and as a 'central country' linking three continents (Tanrisever, 2018). Moreover, strategic autonomy in Turkey's foreign policy from the West and the quest for expanding Turkish influence into untapped areas of Eurasia through building strategic alliances with Eurasian countries lie at the core

of Turkish Eurasianism. Turkish Eurasianism is first and foremost a nationalist discourse that places Turkey at the center of regional and global politics as a 'middle power'. Therefore, the current study seeks to investigate Turkish Eurasianism and identify its various versions and traditions. Besides, the paper analyzes conceptual, theoretical, and ideological underpinnings of different versions of Turkish Eurasianism, looking into how they affect Turkey's foreign policy course, especially in steering the country away from the conventional unidimensional pro-Western orientation and shifting it towards greater Eurasia through building a strategic alliance with Russia, China, Iran, the Turkic republics, and other states in Eurasia.

### Materials and methods

With the goal to shed light on Turkish Eurasianism, this article seeks to examine various versions and traditions of Eurasianism in Turkey, analyzing conceptual, theoretical, and ideological underpinnings of different varieties of Turkish Eurasianism, and looking into how they affect Turkey's foreign policy. In undertaking this study, we have engaged in critical analysis of the relevant literature pertaining to the research problem, specifically we have critically analyzed studies written in English and Turkish. We have reviewed a variety of relevant sources and materials pertaining to our study, in particular we have thoroughly scrutinized data from online media, reports produced by leading analytical centers, research papers and studies of Turkish and other foreign scholars. The data collected for our study provides rich, overlapping, and conflicting information with respect to the research problem. That is why, we have been aware that a critical interrogation and in-depth analysis is essential in terms of what relevant and reliable information the data can provide, whether we have missed important context, theoretical and conceptual aspects of the research problem. Hence, while interpreting and analyzing the collected data, we have ensured that the data is reliable and relevant to our study and can provide sufficient information that helps us to find answers to the research questions.

The methodology of our study is qualitative because our study employs a historical-comparative and discourse analysis to examine Turkish Eurasianism, its emergence, evolution, and development, as well as its various versions and their ideological underpinnings. A historical-comparative and discourse analysis is a powerful tool that helps us identify and critically analyze the historical roots of Turkish Eur-

asianism, its rise and spread in the 1980s-1990s in Turkey. Besides, this analytical tool allows us to understand why and how Turkish Eurasianism and its offshoots have been produced, reproduced, and reinforced in Turkish intellectual and political circles. Through deploying this analytical tool, we could ascertain the root cause of why such a powerful ideology came into being and what were the driving forces behind Turkish Eurasianism. Thus, we have come to the conclusion that the reason behind the genesis of Turkish Eurasianism was a response of Turkish society to the challenges and transformations resulted from the end of the Cold War and search for a new foreign policy approach that would empower Turkey to play a central role in a new global order. By using a historical-comparative and discourse analysis we have revealed that Turkish nationalism and anti-Western sentiment lie at the core of Turkish Eurasianism. In addition, Turkish Eurasianism is informed and shaped by neo-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, pan-Turanism, and Islamism. Furthermore, we have closely examined the existing gap between theory and practice in terms of to what extent Turkish Eurasianism affects and shapes Turkey's foreign policy trajectories. It has been identified that even though Turkish Eurasianism is a powerful political discourse, Turkey strongly adheres to pragmatic and realist approaches in its foreign policy and in dealing with international issues. From this perspective, our study seeks to answer the following questions: a) Why has Turkish Eurasianism come into being? b) What are ideological underpinnings of Eurasianist discourses in Turkey and how do they affect foreign policy of Ankara?

### Literature review

There has been much scholarly analysis of Turkish Eurasianism, its various discourses, ideological underpinnings, and how Eurasianism has affected Turkey's foreign policy (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009; Çolakoğlu, 2019; Erşen, 2019, 2022; Kınıklioğlu, 2022; Perinçek, 2012; Tanrısever, 2018; Tüfekçi, 2017a, 2017b; Tüysüzoğlu, 2014, 2021, 2023; Yavuz, 2022). Turkish Eurasianism is a relatively new geopolitical and foreign policy discourse that emerged in Turkish intellectual circles as a response to the new challenges caused by the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Turkish Eurasianism appeared as a response to the overdependence of Turkey on the West in terms of ensuring security reflected in the hegemonic Kemalist ideology. Colakoğlu (2019) claims that Turkish Eurasianism ideologically is close to Ba'athism in the Arab world. The central

idea of Turkish Eurasianism lies in the demand that Turkey ought to abandon the West as its interests lie outside the West and are closely intertwined with Eurasia. In this regard, Turkey is perceived by Turkish Eurasianists as a Eurasian country, belonging to a Eurasian civilization (Perinçek, 2012). Brzezinski (1997) considers areas encompassing Turkey, the Middle East, and Central Asia to be part of Eurasia, to which he referred as the Eurasian Balkans. Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" has been linked to 'neo-Ottomanism' and 'Turkish Eurasianism' (Davutoğlu, 2001). Tüysüzoğlu (2014) highlights that Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" is a conceptual amalgamation of neo-Ottomanism and Turkish Eurasianism, or it is an attempt to connect Ottoman geography to Turkish Eurasianist thought.

Turkish Eurasianists seek to divorce Turkey from the West and incorporate it into Eurasia because Eurasian powers position themselves as powerful centers to challenge the US-led global order (Gürçan, 2021). Therefore, anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism lie at the core of Turkish Eurasianism because Turkish Eurasianists are convinced that Atlanticism as the ideology of the West and NATO is no longer confined within the Euro-Atlantic area, rather it is embarking on a quest for the global domination and the subjugation of the countries of the Global South (Gürçan, 2013). That is why, increasingly felt threatened by the Western imperialism, Turkish Eurasianists advocate a foreign policy shift to Eurasia (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022). Tüysüzoğlu (2014) indicates three key dimensions of Turkish Eurasianism. First, leftist, and socialist Eurasianism places greater importance on close collaboration with Eurasian powers such as Russia and China in countering Western imperialism. Second dimension of Turkish Eurasianism is dominated by nationalist political groups and figures. Third dimension of Turkish Eurasianism is led by conservatives who focus on close cooperation with the Muslim nations of the Middle East. Nonetheless, studies highlight that Eurasianism is invoked by Turkish policymakers when it is necessary and hence Turkey's foreign policy is based on pragmatism and realism (Tüysüzoğlu, 2021, 2023). In fact, although Turkey uses Eurasianism as a foreign policy tool when it suits its interests, Ankara does not change its strategic alliance with the West (Tüysüzoğlu, 2021).

## Results and Discussion

### *The rise of Turkish Eurasianism*

Since the establishment of Turkey in 1923 Turkey's involvement in international politics has been

within the Western Transatlantic security system where Turkey had very limited autonomy in its foreign policy. For a long time, Turkey's domestic and foreign policy developments and trajectories have been informed and guided by the Kemalist ideology mostly oriented towards the West. Kemalism has stirred the nation in the Western direction. In Turkey Kemalism is a modernist state ideology underpinned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's political thought and views. It became an official state ideology of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 in the aftermath of the Turkish liberation war waged against invading European powers and their proxies such as Greece. Kemalism was designed to transform post-Ottoman Turkey into a modern advanced society based on six key principles such as republicanism, secularism, statism, revolutionism, populism and nationalism (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 551). Although Kemalism has remained the official state ideology since 1923, with time passing under deep transformations and deep paradigm shifts in Turkey during the 1980s-1990s such as neoliberal globalization facilitated by the IMF and massive privatization, Kemalism was challenged and undermined. Its further erosion has been induced by the resurgence of Islam and ethnic separatism represented by Kurdish struggle for national self-determination, which threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Turkish state. These challenges and transformations have particularly eroded the Kemalist principles of populism, revolutionism, and statism (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 551).

Furthermore, this turbulent and volatile period coincided with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, which caused tremendous paradigm shifts in the conventional deep-seated Cold War security and strategic thinking and discourses. During the Cold War Turkey's national security and foreign policy were closely embedded within the Western Transatlantic security systems, Turkey being part of the American-led NATO. With the advent of the post-Cold War era the strategic significance of Turkey as Western outpost and frontier in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East has eroded, which pushed Turkish policymakers to search for alternative foreign policy and security strategies to play decisive role within the Western security arrangements as well as regional and global politics. The genesis of a new world order and structural changes in the Western approaches to international politics in the 1990s caused certain frictions, and crises in Turkish-Western relations, forcing Turkey to look for autonomy in its foreign policy and alternative geographical areas for its geopoliti-

cal and geo-economic maneuvers (Yavuz, 2022). Turkish quest for autonomy and greater engagement in international politics induced paradigm shifts in Turkey from the hegemonic pro-Western Kemalist perspective to alternative foreign policy approaches. In the process of searching for alternative strategies to diversify its unidimensional Western foreign policy Turkish political circles proposed multidimensional foreign policy, including Eurasianism as a new approach to deal with the challenges presented by a new international environment. Moreover, in the post-Cold War era the US and European policies towards Turkey's neighborhoods such as Iraq, Syria, and the whole Middle East have mostly been at odds with Turkish national interests. The US unilateral actions in the Middle East have irritated and angered Turkish intellectuals and politicians who have been forced to pivot to Eurasia.

Tufekci identifies four key political ideologies that have been dominant since the late 1980s in Turkey such as neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Turanism (2017a, p. 96). In his view, these ideologies have been essential in Turkish political thought, shaping and affecting the discourse of Turkish Eurasianism (Tufekci, 2017a). Thus, the rise and development of Turkish Eurasianism has been facilitated by these four major discourses in the Turkish political environment. The discourse of Eurasianism became part of mainstream debate on foreign policy in Turkey in the 1990s when Turkey redefined its role as a 'bridge' between the West and the East (Tanrısever, 2018, p. 20).

It is true that Eurasianism originated in Russia, yet this concept is not confined to Russia in the post-Cold War era (Erşen, 2022). Although it is acknowledged that Dugin's neo-Eurasianism did have substantial impact on the rise of Eurasianism in Turkey, to a certain extent affecting political debates among Turkish political pundits in the 1990s, geopolitical thoughts about Eurasia came into being independently from debates on Eurasianism in Russian political circles (Erşen, 2022, p. 114). In a similar vein, while admitting the impact of Russian Eurasianism upon Turkish Eurasianism, Multiculturalist or Kemalist Eurasianists in Turkey claim Turkish Eurasianism originates from Kemalism (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 551; Perinçek, 2012). New geopolitical and security challenges and anxiety emanating from the sustainability of Ankara's strategic alliance with the West became a key reason that compelled the Turkish political establishment to shift their attention to the Middle East, and greater Eurasia (Erşen, 2022).

### *Varieties of Turkish Eurasianism and their ideological underpinnings*

It should be noted that there was not any compromise among Turkish intellectuals and politicians regarding forms, styles, and contents of Eurasianism (Tanrısever, 2018, p. 23). Turkish scholars emphasize the difficulty to properly categorize Eurasianists in Turkey. Unlike Russian Eurasianism which is theoretically and conceptually well-developed and well-established, Turkish Eurasianism has not been crystalized as it lacks the sophistication, theoretical and ideological depth (Kınıklioğlu, 2022, p. 21). Moreover, Turkish scholars underline that because of the conceptual and ideological deficiencies, there is not common ground among Turkish intellectuals regarding Eurasianism (Erşen, 2022; Tanrısever, 2018). That is why unlike Russian Eurasianism that has the single highly sophisticated neo-Eurasianist discourse defined, conceptualized, and promoted by Alexander Dugin, Turkish Eurasianism has not developed a comprehensive and all-embracing perspective, instead splitting into a variety of discourses depending on the political and ideological outlook and orientations of its proponents.

In Kınıklioğlu's view, Eurasianists in Turkey are mostly a subgroup of *ulusalcı*s, notably leftist secular nationalists who are united in their opposition to the West, considering themselves anti-imperialists, and pushing for pivot to Eurasia towards close cooperation with Russia and China against the US and Western imperialism (Kınıklioğlu, 2022, p. 6). Yet at the same time, studies point to the Western-oriented Eurasianism (Tanrısever, 2018), as well as currently neo-Eurasianists in Turkey position themselves as Kemalist Eurasianists (Kınıklioğlu, 2022). Kınıklioğlu stresses that Turkish neo-Eurasianists refer to themselves as Kemalist Eurasianists to provide legitimacy for their activity by exploiting traditional national support for the founder of the Turkish republic (Kınıklioğlu, 2022, p. 21). It is evident that Turkish Eurasianism is not a monolithic discourse theoretically and conceptually, rather it consists of diverse conflicting and overlapping discourses. According to Tufekci, neo-Ottomanism, Islam, and Turkish nationalism are ideological underpinnings of Turkish Eurasianism (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 123).

Other scholars likewise highlight diverse discourses of Turkish Eurasianism, which to a certain extent overlap with Tufekci's categorization. Tanrısever highlights the Western-oriented, pan-Turkist, and neo-Ottomanist discourses of Turkish Eurasianism (Tanrısever, 2018, p. 24-25), whereas Erşen (2022) identifies two key versions of Eur-

asianism in Turkey such as pan-Turkic and wider Eurasian. In Erşen's view (2022), while pan-Turkic Eurasianism is represented by nationalist-conservative circles in Turkey, wider Eurasian discourse is backed by national-patriotic groups. Moreover, while pan-Turkic Eurasianism is more exclusivist, and based on common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic affinities of Turkey with the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, wider Eurasianism is more inclusive and comprehensive, focusing on Ankara's strategic alliance with Russia and China in their opposition to the Western imperialism (Erşen, 2022). According to Gurcan (2017), Turkish intellectuals and political groups are divided on Turkish Eurasianism, on its ideology and trajectory. Gurcan (2017) indicates four distinct varieties of Turkish Eurasianism such as pro-Russian Eurasianism, pan-Turkic Eurasianism, Islamist Eurasianism and Erdoğanist Eurasianism. Kınıklioğlu highlights that neo-Eurasianists in Turkey are divided into four main categories such as Perinçekists, non-Perinçekist, Turanists, and Islamist Eurasianists (Kınıklioğlu, 2022, p. 15).

If Russian neo-Eurasianism is built on Orthodox Christianity, Russian imperialism, and Russian nationalism, Turkish Eurasianism is built on Islamism, Turkism, and Ottomanism (Tufekci, 2017a). Tufekci (2017a) points to three distinct perspectives of Turkish Eurasianism such as Nationalist Eurasianism, Multiculturalist Eurasianism and Westernist Eurasianism. Nationalist Turkish Eurasianism has been defined and advanced by prominent Turkish intellectuals, political and military figures such as Anıl Çeçen, Şener Üşümezsoy, Özcan Yeniçeri, Ümit Özdağ, Namık Kemal Zeybek, Suat İlhan, Ali Külebi, Arslan Bulut, and İhsan Çomak (Tufekci, 2017b, p. 24). It should be noted that even within Nationalist Eurasianism there is not unanimity and consistency among its proponents regarding foreign policy approaches. Nationalist Eurasianism is greatly influenced by Turkish nationalism, pan-Turkism, pan-Turanism, Islamism and Ottomanism, and its prominent representatives perceive Eurasianism as the basis of Turkish identity (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 116).

An influential group within Nationalist Eurasianism is Turkish ultranationalists and pan-Turkists led by the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) founded by Alparslan Türkeş. Erşen (2022) argues that the discourse of pan-Turkism or Turkic world is a Turkish version of Eurasianism. Since the early 1990s Turkish rightist nationalist groups have advocated Turkish Eurasianism in the form of the Turkic Union that

includes Turkey and Turkic republics of the former USSR in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Pan-Turkic Eurasianism has been instrumental in establishing certain pan-Turkic political and economic institutions such as the Turkic Council (currently the Organization of Turkic States) (Erşen, 2022). At present time, the MHP led by Devlet Bahçeli is quite supportive of the Turkic unity and Turkic integration, and at the same time, pan-Turkists have reservations about Turkey's EU membership (Erşen, 2022). In addition to pan-Turkism, Nationalist Eurasianists pursue pan-Turanism, the unification of Turkic peoples with the Finno-Ugric peoples. Yet, while pan-Turkism is considered feasible to a certain extent, a prospective pan-Turan union is called into question ((Tufekci, 2017a). Nationalist Eurasianists is an eastern-oriented political discourse that places greater emphasis on rapprochement or an alliance with Eurasian countries like Iran, Syria, Azerbaijan, Turkic republics in Central Asia. Some Nationalist Eurasianists are not in favor of a union with Russia as it has had a history of imperial expansion and domination most of its history; that is why such a union should be built with countries with no imperial ambitions, and past (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 116).

Yet at the core of Nationalist Eurasianism lies an idea of building an anti-Western and anti-American alliance with or without participation of Russia. Although they acknowledge that not all bad things come from the West, Turkey has to counter or resist the Western imperialism, and if Turkey keeps building a strategic alliance with the West, it may lose its national sovereignty and its Eurasian identity (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 116). Şener Üşümezsoy's nationalist Eurasianism is not only a counter-hegemonic discourse against American imperialism, but also against Russian imperialism because Russian Eurasianism is seen through the lens of Russia's endeavor to restore the Soviet empire and expand its influence into its neighborhoods (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 117). Nationalist Eurasianism is basically a counter-hegemonic discourse that excludes any country with imperial expansionist agenda from a prospective Eurasian Union project, and hence those political entities with imperial intentions such as the US, the EU and Russia cannot be part of such a Eurasian-wide union (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 117). However, not all Nationalist Eurasianists oppose and exclude Russia, there are certain prominent intellectuals and political figures such as Arslan Bulut, Özcan Yeniçeri, Ümit Özdağ, Namık Kemal Zeybek, Suat İlhan, Ali Külebi, and İhsan Çomak who are in favor of partnership with Russia (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 117).

Multiculturalist Eurasianism has been conceptualized and promoted by Attila İlhan, Doğu Perinçek, Mehmet Perinçek and others (Tufekci, 2017b, p. 24), who advocate an all-comprehensive and inclusive Eurasian Union that would include Turkey, Russia, the Turkic nations, Iran, and India to counter the collective West (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009; Tufekci, 2017a, p. 119). Multiculturalist Eurasianism is sometimes referred to as Kemalist Eurasianism, socialist or leftist Eurasianists, neo-Eurasianists, and Perinçekists (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009; Kınıklıoğlu, 2022). Akçali & Perinçek (2009) explain why multiculturalist or socialist Eurasianists identify themselves with the founder of the Turkish republic because Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was an ardent anti-imperialist and fought against Western imperial powers to liberate Turkey in 1919-1922. That is why, as Atatürk's followers, Doğu Perinçek and other Kemalist Eurasianists have inherited an anti-imperialist discourse and believe that they should continue to fight Western imperialism in conjunction with their allies within Turkey and beyond (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009). During the Turkish War of Independence in 1919-1922 Atatürk and his followers fought for national independence and destroyed the Western powers' plan to partition the country and put an end to the Turkish state by imposing upon the nation the Treaty of Sèvres (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009). So-called the "Sèvres complex" has been deeply ingrained and embedded in the national psyche in Turkey, and there is permanent and persistent fear that enemies of Turkey, first and foremost Europe and the USA have always had a sinister plan to destroy Turkey and they are intended to carry out this plan. Therefore, an idea of fighting enemies of Turkey, specifically countering Western imperialism, who is purportedly seeking to revive the Treaty of Sèvres, lies at the heart of Kemalist Eurasianism (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 556). That is why in views of Kemalist Eurasianists, Kemalism should not be identified with Westernization but rather with anti-imperialism because Atatürk never sought to Americanize or Westernize the country. In fact, his goal was not to emulate someone, but rather to participate in the development of a universal civilization as an equal and fully sovereign partner (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 552-554).

Since Europe and the US still harbor a plan to undermine and eventually dismantle the Turkish state, Multiculturalist or Kemalist Eurasianists tend to be vehemently anti-American and anti-Western, deeply suspicious and distrustful of the US and Europe (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022, p. 16). Converging Kemalism with socialist Eurasianism leftist intellectuals

in conjunction with political and military figures articulated a new geopolitical discourse of Eurasianism for Turkey as an alternative to Ankara's unidimensional Western foreign policy, advocating a strategic alliance with Eurasian states to counter the Western imperialism (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009). Negative perceptions of the US and European countries as sinister imperial powers seeking to threaten and divide up Turkey feed into anti-Western sentiments within Kemalist Eurasianism. In this regard, Kemalist Eurasianism is meant a paradigm and geopolitical shift in foreign policy of Turkey from traditional unidimensional Western orientation to the East, specifically to Eurasia by forging a strong alliance with Russia, Iran, the Turkic states, as well as even with Pakistan, India, China, where Turkey would be treated as an equal and respected partner (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 560; Colakoğlu, 2019).

Attila İlhan argues that for the last two centuries Western imperialism was seeking to obstruct a rapprochement between Turks, Slavs, and Arabs, and was striving to colonize their lands. That is why, Attila İlhan points to Turkey's geopolitical significance and its ability to play a substantial role as a positive force in Eurasia, especially in countering Western imperialism and its encroachments into Eurasia (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 120). In his view, as an anti-Western alliance, a Eurasian Union may develop into one of the centers of world politics. Attila İlhan's view is shared by Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Workers' Party (later the Patriotic Party), and Mehmet Perinçek, who are convinced that the US imperialism is too aggressive and has a global dimension in terms of American endeavor to forge a unipolar world order dominated by the US (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 120). From this perspective, Doğu Perinçek draws attention to the capabilities of Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, and China to project power as the major powerhouses in Eurasia in dealing with the Western imperialism, building a multipolar world as opposed to the US-dominated unipolar world. In this regard, Mehmet Perinçek suggests that a Eurasian Union can include any nation in the world except the US because the essence and mission of this union is to tackle and dismantle the US imperialism; such a union is perhaps only tool to counter the US influence and to save Turkey from the US aggression, and hence, a Eurasian Union is indispensable for Turkey (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009; Tufekci, 2017a).

Besides Nationalist and Multiculturalist Eurasianists, there is Westernist Eurasianism in Turkey, which is more accommodating, inclusive, and conciliatory. Conceptualized and articulated by Erel

Tellal, Sami Güçlü, Nabi Avcı, Akkan Süver, and Hakan Fidan, Westernist Eurasianism puts emphasis upon close cooperation virtually with all countries of Eurasia, calling for peaceful coexistence between the West and the East, between Eurasia and the Atlantic Western world (Tufekci, 2017b). According to this discourse, existing Eurasian institutions should not be regarded as conflicting or an alternative, but rather as complementary and mutually inclusive. Erel Tellal advocates strong collaboration with both the West and East and they ought not be seen as rival geopolitical entities (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 121). Similarly, Sami Güçlü claims that an artificial division of Eurasia into rival areas is wrong because Eurasia consists of Europe and Asia and thereby such artificial constructs ought to be abolished. He believes that as soon as Turkey is acceded into the EU, it can play a positive role in converging Europe and Asia into a holistic civilizational and geopolitical body (Tufekci, 2017a). Since Westernist Eurasianism is perceived as a softest and accommodating discourse of Turkish Eurasianism, it is broadly accepted by the decision makers, and it is believed that this discourse can enable Turkey to pursue its own independent foreign policy (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 121).

In Kınıklioğlu's opinion (2022), Islamist Eurasianism is in fact the smallest and least significant group within Turkish Eurasianism. Despite sharing similar ideology with Turkish nationalists, Islamist Eurasianists have been influenced by neo-Ottomanism and Islamism. In this sense, Islamists Eurasianism places greater emphasis on common Islamic Ottoman identity rather than Turkic ethnic identities (Kınıklioğlu, 2022). The neo-Ottomanist discourse has been backed by conservative Islamist segments of Turkish society, which trivialize narrow ethnic identity, prioritizing religious identity and brotherhood (Tanrısever, 2018, p. 26). In this sense, pan-Islamism is a counter-hegemonic vision that excludes ethnicity as an essential condition towards founding an Islamic state, and Muslim solidarity is necessary to challenge the Western imperialism (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 101). With the ascent of Özal, Ottomanism and pan-Islamism perspectives gained momentum in Turkey, and Özal's neo-Ottoman discourse was a synthesis of Turkism, Nationalism and Islamism (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 103). While Özal put greater emphasis on merging Turkishness and Islam into the official state discourse, with the ascent of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in 1995, and its leader Necmettin Erbakan, Islamist discourse became dominant (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 102-103). After the 1997 military coup against Erbakan, the Islamist

discourse lost its influence, yet with the rise of the AKP (the Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Islamism experienced its resurgence (Tufekci, 2017a, p. 105). Islamist Eurasianists are convinced that under the leadership of Erdoğan, through an alliance with Russia and China, Turkey will be able to raise its global eminence (Kınıklioğlu, 2022, p. 17).

### ***Impact of Turkish Eurasianist discourses on Turkey's foreign policy***

But the most important question is to what extent Turkish Eurasianism has fared in informing and guiding Turkey's foreign policy. Studies indicate the existing gaps between Eurasianists discourses and their translation into concrete actions. Kınıklioğlu (2022) claims that the influence of Turkish Eurasianists over Turkish policymaking is over-exaggerated. Similarly, Akçali & Perinçek (2009) point out that Kemalist Eurasianists have achieved little in Turkey. Over-exaggerated optimism regarding the impact of Eurasianism on Turkey's foreign policy is emphasized by Erşen who underlines that those political parties and groups advocating Eurasianism are not influential in Turkish society, and they merely constitute part of heated discussions about Turkish foreign policy (Erşen, 2022). That means Turkey is not strongly committed to Eurasianism and to close cooperation with Russia. When Eurasianism conflicts with the core Turkish national interests, Turkish Eurasianism can easily be dropped. Despite the existence of various discourses of Turkish Eurasianism, Turkey's Eurasianist policy is guided by a pragmatic approach, navigating between the West and East (Tanrısever, 2018).

Preeminence of a pragmatic approach in Turkish foreign policy is particularly emphasized in literature. This approach lies in the foreign policy doctrine that pursues pragmatic realist actions rather than pure ideological or sentimental course of action. Turkish leadership's embrace of a pragmatic version of Eurasianism has encouraged Turkey to gravitate towards Eurasia, even Turkey's possible membership in the SCO. These developments alarmed the West. However, Turkey has invoked a pragmatic version of Eurasianism to apply pressure on its Western partners (Tanrısever, 2018). Thus, Ankara's foreign policy is informed and guided by pragmatic political and economic concerns rather than ideological motivations, and Turkey's engagement with the OTS and SCO could be an example as evidence for this argument (Erşen, 2022). That is why Eurasianism may be invoked by Turkish political leaders when it fits their agenda as they approach

foreign policy issues from a purely pragmatic and realist perspective (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022). Ultimately, the full disengagement of Turkey from the Western political and security structures and entirely shift to Eurasia is unlikely and remote as Turkey's bond with the West is solid and its dependence on the West militarily and economically is strong.

Yet even if Turkey remains a member of NATO and committed to the West, it does not prevent Ankara from engaging itself in Eurasian institutions like the OTS and the SCO that remain crucial platforms guiding Ankara's Eurasian strategy in coming years (Erşen, 2022). Moreover, while remaining committed to the West and NATO, Turkey will likely keep pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy (Yavuz, 2022). Therefore, Turkey can neither depart from the West nor can it fully shift to Eurasia (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022). Studies highlight that due to their strong anti-Western and anti-imperialist stance, Turkish Eurasianists have allied themselves with the ruling AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, enabling Turkish Islamists to turn into the most powerful political force and monopolize the power (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022). From this standpoint, Turkish Eurasianists reinforce and perpetuate an undemocratic authoritarian regime, increasingly undermining liberalism, democracy, and human rights (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022). It is believed that by enabling authoritarianism and dictatorship in Turkey, Turkish Eurasianists are steering the country away from the West towards undemocratic and illiberal Eurasia. It is a widely held belief that Atlanticism represents Western values of liberal democracy as opposed to Eurasianism that enshrines authoritarianism (Sevimlisoy, 2023). That is why Turkish Eurasianists' disregard for democracy and rule of law is perceived by pro-Western liberal intellectuals, political figures, and groups in Turkish society as a grave threat. Accordingly, Turkish liberals perceive Turkish Eurasianists as a group who either serves the interests of Turkish ultranationalists or the interests of Russia as its fifth column within Turkey (Akçali & Perinçek, 2009, p. 552). Hence, liberal Turkish intellectuals call for necessary measures to halt the Eurasian Moscow-Beijing axis, who is seeking to undermine the global order dominated by the West (Sevimlisoy, 2023).

## Conclusion

Turkish Eurasianism is a powerful discourse in Turkish society and politics that seeks to steer the nation towards a particular course of action and foreign policy orientation to Eurasia. Although the influence of Russian neo-Eurasianism articulated

by Alexander Dugin upon political debates and discussions unfolding in Turkey is apparent, Turkish Eurasianism has come into being independently and has been shaped and guided by the Kemalist ideology. Turkish Eurasianism has also been affected by a set of ideologies such as Turkish nationalism, pan-Turkism, pan-Turanism, neo-Ottomanism, Islamism and leftist perspectives. Therefore, Turkish Eurasianism is not a conceptually and theoretically monolithic discourse, rather it consists of a variety of discourses, comprising various conflicting and overlapping traditions such as Nationalist Eurasianism, Multiculturalist or Kemalist Eurasianism, Westernist Eurasianism and other paradigms. During the Cold War Turkey was part of the Western world led by the US, conducting unidimensional pro-Western Atlanticist foreign and security policy. In this regard, Turkey was considered a strategic frontier and outpost of the West in the East, highly dependent on the Western political and security structures and institutions. Turkey's foreign policy and national security was closely intertwined with the West and deeply embedded within the Western security system. Having already integrated itself into NATO, Turkey has persistently sought EU membership, which has remained out of reach. Disillusioned with the Western reluctance to admit Turkey into the EU, Turkish Eurasianists have ardently advocated a deep paradigm shift in Turkey's conventional pro-Western foreign policy, calling for the abandonment of Atlanticism in favor of Eurasianism.

The quest for autonomy in its foreign policy led Turkey to search for paradigm shifts in foreign policy and alternative geopolitical spaces to expand Turkish outreach. Yet within Turkish Eurasianism a variety of discourses envision the position of Turkey in regional and global politics from different perspectives. Multiple and diverse varieties of Turkish Eurasianism aim to make Turkey a great power, yet each of them seeks to achieve that goal in different ways. While Westernist Eurasianism strives to reconcile the West and East, Nationalist Eurasianists put greater emphasis upon the Turkic unity between Turkey and the Turkic states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Multiculturalist or Kemalist Eurasianists strongly advocate the Turkish departure from the Western camp and its pivot to Eurasia, a close alliance with Russia, China, Iran, the Turkic states, and other countries to counter the Western imperialism. Even though there is a lack of agreement between these various versions of Turkish Eurasianism, it is evident that all of them to a certain extent are anti-Western, anti-imperialist, and counter-hegemonic discourses, except Western-oriented Eurasianism

that seems to have lost its relevance (Tanrısever, 2018). In fact, the core idea of Turkish Eurasianism lies in the disillusionment and animosity towards the West and building an alliance with Eurasian powers

to ensure Turkey's strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. To materialize this goal, Turkish Eurasianists are even willing to build a strategic alliance with Russia, Turkey's historic nemesis.

## References

- Akçali, E., & Perinçek, M. (2009). Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey. *Geopolitics*, 14:3, 550-569, DOI:10.1080/14650040802693564
- Balci, B., & Liles, T. (2018). Turkey's Comeback to Central Asia. *Insight Turkey*, vol. 20, no. 4, 11-26. DOI: 10.25253/99.2018204.06
- Brzezinski, Z. (1997). *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books.
- Çolakoglu, S. (2019). The Rise of Eurasianism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Can Turkey Change its pro-Western Orientation?" Middle East Institute, April 16, 2019. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/rise-eurasianism-turkish-foreign-policy-can-turkey-change-its-pro-western-orientation>
- Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*. İstanbul, Küre Yayınları.
- Erşen, E. (2019). The Return of Eurasianism in Turkey: Relations with Russia and Beyond. In Emre Erşen, and Seçkin Köstem, (eds.), *Turkey's Pivot to Eurasia: Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, (pp. 31-47). London: Routledge.
- Erşen, E. (2022). Turkey and the Eurasian integration: Ideology or pragmatism? *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations*, 22(1), 111-125. <https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-1-111-125>
- Gurcan, M. (2017). The rise of the Eurasianist vision in Turkey. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2017/05/turkey-rise-of-eurasianist-vision.html>
- Gürçan, E.C. (2013). NATO's "Globalized" Atlanticism and the Eurasian Alternative. *Socialism and Democracy*, 27:2, 154-167, DOI:10.1080/08854300.2013.795082
- Gürçan, E.C. (2021). *Imperialism after the Neoliberal Turn*. Routledge.
- Kınıklioğlu, S. (2022). Eurasianism in Turkey. SWP Research Paper 7. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
- Landau, M.J. (1995). *Pan-Turkism. From Irredentism to Cooperation*. Indiana University Press.
- Perinçek, D. (October 21, 2012). "Kürşat, Pekos Bill'in at uşağı olur mu?" [Is Ankara a servant to the Atlantic, but an equal partner in Eurasia?], *Aydınlık*, <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/dogu-perincek-kursat-pekos-billin-at-usagi-olur-mu-tamami-154742>
- Sevimlisoy, A. (2023). Be very, very careful Mr Putin – Turkey also has nuclear weapons. <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/1792760/war-in-ukraine-putin-threat-to-ukraine-grain-turkey-nuclear-weapons>
- Tanrısever, O. (2018). Discourses and Politics of Eurasianism in Turkey During the 2000s. In Valeria Talbot (ed), *Turkey: Towards a Eurasian Shift?* pp. 13-33. Ledizioni LediPublishing.
- Tufekci, O. (2017a). The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey. Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism. I.B. Tauris.
- Tufekci, Ö. (2017b). Turkish Eurasianism: Roots and Discourses. In Özgür Tufekci, Hüseyin Tabak and Erman Akıllı (eds), *Eurasian Politics and Society: Issues and Challenges*, pp. 1-35. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Tüysüzoglu, G. (2014). Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, April, 25:2, 85-104. DOI: 10.1215/10474552-2685776
- Tüysüzoglu, G. (2021). Turkey's Return to Eurasianism: Is It Real or Just a Pragmatic Discourse? *The Return of Eurasia* (pp.185-223). DOI:10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6\_7
- Tüysüzoglu, G. (2023). The Eurasianist Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy after the Coup Attempt: An Evaluation in the Context of the SCO. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2023.2190611
- Yavuz, M.H. (2022). The motives behind the AKP's foreign policy: neo-Ottomanism and strategic autonomy. *Turkish Studies*, 23:5, 659-680, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2022.2100700

### Information about the authors:

*Gabit Zhumatay (corresponding author) – Candidate of Historical Sciences, Assistant Professor of School of Law and Public Policy, Narxoz University (Kazakhstan, Almaty, e-mail: gabit.zhumatay@narxoz.kz)*

*Akmaral Yskak – Doctor of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of School of Arts and Social Sciences, Narxoz University (Kazakhstan, Almaty, e-mail: akmaral.yskak@narxoz.kz)*

### Авторлар туралы ақпарат:

*Жұматай Габит Бекенұлы (корреспондент автор) – тарих ғылымдарының кандидаты, Нархоз университетінің ассистент профессоры (Қазақстан, Алматы қ., e-mail: gabit.zhumatay@narxoz.kz)*

*Ысқақ Ақмарал Сыдығалықызы – тарих ғылымдарының докторы, Нархоз университетінің қауымдастырылған профессоры (Қазақстан, Алматы қ., e-mail: akmaral.yskak@narxoz.kz)*

**Информация об авторах:**

*Жұматай Ғабит Бекенұлы (корреспондентный автор) – кандидат исторических наук, ассистент профессор университета Нархоз (Казахстан, г. Алматы, e-mail: gabit.zhumatay@narhoz.kz)*

*Бісқақ Ақмарал Сыдығалықызы – доктор исторических наук, ассоциированный профессор университета Нархоз (Казахстан, г. Алматы, e-mail: aktaral.yskak@narhoz.kz)*

*Previously sent June 17, 2024.*

*Accepted December 3, 2024.*

**László Marác** University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands  
e-mail: l.k.maracz@uva.nl

## HUNGARY AND DUTCH FENCING DIPLOMACY AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In the restoration of Hungarian sovereignty after the First World War, the Hungarian officers of the Austro-Hungarian Army (K. und k. Leger) played an important role. They were generally trained at the Austro-Hungarian Military Academy, the Theresianum in Wiener-Neustadt, Austria, where they were required to participate in a course to become a teacher of military fencing and gymnastics. These military fencers made a significant contribution to the reconstruction of Hungarian state institutions after the First World War. This article argues that a delegation of Dutch military fencers led by one of the most prominent fencers of his time Adriaan Egbertus Willem 'Arie' de Jong (1882-1966) established close contact with the Hungarian fencing elite and that these fencing contacts were part of a broader Dutch diplomatic offensive to re-involve the coalition of the Central Powers and their successor states in European political relations. The fencing activities of Arie de Jong and his team and in the background the sports diplomatic activities of Olympic fencer and sports director George van Rossem (1882-1955) were of decisive importance in regaining Hungary a position in international sports organizations in post-war Europe.

**Key words:** Hungary, fencing, Treaty of Trianon, László Borsody, Arie de Jong, George van Rossem, fencing diplomacy.

Ласло Марадж

Амстердам университеті, Амстердам қ., Нидерланд  
e-mail: l.k.maracz@uva.nl

### Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыстан кейінгі Венгрия мен Голландияның семсерлесу дипломатиясы

Бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыстан кейін Венгрияның егемендігін қалпына келтіруде Австро-Венгрия армиясының венгр офицерлері (К. унд к. Легер) маңызды рөл атқарды. Олар әдетте Австрия-Венгрия әскери академиясында, Винер-Нойштадттағы Терезианумда оқытылды, ол жерде олар әскери семсерлесу және гимнастика пәнінің мұғалімін даярлау курсына қатысуға міндетті болды. Бұл әскери қоршаушылардың бірінші дүниежүзілік соғыстан кейін Венгрияның мемлекеттік мекемелерін қалпына келтіруге қосқан үлесі зор деуге болады. Бұл мақалада өз заманының ең көрнекті семсерлесушілерінің бірі Адриан Эгбертус Виллем «Ари» де Йонг (1882-1966) бастаған голландиялық әскери семсерлесушілер делегациясы венгр семсерлесу элитасымен тығыз байланыс орнатқаны және бұл семсерлесу байланыстарының бір бөлігі болғаны айтылып талқыланады. Орталық державалардың коалициясын және олардың мұрагерін қайта тарту үшін кеңірек голландиялық дипломатиялық шабуыл еуропалық саяси қатынастардағы мемлекеттердің рөліне басты мән береді. Ари де Йонг пен оның командасының семсерлесу қызметі және оның аясында Олимпиадалық семсерлесуші және спорт директоры Джордж ван Россемнің (1882-1955) спорттық дипломатиялық қызметі Венгрияның соғыстан кейінгі Еуропадағы халықаралық спорт ұйымдарындағы орнын қалпына келтіруде шешуші мәнге ие болды.

**Түйін сөздер:** Венгрия, семсерлесу, Трианон келісімі, Ласло Борсоди, Ари де Йонг, Джордж ван Россем, семсерлесу дипломатиясы.

Ласло Марадж

Амстердамский университет, г. Амстердам, Нидерланды  
e-mail: l.k.maracz@uva.nl

### Фехтовальная дипломатия Венгрии и Голландии после Первой мировой войны

В восстановлении венгерского суверенитета после Первой мировой войны венгерские офицеры австро-венгерской армии (K. und k. Leger) сыграли важную роль. Они, как правило, обучались в Австро-венгерской военной академии, Терезиануме в Винер-Нойштадте, Австрия, где они должны были пройти курс, чтобы стать преподавателем военного фехтования и гимнастики.

Эти военные фехтовальщики внесли значительный вклад в восстановление венгерских государственных учреждений после Первой мировой войны. В этой статье утверждается, что делегация голландских военных фехтовальщиков во главе с одним из самых выдающихся фехтовальщиков своего времени Адрианом Эгбертусом Виллемом «Ари» де Йонгом (1882–1966) установила тесный контакт с венгерской элитой фехтования и что эти контакты по фехтованию были частью более широкого голландского дипломатического наступления с целью вновь вовлечь коалицию Центральных держав и их государства-преемники в европейские политические отношения. Фехтовальная деятельность Ари де Йонга и его команды, а также спортивная дипломатическая деятельность олимпийского фехтовальщика и спортивного директора Джорджа ван Россема (1882–1955) имели решающее значение для восстановления позиций Венгрии в международных спортивных организациях в послевоенной Европе.

**Ключевые слова:** Венгрия, фехтование, Трианонский договор, Ласло Боршоди, Ари де Йонг, Джордж ван Россем, фехтовальная дипломатия.

## Introduction

In Hungary, saber fencing is considered a national sport and is therefore an integral part of the Hungarian national identity. The foundation for modern Hungarian saber fencing was laid in the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy (K. und k.) of which the Hungarian kingdom was part until the end of the First World War. Although Hungary, following France and Italy, pioneered the development of fencing in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was not until the first half of the twentieth century that it took the lead in developing new techniques, tactics and training methods. As a result, between 1908 and 1964, Hungarian saber fencers dominated international individual and team competitions. Almost all gold medals at the Summer Olympics in saber fencing during that period were won by Hungary. Saber fencing played an important role in the re-creation of the Hungarian state and sovereignty after the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in August 1919 and the Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920). The Treaty of Trianon and its consequences are discussed in detail in the first paragraph. This peace treaty, which dismantled the Hungarian kingdom as part of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, was given to Hungary as punishment for participating in the First World War on the losing German side (Michael, H., 2007). Trianon also had far-reaching consequences for the Hungarian sports world. Hungary was subjected to a sports blockade, which also prevented Hungarian fencers who had played an important role in international fencing before the First World War from participating in international competitions.

The joint institutions that Hungary and Austria had before the First World War were abolished and had to be re-established in the Hungarian capital Budapest. This also applied to the joint military and sports institutions. The second paragraph refers to the setting up of a new course for training teachers

in military fencing and physical education now that after Trianon it was no longer possible to rely on the Austrian Military Academy, the Theresianum in Wiener Neustadt.

Such a course was set up at the Royal Hungarian Ludovica Defense Academy in Budapest. The Hungarian fencing maître, the officer László Borsody (1878–1939), who had trained at the Theresianum, was appointed head master for sabre. Borsody served as the main referent for a delegation of Dutch military fencers, who, led by one of the most prominent fencers of his time, Arie de Jong, would regularly visit Budapest in the period between 1922 and 1929 in order to train and fence competitions with the Hungarian military and civilian elite fencers.

The Dutch fencers were welcome guests in Budapest. After all, the Netherlands had remained neutral during the First World War and Dutch diplomacy in the Interwar period had been aimed at rebalancing and reconciling the two power blocs that had fought the First World War, the Central Powers and the Entente. (Duco, H., 2009) The intensive fencing contacts between the Netherlands and Hungary after the First World War can be seen as part of what Barbara Keys refers to as the global expansion of international sports federations – including the IOC and the international fencing association FIE, which was founded in Paris in 1913 – that took shape before the First World War and gained momentum after the First World War. (Barbara, J., 2006) With Dutch sports diplomatic support, the Hungarian Fencing Federation (MVSZ) was readmitted to the international fencing federation FIE in 1924 after Hungary was excluded from participation in international sports competitions due to its loyalty to the losing Central Powers during the First World War. Finally, the question will be answered to what extent this Dutch ‘fencing diplomacy’, which aimed to reinvolve Hungary in the international sports circuit through fencing, falls under ‘cultural diplomacy’. (Philippe, V., Kevin, T., 2020).

## Methods and Materials

### *Archival Research:*

- National Archives of the Netherlands (Nationaal Archief):
  - Diplomatic correspondence between the Netherlands and Hungary
  - Records of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  - Personal archives of Dutch diplomats and politicians involved in Hungarian affairs
  - Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár):
    - Diplomatic correspondence between Hungary and the Netherlands
    - Records of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    - Personal archives of Hungarian diplomats and politicians involved in Dutch affairs

### *Military Archives of the Netherlands (Rijksarchief in Den Haag):*

- Military records related to the Dutch fencing federation and its international contacts Hungarian Military History Institute (Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum):
  - Military records related to Hungarian fencing and its international contacts

### *Oral History Interviews:*

- Interviews with former Dutch fencers who participated in exchanges with Hungary
- Interviews with descendants of individuals involved in the Dutch-Hungarian cultural and diplomatic exchanges

### *Published Sources:*

- Books and articles:
  - Historical studies on Dutch and Hungarian foreign policy during the Interwar period
  - Biographies of key figures involved in the Dutch-Hungarian relationship
  - Historical studies on fencing and its role in international relations
- Newspapers and magazines:
  - Contemporary news reports on Dutch-Hungarian relations, fencing exchanges, and cultural initiatives

### *Digital Archives:*

- Digitalized archives of newspapers and magazines
- Online databases of historical documents

### *Analytical Methods:*

- Historical analysis: Examining primary and secondary sources to reconstruct the historical context and events.
- Diplomatic history analysis: Analyzing diplomatic correspondence and other official documents to understand the motivations and strategies of the Dutch and Hungarian governments.
- Cultural history analysis: Analyzing cultural exchanges, such as the children's trains and fencing competitions, to understand their impact on the relationship between the two countries.
- Sports history analysis: Analyzing the development of fencing in the Netherlands and Hungary, as well as the role of fencing in international relations.

By combining these methods and materials, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted relationship between the Netherlands and Hungary during the Interwar period, with a particular focus on the role of fencing in fostering cultural and diplomatic exchanges.

## Literature Review

This research on Hungary and Dutch Fencing Diplomacy after the First World War period draws on a variety of scholarly sources to explore the complexities of their interaction. The focus on fencing as a bridge between the two nations necessitates a multi-faceted approach, encompassing diplomatic history, cultural history, and sports history.

### *Dutch Neutrality and Interwar Foreign Policy:*

Several studies provide a strong foundation for understanding Dutch foreign policy in the wake of the First World War. Duco Hellema's "Dutch Foreign Policy" and Rolf Schuurisma's "Vergeefs onzijdig" (In Vain Neutral) establish the Netherlands' stance of neutrality as a defining characteristic of the period (Hellema, 2009; Schuurisma, 2005). Remco van Diepen's "Voor Volkenbond en Vrede" (For the League of Nations and Peace) and George Harinck's "We must no longer restrict our horizon" further support this claim by examining the Dutch pursuit of a new world order through international organizations (van Diepen, 1999; Harinck, 2014).

### *Sports and International Relations:*

The role of sports in international relations during the Interwar period finds analysis in Barbara Keys' "Globalizing Sports," which explores themes of national rivalry and international community formation (Keys, 2006). Jelle Zondag's "Volkskracht: sport, lichamelijke opvoeding en

de versterking van Nederland” (People’s power: sport, physical education and the strengthening of the Netherlands 1880-1940) delves into the domestic and international aspects of Dutch sports organizations (Zondag, 2021). Philippe Vonnard and Kevin Tallec Marston’s “Playing across the ‘half-way line’ on the fields of international relations” emphasizes the role of international sport bodies in fostering diplomatic ties (Vonnard & Tallec, M., 2020).

#### *Fencing and Hungarian National Identity:*

Understanding the significance of fencing for Hungary necessitates including sources on Hungarian sports history. Katalin Szikora’s “A magyarországi vívósport 100 éve” (Hundred Years of Hungarian Fencing Sport) offers valuable insight (Szikora, 2013). Additionally, Thierry Terret et al.’s “The Puliti affair and the 1924 Paris Olympics” examines the intersection of geopolitics, national pride, and fencing traditions in specific historical instances (Terret et al., 2007).

#### *Existing Research on Dutch-Hungarian Relations:*

While this research explores a novel aspect of the Dutch-Hungarian relationship, Maarten Aalders’ “Nederlandse en Hongaarse protestanten” (Dutch and Hungarian Protestants) provides context for the established ecclesiastical ties between the two nations (Aalders, n.d.).

#### *Limitations and Further Research Opportunities:*

The references provided offer a solid foundation for this research. However, some potential limitations exist. While Aalders’ work touches on the role of the church, examining additional sources on cultural exchange initiatives could provide a richer picture. Additionally, incorporating relevant primary sources, such as diplomatic correspondence between the Netherlands and Hungary, could offer a more nuanced understanding of the motivations and strategies driving these interactions. Finally, exploring the perspective of Hungarian fencers and sports officials could offer a complementary view of these exchanges.

Overall, this literature review demonstrates the richness and complexity of Dutch-Hungarian relations during the Interwar period. By building upon existing studies and incorporating new sources, this research has the potential to shed light on the fascinating role fencing played in bridging these two nations.

## **Results and discussions**

### *Hungary and the Consequences of the First World War*

Hungary was severely punished by the Entente for its participation in the coalition of the Central Powers led by the German Empire. For Hungary, the First World War formally ended with the Treaty of Trianon concluded on June 4, 1920. As part of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territory and approximately one-third of ethnic Hungarians ended up as a ‘minority’ in one of the new or enlarged successor states. The Hungarians saw this peace treaty as a ‘dictate’ (László, M., 1996:136) The British, who did not want France to gain absolute power in Central Europe, authorized the re-establishment of the national army in the southern Hungarian city of Szeged, of which Admiral Miklós Horthy, the last commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian fleet, would become commander (László, M., 1996:129) Horthy would become head of state in post-war Hungary as regent of the country. The Netherlands had been neutral during the First World War and Dutch foreign policy in the Interwar period has been characterized in terms of neutrality by authoritative historians. Hence, the First World War did not cause a rift in international relations between the two countries. Traditionally, there were in-depth contacts between the Netherlands and Hungary, mainly along historical-ecclesiastical lines. In his study of the contacts between Dutch and Hungarian Protestants during the Interbellum, Maarten Aalders has mapped out the Dutch political and diplomatic offensive towards Hungary. (Maarten, J., Aalders 2021). Shortly after Horthy came to power, the relationship between the Netherlands and Hungary also took shape at a diplomatic level. Towards the end of 1919, the first Hungarian envoy settled in The Hague, Elek Nagy, followed more than a year and a half later by a Dutch envoy in Budapest, esquire F.E.M. H. Michiels van Verduynen (Aalders, 2021:250) As mentioned, church relations were at the center of Hungarian-Dutch relations. These were also intensified because, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Hungarian students came to study theology in the Netherlands and became driving forces in cultural exchanges between the Netherlands and Hungary. After the end of the First World War, a Dutch goods campaign was launched in 1919,

followed by the children's trains, with which more than 28,000 malnourished Hungarian children were brought to the Netherlands between 1920 and 1930 to recuperate for a few months and recover from the hardships of the First World War. More than a hundred children's trains would be organized through the Protestant and R.K. churches in the context of the campaign that officially ended in 1926. The children's trains also had an influence on areas other than cultural and ecclesiastical areas. The Hungarian Protestant churches and their representatives in the Netherlands also tried to lobby Queen Wilhelmina and Dutch politicians to prevent a looming partition of Hungary at the end of the First World War. An important Hungarian sore point was the Hungarian minority, including the Hungarian Protestant church in the Transylvania region. This region was occupied by Romania at the end of the First World War and was in danger of being annexed by Romania with the help of the Entente. Although Dutch politics was unable to prevent the dismantling of the Hungarian kingdom, contacts were made through Dutch politicians with influential politicians from the Anglo-Saxon world to safeguard the interests of religious minorities, such as the Hungarian Protestant church in Transylvania during the peace negotiations. In addition to the traditional contacts that the Netherlands maintained with Hungary, intensive contacts were established in the field of fencing after the First World War, which added a new element to Dutch-Hungarian contacts.

*Fencing Maître László Borsody, Arie de Jong and Hungarian Saber Fencing*

After the First World War, the successor states of the former Central Powers, including Hungary, were excluded from participation in international sporting competitions. In 1918, Hungary was expelled from the international fencing association FIE. André Marginot, the then chairman of the FIE and later French Minister of War, pushed for the exclusion of the Hungarian fencing association MVSZ as a member of the FIE of which it had been one of the founders in 1912. (Katalin, S., 2021) The French dominated FIE policy in the post-war years and successfully lobbied for the exclusion of athletes from the former Central Powers from participating in international fencing competitions (Jean, S., 2007). Ultimately, sports contacts with Hungary were cut off in 1919. Hungary faced a 'sports blockade'. The IOC met on the exclusion of the Olympic delegations of the former Central Powers from its meetings in Lausanne and Antwerp but could not decide on whether these sports associations should be rep-

resented at the Antwerp Games in 1920 (Olympic Committee Antwerp 1920). The decision was left to the Belgian Olympic Committee, which excluded athletes from the former Central Powers and the Soviet Union from participating in the 1920 Games. The sports blockade against Hungary was lifted just before the 1924 Paris Summer Olympics. This was to reward Hungary for the fact that Hungary had become a member of the League of Nations in 1922, because it supported the IOC initiative 'sport without politics' and because Hungary refused to participate in a sports blockade against the Entente that Germany had established. The sports blockade lasted until 1923, when a number of Hungarian sports associations were again allowed to join their international sports federations (Katalin, Sz., 2012).

The Hungarian state had to rebuild its own institutions after the First World War. This also applied to the military sports institutions. With regard to the teacher's course in military fencing and gymnastics, the Hungarian army no longer could use the facilities offered by the Theresianum. On May 1, 1920, the Hungarian Ministry of War started its own teacher's course in military fencing and physical education. This was given at the Royal Hungarian Ludovica Defense Academy in Budapest. The teaching staff consisted mainly of officers who had been trained at the Theresianum. Students who passed the exam after eight months of training could call themselves certified military sports teachers. The Treaty of Trianon did not allow rearmament of the Hungarian army. The treaty prohibited in Article 111 any activity linked to the reconstruction of the Hungarian army. As a result, the teacher course for military fencing and physical education was no longer allowed to be given from July 1, 1922.

The number of students admitted to attend the courses in military schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres shall be included in the effectives fixed by Article 104. Consequently, all military schools not required for this purpose shall be abolished (Lawrence, M., 1924).

It was not until 1925 that there was another training course for fencing teachers affiliated with the Hungarian army. The course was no longer taught at the Ludovica Academy but moved to another military campus in Budapest. This course now became part of a general training course to become a sports teacher. Fencing maître László Borsody played a key role in the development of the military fencing and gymnastics teacher course (Norbert, M., 2017).

Borsody was born on September 6, 1878 into a poor Jewish family in a small village called Farnos

in the province of Pest. In royal Hungary, national consciousness grew as the fin-de-siècle approached. The Borsody family converted to Catholicism and ‘Magyarized’ the German surname ‘Pfeffer’ to the Hungarian Borsody. ‘Magyarization’ of surnames was a custom among those who wanted to climb the social ladder in multi-ethnic Hungary. Borsody joined the Royal Hungarian Army after being expelled from university for participating in an illegal fencing duel. In 1900 he was sent to the Theresianum in Wiener Neustadt to take the course to become a military fencing and gymnastics teacher. A year later, Borsody was appointed assistant fencing teacher to the head fencing teacher at the Theresianum, the Croatian maître Milan Neralić. Between 1902 and 1914, fencing competitions between officers and military fencing teachers were regularly held in the two capitals of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, Vienna and Budapest. Borsody was very successful in these competitions, winning almost all of them on both saber and foil.

As part of the military fencing and physical education teacher course, Borsody developed his own methods for saber fencing and decided to train future champions with a lot of energy. Hungary wanted to undo the humiliations of the Treaty of Trianon, although they realized that due to the new European balance of power after the war this could not take place on the battlefield. However, compensation was possible on the fencing pistes with what was considered by the Hungarians to be the Hungarian weapon par excellence, the saber. Borsody became responsible for the sports fencing training program within the Royal Hungarian Army and received the support of Regent Horthy, a former student of the Theresianum, and his government. The brilliant Borsody was a real champion maker. Under his supervision, Hungary won 18 gold and silver medals in saber fencing at nine different Olympic Games; and 18 gold and 45 silver medals at the World Saber Fencing Championships (József, K., 1976). Borsody trainde 15 Europese kampioenen en 24 Europese militaire kampioenen en zijn leerlingen wonnen in totaal 124 nationale Hongaarse titels (Máday, *Borsody L.*, 1976). On May 1, 1925, László Borsody, who had meanwhile been promoted to the rank of major, was appointed head maître of the fencing department of the sports teacher training course of the Royal Hungarian Army.

Borsody was an important reference point for the Dutch fencing delegation, which was led by Arie de Jong and in which two other Dutch top fencers of that time, the officers Henri Wijnoldy Daniëls (1889-1932), and Jan van der Wiel (1882-1962) invari-

ably were part of. In the spring of 1923, De Jong’s delegation toured Germany, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to fence competitions. This tour follows the trip that De Jong made alone to Budapest in the autumn (October-November) of 1922 to establish contact for the first time with the Hungarian military and civil fencing associations in Budapest. De Jong found a country seriously affected by the First World War and the adverse consequences of the Treaty of Trianon. The sports world was hit hard by the sports blockade, which prevented Hungarian athletes from participating in international competitions. De Jong and his fencing delegations would regularly visit Budapest in the following years to train and compete against the Hungarian fencing elite. The Dutch captain and his men were welcome in Budapest because of the special historical bond with the Netherlands and because the country had been neutral during the First World War. The Dutch fencers served as one of the few international sparring partners of the Hungarian fencing elite. It must have been a great pleasure for De Jong and the Dutch fencers that they could fence in Hungary, the “homeland” of the saber. The Dutch delegation was even allowed to participate in the 1923 Hungarian national fencing championship, making this the first “international” fencing competition for the Hungarian saber selection since the sports blockade. This championship took place on May 5 and 6, 1923 in the auditorium of the Technical University of Budapest. De Jong was the only Dutch fencer to reach the final round. These contacts ultimately led to support at the highest political level for an exchange between Dutch and Hungarian top fencers.

In the meantime, the Dutch Olympic fencer, officer, sports official and chairman of the Dutch fencing association (KNASB), George van Rossem, had become chairman of the FIE. Van Rossem took over the gavel from Maginot, who had taken too French a course. The Dutch sports director would be chairman of the FIE between 1925 and 1928 and worked behind the scenes to give the successor states of the Central Powers access to international fencing competitions again. He was also general secretary of the preparatory committee for the Amsterdam Olympic Games, which would be held in 1928. In that capacity he had access to IOC circles to advocate a similar goal. The Amsterdam Games were of great importance to the Hungarian political and fencing leadership. The Hungarians had their sights set on both disciplines of the saber tournament. In this way, Dutch fencers and sports diplomats became important for Hungary to regain a place in the international fencing world.

Although the first fencing tour of the De Jong delegation visited four successor states of the former Central Powers, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in April-May of 1923, the Dutch fencers were most attracted by the open, rich and innovative fencing climate in Budapest. In addition to military fencing *maîtres* such as Borsody, civilian *maîtres* were also active here, such as the Italian *maître* Italo Santelli (1886-1945). The rivalry between the military and civilian fencing associations in Budapest had a beneficial effect on the level of Hungarian saber fencing. It would soon become apparent that despite the sports blockade, Hungarian top fencers would effortlessly compete for podium places at international competitions after the lifting of those blockades.

Arie de Jong was the best and most famous Dutch fencer of his time. He was born in 1882 in the Dutch East Indies and died in 1966 in The Hague. He retired early from the army at the rank of major and then became a restaurateur of an Indonesian restaurant in The Hague. Although he fenced with all three weapons, his favorite weapon was the saber. De Jong became European champion in Paris in 1922 and in The Hague in 1923. He became Dutch champion a total of 18 times and he participated five times in the Olympic Games between 1906 and 1928, where he won bronze five times. Three albums of his personal fencing history have been preserved, containing a wealth of information about De Jong's fencing activities in the 1920s. Well documented are three types of international fencing competitions in which De Jong participated: the European Championships in Paris (1922), The Hague (1923), Budapest (1926), and Vichy (1927); the Olympic Games in Antwerp (1920), Paris (1924), and Amsterdam (1928) and the European Military Fencing Championships in The Hague (1927) and Budapest (1929). In between these official competitions, the tours of the Dutch fencing delegations, consisting almost exclusively of military fencers, in the countries of the former Central Powers, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are also richly documented. This documentation consists of many team photos, group photos, competition convocations and posters, competition results, signatures of the participating fencers and dignitaries who were present at the competitions, photos of banquets in tuxedos or gala uniforms at which dignitaries also appeared, short texts with a personal message from fellow fencers and officials, postcards from fellow fencers, menus, newspaper clippings with competition reports from the Dutch, German, Austrian, Italian, French, Czechoslovak and Hungarian press,

drawings and caricatures also from De Jong himself, business cards from fellow fencers and officials. There are also photos and short reports of FIE meetings where De Jong represented the Netherlands in the absence of other officials. All this material provides a good overview of the peak years of fencer Arie de Jong, but also of the Dutch, European and Hungarian fencing networks in which he operated. In the three albums, reference material relating to Hungary occupies a special place.

Because the Netherlands had remained neutral during the First World War, the Dutch fencers and especially their captain 'Captain De Jong', as he was referred to in the Hungarian press, were welcome in the fencing halls in Budapest. Apart from the political interests that the Netherlands offered the Hungarian Fencing Federation a diplomatic channel to break out of the isolated position caused by the sports blockade, the Hungarian fencing community was very pleased with the Dutch fencing delegation. This is because of the acceptable level that the Dutch fencers had and especially because they worked hard at the training sessions during their Hungarian internships. The Dutch fencers benefited from the innovative techniques and tactics in saber fencing that Borsody was developing. A close bond developed between the Dutch fencing delegation and Borsody. This led to Borsody, the fencing professor as he was called in the Dutch press at the time, being invited by the Dutch Minister of Defense Johan Lambooij to give a number of workshops and demonstrations in various Dutch cities. László Borsody's invitation to the Netherlands was linked to the European Military Fencing Championships that were held in The Hague in early June 1927 and of which Minister Lambooij was the patron. Prior to this championship, Borsody gave demonstrations and workshops in which his Dutch saber students, such as Arie de Jong, participated. Borsody's demonstrations were extensively discussed in the Dutch and Hungarian press and enthusiastically supported by the Royal House, both H.M. Queen Wilhelmina and her husband H.R.H. Prince Hendrik were present at Borsody's reception in The Hague.

The 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam were a reference point for Borsody (G. van Rossem., 1928). The Hungarian fencing *maître*, who did not like to travel abroad, made an exception for his Dutch invitation. Borsody visited the Netherlands a year before the Amsterdam Games were to take place. This visit to the Netherlands served not only to give workshops and demonstrations, but also as preparation for the summer games. Borsody had his sights set on these games. His goal was to win the

two saber disciplines at the Amsterdam Games, the individual and the team tournament. Amsterdam would prove to be a successful tournament for Hungarian saber fencing. The Hungarian officer Ödön Terstyánszky (1890-1929), one of Borsody's favorite students, became Olympic champion in the individual saber competition in a legendary Hungarian-Hungarian final against his teammate Attila Petschauer (1904-1943), who was a student of Santelli. In the team final, Hungary competed against arch-rival Italy, taking revenge for the defeat against Italy in the Olympic team final in 1924 during the Games in Paris. That the Hungarian victory at saber in Amsterdam was driven by political objectives became clear the day after Terstyánszky's victory on August 12, 1928.

Immediately after his victory, Terstyánszky traveled to London to meet Lord Harold Rothermere, a conservative British aristocrat, member of the House of Lords and owner of the British newspaper the Daily Mail. Lord Rothermere was the only Western politician to openly support Hungary in its quest for a revision of the Trianon Treaty. In an article published on June 21, 1927 in the Daily Mail, Rothermere called for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Highlighting how unfair the treaty was, the British Conservative supported the view that areas along the border with Hungary that were mainly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians should be returned to Hungary. To reinforce his words, he launched his campaign 'Justice for Hungary'. The article published in the Daily Mail provoked strong reactions from representatives of France and the Little Entente. The whole issue degenerated into a media war and continued to fester until 1929. The French and British governments put pressure on Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen to moderate the British Lord's tone in his publications (Ignác, R., *Bethlen, I., 1989: 181-183*).

As a sign of respect for his pro-Hungarian views, the newly crowned Olympic champion Terstyánszky donated his saber with which he had fenced the saber final in Amsterdam to Lord Rothermere. When Terstyánszky returned to Hungary and met his fencing maître Borsody, he characterized Terstyánszky's act of donating his saber to Lord Rothermere, the only Western politician who openly advocated the revision of the Treaty of Trianon, as follows: 'Your act is worthy of a Hungarian army officer, it is worthy of Hungarian saber fencing.' (Máday, *Borsody, L., 1978*).

#### *Dutch Fencing Diplomacy*

The Netherlands had remained neutral during the First World War and, where possible, had tried

to act as a mediator between the German bloc on the one hand and the French-British bloc on the other. After the First World War, the Netherlands attempted to continue its policy of neutrality. Although the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Karnebeek replaced the term 'neutrality' with 'independence policy', partly to allow the Netherlands to play a more active role in the League of Nations, which the Netherlands had become a member of in 1920, the Netherlands continued to adhere to the policy of neutrality. This foreign policy was expressed in the balancing act between the two blocs, the so-called German bloc of the former Central Powers and their successor states to which Austria-Hungary had also belonged and the Allies of which the French-British Entente was the bearer. Dutch diplomacy made efforts to re-involve the losers of the war, the Central Powers and their successor states in European relations, to ensure that economic and trade relations with those states, especially with Germany, could flourish again and to prevent France from becoming too powerful on the continent. In any case, it wanted to prevent a unilateral domination of Europe by the Allied and Associated Powers. The Netherlands feared that without the membership of Germany or the successor states of the Central Powers, the League of Nations would become an instrument of power in the hands of the Allies. Even after the First World War, the Netherlands wanted to remain neutral, retain its sovereignty and commit itself to maintaining international order and peace. That is why the Netherlands made efforts to re-involve the former Central Powers in the international diplomatic networks.

In the context of these political, diplomatic and humanitarian actions on the part of the Netherlands to support Hungary as part of the Central Powers, Dutch initiatives must also be placed to lift the Hungarian sports blockade, which also affected Hungarian fencing (Willem, O., Joke, S., 1977). This was to give Hungary access to the international sporting circuits, thereby enabling the country to normalize its official position in European international relations. The question can be asked to what extent Dutch fencing diplomacy towards Hungary can be classified as a case of cultural diplomacy. Gienow-Hecht quotes the following definition of cultural diplomacy: "direct and enduring contact between peoples of different nations" designed to "help create a better climate of international trust and understanding in which official relations can operate." Gienow-Hecht concludes that cultural diplomacy is a matter of traditional foreign policy, but actually in an indirect way (Zie, J., 2010). The Dutch fencing contacts with Hungary, of which Arie de Jong and his

fencing delegations were advanced posts, certainly fall under the above definition. There are many signs that these fencing contacts had the coverage of the highest political circles in the Netherlands, entirely in accordance with the policy of neutrality or independence officially professed by the Netherlands in those years. De Jong and his men were serving officers who had to be given permission to enter into informal fencing contacts abroad in the tense years after the First World War. Furthermore, they received the support of the highest political leadership, namely the then Minister of War Johan Lambooij and the Royal House, who often acted in the role of 'patron' during the visits of the Hungarian fencing elite. The activities of the Dutch fencer and sports director George van Rossem should not go unmentioned in this context. Van Rossem was a linchpin in the years of normalization of sports contacts in Europe. As a board member of the FIE and the Dutch Olympic Committee (NOC) that prepared the Amsterdam Olympic Games and his contacts at the IOC, he was ideally placed to bring about sports diplomatic changes in the 1920s. It is significant that Van Rossem was released from his military obligations by the Ministry of War to fully focus on the preparation of the Amsterdam Games. The choice to support the Dutch-Hungarian fencing exchanges from the Dutch state may have been striking in the light of the traditional ecclesiastical relations between the two countries, but it is understandable when we consider that the new state leadership of Hungary fell into the hands of officers after the First World War, such as Regent Admiral Horthy, who were educated at the Theresianum and were passionate about fencing. For example, contacts with Hungarian fencing provided access to the highest Hungarian political leadership in the country. The

documentation in De Jong's fencing albums, which mainly consists of photographic material and signatures, illustrates this perfectly. This means that we can rightly speak of 'Dutch fencing diplomacy'.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, the Dutch fencing exchanges with Hungary, particularly those facilitated by Arie de Jong and his fencing delegations, can undoubtedly be classified as a form of cultural diplomacy. These exchanges went beyond mere sporting interactions, serving as a channel for informal diplomatic engagement between the two nations.

The support and involvement of high-ranking Dutch officials, including the Minister of War and the Royal House, underscore the strategic importance of these fencing contacts. They were seen as a means to foster international understanding and trust, especially in the tense post-World War I era.

The role of individuals like George van Rossem, a key figure in European sports diplomacy, further highlights the significance of these exchanges. His position within the FIE and the NOC enabled him to leverage sports as a tool for diplomatic change.

By analyzing the documentation and historical context, it becomes evident that Dutch fencing diplomacy towards Hungary was a calculated strategy to build bridges and influence political relations. The focus on fencing, a sport deeply rooted in Hungarian culture and tradition, provided a unique avenue for engagement with the Hungarian elite.

Ultimately, the Dutch-Hungarian fencing exchanges offer a fascinating case study of how cultural diplomacy can be employed to achieve specific foreign policy objectives, even in the most unexpected of ways.

### References

- Aalders M. J. (2021) *Nederlandse en Hongaarse protestanten gedurende het interbellum* [Dutch and Hungarian Protestants during the Interwar period]. Amersfoort: Uitgeverij De Vuurbaak.
- Belgium Olympic Committee. (1957) *Olympic Games Antwerp 1920 Official Report*. Brussels: BOC.
- Diepen, Remco van. (1999) *Voor Volkenbond en Vrede. Nederland en het streven naar een nieuwe wereldorde 1919-1946* [For the League of Nations and Peace. The Netherlands and the Pursuit of a New World Order 1919-1946]. Amsterdam: Prometheus.
- Gienow-Hecht J.C.E. (2010) 'What Are We Searching For? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents and the State' in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, red. J.C.E. Gienow-Hecht, and M.C. Donfried. New York: Berghahn.
- Harinck G. (2014) 'We must no longer restrict our horizon to one country: Neo-Calvinism and Internationalism in the Interbellum Era', in *European Encounters: Intellectual Exchange and the Rethinking of Europe 1914-1945*, eds. C. Reijnen and M. Rensen, Amsterdam: Rodopi, p. 225-245.
- Hellema D. (2009). *Dutch Foreign Policy. The Role of the Netherlands in World Politics*. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing.
- Howard M. (2007). *The First World War: A very short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keresztényi J. (1976). *Az olimpiák története* [The History of the Olympic Games]. Budapest: Gondolat.

- Keys, B.J. (2006). *Globalizing Sports: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kun L. (1969). *Egyetemes és magyar vívástörténet [Universal and Hungarian fencing History]*. Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó.
- Máday, N. (2017). *Borsody László: a géniusz [Borsody: The Genius]*. Budapest.
- Máday, N. (2017). *Borsody László: a géniusz árvái [The Orphans of the Genius]*. Budapest.
- Marác L. (1996). *Hungarian Revival: Political Reflections on Central Europe*. Nieuwegein: Aspekt.
- Marác L. (2017). *Towards Eurasian Linguistic Isoglosses: The Case of Turkic and Hungarian*. Astana: International Turkic Academy.
- Marác L. (2019). *Saber Fencing and the Remaking of the Hungarian State*. Erdélyi Társadalom/Transylvanian Society, Vol. 17(1), 21–37. <https://doi.org/10.17177/77171.222>.
- Marác, L. and Máday N. (2019). *Kard a tulipán alatt: a magyar-holland történelmi vívókapcsolatokról [Saber under the Tulips: The Hungarian-Dutch historical fencing Relations]*. Budapest.
- Martin L. (1924). *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. I Containing the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye and the Treaty of Trianon*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Romsics I. (1989). *Bethlen István, Politikai életrajz [István Bethlen, a political biography]*. Budapest: Magyarságkutató Intézet.
- Rossem, G. van, ed. (1928). *The Ninth Olympiad being the Official Report of the Olympic Games of 1928 Celebrated at Amsterdam*. Amsterdam: The Netherlands Olympic Committee.
- Schuursma R. (2005). *Vergeefs onzijdig: Nederlands neutraliteit 1919-1940 [In vain neutral: Dutch neutrality 1919-1940]*. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Matrijs.
- Szikora K. (2012). 'Az első magyar testnevelési (sport)törvény'. [The first Hungarian (sport) Law of Physical Education], *Hadtörténeti közlemények* Vol. 125, nr. 2 (2012), p. 531-554.
- Szikora K. (2013). 'A magyarországi vívósport 100 éve' [Hundred Years of Hungarian Fencing Sport], *Me.dok VIII*, nr. 3 (2013): 5-26, accessed on 9 april 2023, <https://www.medok.ro/sites/medok/files/publications/pdfs/ME.dok-2013-3.pdf>.
- Thierry Terret T., Ottogalli-Mazzavavallo C., and Saint-Martin J. (2007). 'The Puliti affair and the 1924 Paris Olympics: Geo-Political Issues, national Pride and fencing Traditions', *The International Journal of the History of Sport* Vol. 30, nr. 7 (2007), p. 757-773, <https://doi.10.1080/09523360701505429>.
- Vonnard Ph. and Tallec Marston K. (2020), 'Playing across the "halfway line" on the fields of international relations: the Journey from Globalizing Sport to Sport Diplomacy'. *Contemporary European History* Vol. 29:2 (2020 ), p. 220-231.
- Willem Otterspeer W. and Schuller tot Peursum-Meijer J. (1997). *Wetenschap en wereldvrede. De Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen en het herstel van de internationale wetenschap tijdens het Interbellum [Science and world peace. The Royal Academy of Sciences and the recovery of international science during the Interwar period]*. Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen.
- Zondag J. (2021). *Volkskracht: sport, lichamelijke opvoeding en de versterking van Nederland 1880-1940 [People's power: sport, physical education and the strengthening of the Netherlands 1880-1940]*. Amsterdam: Boom.

**Information about author:**

László Károly Marác – Professor of the European Studies Department at the Amsterdam University (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, E-mail: [L.K.Maracz@uva.nl](mailto:L.K.Maracz@uva.nl))

**Автор туралы мәлімет:**

Ласло Карой Марач – Амстердам университетінің Еуропалық зерттеулер кафедрасының профессоры (Амстердам қ., Нидерланды, E-mail: [L.K.Maracz@uva.nl](mailto:L.K.Maracz@uva.nl))

**Информация об авторе:**

Ласло Карой Марач – профессор кафедры европейских исследований Амстердамского университета (г. Амстердам, Нидерланды, E-mail: [L.K.Maracz@uva.nl](mailto:L.K.Maracz@uva.nl))

*Previously sent November 9, 2024.*

*Accepted December 10, 2024.*

2-бөлім

**АЙМАҚТАНУ ЖӘНЕ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ  
ҚҰҚЫҚТЫҢ ӨЗЕКТІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

---

Section 2

**CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL  
STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

---

Раздел 2

**АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ РЕГИОНОВЕДЕНИЯ  
И МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА**

**G. Zhaxygulova** 

Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey  
e-mail: [gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr](mailto:gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr)

## **TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN-CHINESE INTERACTION IN CENTRAL ASIA: FROM STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP TO ASYMMETRIC RIVALRY**

The article examines the transformation of Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia against the background of China's growing presence in the region, which is particularly relevant in the context of global geopolitical changes and increasing international tensions.

The purpose of the research is to critically analyze the relationship between the official discourse of strategic partnership and the actual dynamics of Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia. The work focuses on studying economic presence, transformation of migration processes, changes in military-political influence, and educational space.

The methodological basis of the research consists of a comprehensive approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods of empirical data analysis for the period 2010-2023. Official statistical materials, interstate agreements, data from expert-analytical centers, and results of sociological research were used.

Based on systematic analysis, the formation of an asymmetric rivalry model has been identified, where behind the facade of declared strategic partnership, there is a consistent replacement of Russian influence by Chinese presence, which is confirmed by quantitative indicators.

The scientific significance of the research lies in the development of theoretical approaches to the analysis of Russian-Chinese relations, demonstrating the need for a differentiated consideration of global and regional levels of interaction. The work makes a substantial contribution to understanding the mechanisms of regional balance of power transformation and the peculiarities of major powers' interaction at the regional level.

The practical value of the results lies in their potential use in forming Russia's foreign policy strategy in Central Asia and adjusting mechanisms for maintaining regional influence in conditions of growing competition with China.

The practical significance of the research is determined by its value for developing balanced foreign policy by Central Asian states in conditions of increasing competition between Russia and China. The results of the work allow regional countries to optimize their participation in various integration projects, improve investment attraction mechanisms, and develop more effective strategies for multi-vector diplomacy.

**Key words:** Russian-Chinese relations, Central Asia", asymmetric rivalry, regional influence, strategic partnership.

Г. Жақсығұлова

Болу Абант Иззет Байсал Университеті, Болу қ., Түркия  
e-mail: [gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr](mailto:gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr)

### **Орталық Азиядағы Ресей-Қытай өзара әрекеттестігінің трансформациясы: стратегиялық серіктестіктен асимметриялық бәсекелестікке дейін**

Мақалада Орталық Азиядағы Ресей-Қытай өзара әрекеттестігінің трансформациясы ҚХР-дың аймақтағы қатысуының күшеюі аясында зерттеледі, бұл жаһандық геосаяси өзгерістер мен халықаралық шиеленістің өсуі жағдайында ерекше өзектілікке ие.

Зерттеудің мақсаты стратегиялық серіктестіктің ресми дискурсы мен Орталық Азиядағы Ресей-Қытай өзара әрекеттестігінің нақты динамикасының арақатынасын сыни талдау болып табылады. Жұмыс экономикалық қатысуды, көші-қон процестерінің трансформациясын, әскери-саяси ықпал мен білім беру кеңістігіндегі өзгерістерді зерттеуге бағытталған.

Зерттеудің әдіснамалық негізін 2010-2023 жылдар аралығындағы эмпирикалық деректерді талдаудың сандық және сапалық әдістерін біріктіретін кешенді тәсіл құрайды. Ресми статистикалық материалдар, мемлекетаралық келісімдер, сараптамалық-талдау орталықтарының деректері және әлеуметтанулық зерттеулер нәтижелері пайдаланылды.

Жүйелік талдау негізінде асимметриялық бәсекелестік моделінің қалыптасуы анықталды, мұнда жарияланған стратегиялық серіктестіктің артында Ресей ықпалының Қытай қатысуымен дәйекті алмастырылуы жүріп жатыр, бұл сандық көрсеткіштермен расталады.

Зерттеудің ғылыми маңыздылығы Ресей-Қытай қатынастарын талдаудың теориялық тәсілдерін дамытуда, өзара әрекеттестіктің жаһандық және аймақтық деңгейлерін саралап қарау қажеттілігін көрсетуде. Жұмыс аймақтық күш-қуат теңгерімінің трансформация механизмдерін және ірі державалардың аймақтық деңгейдегі өзара әрекеттесу ерекшеліктерін түсінуге елеулі үлес қосады.

Нәтижелердің практикалық құндылығы оларды Орталық Азиядағы Ресейдің сыртқы саяси стратегиясын қалыптастыруда және Қытаймен өсіп келе жатқан бәсекелестік жағдайында аймақтық ықпалды сақтау тетіктерін түзетуде пайдалану мүмкіндігінде.

Зерттеудің практикалық маңыздылығы Ресей мен Қытай арасындағы күшейіп келе жатқан бәсекелестік жағдайында Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің теңдестірілген сыртқы саясатын әзірлеу үшін оның құндылығымен анықталады. Жұмыс нәтижелері аймақ елдеріне әртүрлі интеграциялық жобаларға қатысуын оңтайландыруға, инвестицияларды тарту тетіктерін жетілдіруге және көпвекторлы дипломатияның тиімді стратегияларын дамытуға мүмкіндік береді.

**Түйін сөздер:** Ресей-Қытай қатынастары, Орталық Азия, асимметриялық бәсекелестік, аймақтық ықпал, «стратегиялық серіктестік».

Г. Жаксыгулова

Университет Болу Абант Иззет Байсал, г. Болу, Турция  
e-mail: gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr

### **Трансформация Российско-Китайского взаимодействия в Центральной Азии: от стратегического партнерства к асимметричному соперничеству**

В статье исследуется трансформация российско-китайского взаимодействия в Центральной Азии на фоне усиления присутствия КНР в регионе, что представляет особую актуальность в условиях глобальных геополитических изменений и роста международной напряженности.

Цель исследования заключается в критическом анализе соотношения официального дискурса стратегического партнерства и реальной динамики российско-китайского взаимодействия в Центральной Азии. Работа фокусируется на изучении экономического присутствия, трансформации миграционных процессов, изменений в военно-политическом влиянии и образовательном пространстве.

Методологическую основу исследования составляет комплексный подход, сочетающий количественные и качественные методы анализа эмпирических данных за период 2010-2023 годов. Используются официальные статистические материалы, межгосударственные соглашения, данные экспертно-аналитических центров и результаты социологических исследований.

На основе системного анализа выявлено формирование модели асимметричного соперничества, где за фасадом декларируемого стратегического партнёрства происходит последовательное замещение российского влияния китайским присутствием, что подтверждается количественными показателями.

Научная значимость исследования заключается в развитии теоретических подходов к анализу российско-китайских отношений, демонстрируя необходимость дифференцированного рассмотрения глобального и регионального уровней взаимодействия. Работа вносит существенный вклад в понимание механизмов трансформации региональных балансов сил и особенностей взаимодействия крупных держав на региональном уровне.

Практическая ценность результатов состоит в возможности их использования при формировании российской внешнеполитической стратегии в Центральной Азии и корректировке механизмов сохранения регионального влияния в условиях растущей конкуренции с Китаем.

Практическая значимость исследования определяется его ценностью для выработки сбалансированной внешней политики государствами Центральной Азии в условиях усиливающейся конкуренции между Россией и Китаем. Результаты работы позволяют странам региона оптимизировать свое участие в различных интеграционных проектах, совершенствовать механизмы привлечения инвестиций и развивать более эффективные стратегии многовекторной дипломатии.

**Ключевые слова:** российско-китайские отношения, Центральная Азия, асимметричное соперничество, региональное влияние, стратегическое партнерство.

## Introduction

In the modern system of international relations, one of the most debatable issues remains the nature of interaction between Russia and China in Central Asia: whether their interests in the region truly coincide, providing a basis for mutually beneficial cooperation, or whether growing rivalry is hidden behind the facade of declared partnership. This question gains importance against the backdrop of global changes in international relations and mounting geopolitical tensions, where the character of the interaction of the two largest powers of Eurasia acquires a special meaning.

Such a complex and multidimensional phenomenon has resulted in different approaches in the academic literature examining this issue opposing each other with regard to their assessment of its nature. Proponents of the first direction (A. D. Voskresensky, 2021; K. P. Borishpolets, 2020; S. G. Luzyanin, 2022) emphasize the strategic nature of the Russian-Chinese partnership, pointing to the complementarity of interests between the two powers in the region. Their works develop the concept of “greater Eurasian partnership,” where Russia and China act as natural allies jointly opposing Western influence. A. V. Lukin (2023), analyzing the institutional basis for cooperation within the SCO, also emphasizes the constructive nature of bilateral interaction, highlighting the role of multilateral mechanisms in strengthening regional cooperation.

However, there exists a fundamentally different view on the dynamics of Russian-Chinese relations in the region. Researchers taking the opposite position point to increasing competition between Russia and China. A. A. Kazantsev and I. D. Zvyagelskaya (2022), drawing on extensive empirical material, document the process of Russia’s gradual displacement from traditional spheres of influence in the region. Their argumentation is supported by M.V. Danilovich’s research (2023), who demonstrates China’s growing dominance in trade and investment based on detailed analysis of economic statistics. Special significance is given to this direction by the work of researchers – Alexander Cooley and Marlene Laruelle (2021), who emphasize the structural nature of contradictions between the interests of the two powers in Central Asia, pointing to fundamental differences in their strategic goals and approaches to regional development.

In an attempt to overcome the limitations of the binary “cooperation-rivalry” approach, a third direction of research has emerged. Represented by the works of D. V. Trenin (2022) and A. F. Mochulsky

(2023), it offers a more nuanced approach, pointing to the complex coexistence of partnership and competition elements in Russian-Chinese relations. A special contribution to the development of this direction was made by Bobo Lo, who introduced the concept of an “axis of convenience.” This concept characterizes the pragmatic nature of interaction, where cooperation in some areas organically combines with rivalry in others, allowing for a more accurate reflection of the complex nature of Russian-Chinese relations in Central Asia. This approach appears most promising for understanding the real dynamics of interaction between the two powers in the region, as it allows going beyond simplified dichotomies and taking into account the multiplicity of factors influencing the nature of bilateral relations.

Analysis of existing literature shows that at the global level, Russia and China indeed demonstrate a high degree of coordination: they synchronously use their veto power in the UN Security Council, present a united front in BRICS and SCO, and jointly defend the principles of a multipolar world order. However, when it comes to the regional dimension of their interaction, especially in Central Asia, the picture becomes significantly more complex and ambiguous.

The relevance of detailed research on this issue is determined by several factors. First, there is a need for critical analysis of the relationship between official rhetoric about “comprehensive strategic partnership” and actual processes in key areas of regional interaction. Second, in the context of transforming global architecture of international relations, it is fundamentally important to understand: does Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia truly develop according to a win-win model, as claimed by official representatives of both countries, or does reality indicate a more complex and contradictory picture?

In existing literature, there is a notable gap between the analysis of global and regional dimensions of interaction. Most studies focus either on the general nature of bilateral relations or on specific aspects of regional presence, without paying sufficient attention to contradictions between different levels of interaction. Moreover, many works rely predominantly on official documents and statements, without conducting systematic analysis of factual data on the transformation of both powers’ presence in the region.

In this connection, the aim of this study is to critically analyze the relationship between the official discourse of strategic partnership and the real

dynamics of Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia. To achieve this goal, the following research objectives are proposed:

Analyze changes in the economic presence of both powers in the region, paying special attention to the transformation of trade and investment flows and energy cooperation;

Investigate the evolution of educational and migration processes in the region;

Assess the transformation of approaches to ensuring regional security, including through the lens of military-technical cooperation;

Identify actual areas of convergence and divergence of Russian and Chinese interests in the region based on comprehensive analysis of empirical data.

### **Description of materials and methods**

The methodological foundation of this research comprises a comprehensive approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. The research is based on systematic analysis of empirical data covering the period from 2010 to 2023, allowing to trace the dynamics of transformation in Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia.

The main sources of quantitative data include official statistical materials from national statistical services of Russia, China, and Central Asian countries, including indicators of foreign trade turnover, foreign direct investment volumes, data on migration flows, and educational exchanges. Additional sources include databases of international organizations: World Bank, Asian Development Bank, EAEU, and SCO, which ensures comprehensiveness and verifiability of the statistical indicators used.

Qualitative analysis relies on the study of official documents, including interstate agreements, national security strategies, foreign policy concepts, and program documents on regional cooperation. An important source of information comes from speeches and statements by official representatives of Russia, China, and Central Asian states, diplomatic correspondence materials, and final documents from multilateral meetings. To deepen the analysis, content analysis of publications from leading expert-analytical centers of Russia (IMEMO RAS, RISI, RIAC), China (CASS, CIIS), and international research institutes (SIPRI, Carnegie Endowment) specializing in Central Asian issues was conducted.

The study employs comparative analysis method to juxtapose official discourse on strategic partnership with actual indicators of interaction in various spheres. The use of case study method in examining

specific projects and initiatives allows identification of practical mechanisms of cooperation and competition between Russia and China in the region. For processing quantitative data, statistical analysis methods are applied, including correlation analysis to identify relationships between various indicators of economic and political interaction.

The time span of the study is from 2010 to 2023, which makes it possible to compare Russian-Chinese cooperation before and after a series of important geopolitical events, including the reshaping of the international environment after 2014. The halted Central Asia study Countries included are Central Asia Such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This broader methodological approach guarantees all dimensions of the problems are investigated and substantive facts are available to shape an objective picture of the real mechanism of Russian/Chinese interaction.

### **Results**

#### ***Paradoxes of Russian-Chinese Partnership: From Global Cooperation to Regional Competition***

Russia and China today demonstrate a high degree of coordination in international organizations, consistently opposing the formation of a unipolar world order and promoting the concept of a multipolar world, which is reflected in joint initiatives to reform the global governance system, put forward at the UN, BRICS, and SCO platforms.

The current system of coordinating foreign policy actions between Russia and China represents a multi-level mechanism, including regular meetings of heads of state (5-6 times per year), consultations through Security Councils, the work of more than 20 intergovernmental cooperation commissions, strategic dialogue at the level of deputy foreign ministers (4 times per year), as well as a developed network of expert interaction through joint analytical centers and academic exchanges. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is confirmed by concrete coordination results, including the synchronization of positions on key international conflicts in Syria, Venezuela, and Iran, the development of agreed approaches to reforming international institutions, and countering unilateral U.S. sanctions. The most illustrative example of such interaction was the work of the two countries in the UN Security Council, where during the period 2011-2023, 18 joint vetoes were used on key international issues (United Nations Security Council, 2023). In particular, Russia and China blocked resolutions on Syria that could have led to

a repeat of the Libyan scenario, as well as several initiatives that threatened the principle of non-interference in sovereign states' internal affairs. Additionally, the countries consistently oppose attempts by the U.S. and its allies to use UN mechanisms to legitimize unilateral sanctions and political pressure on independent states.

Special attention should be paid to the transformation of Russian-Chinese relations in the context of the military conflict in Ukraine that began in 2022. China's position on this issue demonstrates the pragmatic approach characteristic of Chinese diplomacy: official Beijing refrains from direct support of military actions but consistently opposes anti-Russian sanctions and NATO's military presence expansion. As an example, one can cite Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in March 2023, during which important agreements on expanding economic cooperation were signed and a transition of relations between the two countries to a new level was announced (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023). This was practically confirmed by unprecedented growth in trade between the countries, reaching a historical maximum and exceeding \$200 billion in 2023 (General Administration of Customs of China, 2024). The role of Chinese technology companies in the Russian market has significantly increased, partially filling the niche of departed Western manufacturers. In the energy sector, supplies of Russian energy resources to China have significantly increased, not only through pipeline systems but also through other routes, including the Northern Sea Route (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2023). Cooperation in the financial sphere has intensified: the share of national currencies in bilateral settlements exceeded 80%, and the Chinese yuan has become one of the main reserve currencies for the Russian financial system (Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2023).

Despite the strengthening of global interaction between the two states, there are certain contradictions that are particularly evident at the regional level, specifically in Central Asia. In this region, China's economic expansion and its growing political influence create objective prerequisites for competition with Russia's historical interests.

Paradoxically, while Russia and China demonstrate unity in opposing "American hegemony" and promoting the concept of a multipolar world on the global arena, in Central Asia there is a consistent replacement of Russian influence with Chinese eco-

nomics and political instruments. A comprehensive analysis of key areas of regional interaction – economics, security, migration, and education – reveals the systemic nature of this transformation.

Based on preliminary analysis, a hypothesis can be proposed: an asymmetric rivalry model between Russia and China is forming in Central Asia, where Moscow, trying to maintain its traditional influence, is forced to adapt to growing Chinese presence under conditions of limited resources. This is confirmed by both economic indicators and the transformation of the region's political landscape.

The emerging situation is characterized not so much by open confrontation or declared strategic partnership, but by asymmetric rivalry, where Russia, while maintaining significant influence in the military-political sphere, is consistently losing positions in other dimensions of regional presence. The subsequent paragraphs will present a detailed analysis of this transformation across key areas of interaction, which will allow confirming or refuting the proposed hypothesis based on specific data and facts.

### *Economic Presence of Russia and China in Central Asia*

The study of Russia and China's economic and political interests in Central Asia demonstrates growing competition between the powers for influence in the region, despite their declared strategic partnership at the global level. Statistical data illustrate convincingly a considerable shift in the economic balance favoring China: then was in early 2000s Russia-trade volume with countries of the region was of 2–3 times higher Chinese indicators (World Bank, 2022), by 2023 everything had changed sharply back. In 2022, China's overall trade turnover with five countries of Central Asia accounted \$70 billion – over 3 times more than the Russian figure (about \$21 billion). (Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China [MOFCOM], 2024).

In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the situation is even more remarkable when the share of China in the total foreign trade surpassed 30% and China became the largest trading partner (Asian Development Bank(ADB),2023). A more detailed examination shows that the analysis of trade and economic relations dynamics between Central Asian countries and Russia and China, based on national statistical services data and UN Comtrade database (2023), demonstrates a fundamental change in the economic balance in the region over the past two decades.

**Table 1** – Trade Turnover of Central Asian Countries with Russia and China (billion USD)

| Country      | 2000 with Russia | 2000 with China | China's Share, % | 2022 with Russia | 2022 with China | China's Share, % |
|--------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Kazakhstan   | 4.2              | 1.4             | 7%               | 24.1             | 31.2            | 38.9%            |
| Uzbekistan   | 2.1              | 0.4             | 3.2%             | 9.3              | 11.6            | 21.4%            |
| Kyrgyzstan   | 0.4              | 0.1             | 2.8%             | 2.5              | 7.2             | 31.2%            |
| Tajikistan   | 0.3              | 0.06            | 1.9%             | 1.6              | 2.8             | 29.6%            |
| Turkmenistan | 0.6              | 0.2             | 4.1%             | 1.9              | 11.8            | 42.8%            |
| TOTAL        | 7.6              | 2.16            | 4.8%             | 39.4             | 64.6            | 32.8%            |

**Table 2** – Structure of Trade with China by Main Product Groups (2022, %)

| Country      | Exports to China                        | Imports from China                                  |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Kazakhstan   | Oil (60%), metals (15%), uranium (10%)  | Machinery and equipment (45%), electronics (20%)    |
| Uzbekistan   | Gas (40%), cotton (25%), metals (15%)   | Industrial equipment (35%), consumer goods (30%)    |
| Kyrgyzstan   | Ores (45%), agricultural products (20%) | Textiles (40%), electronics (25%)                   |
| Tajikistan   | Ores (55%), cotton (20%)                | Machinery and equipment (40%), consumer goods (35%) |
| Turkmenistan | Gas (85%), cotton (10%)                 | Industrial equipment (50%), transport (20%)         |

Sources: UN Comtrade Database, national statistical services of Central Asian countries, 2023

The presented statistical data indicate a radical change in the trade and economic balance in the region, where Chinese economic presence shows a steady growth trend. Thus, if in 2000 the turnover of Russian trade with Central Asian countries was 3.5 times higher than the Chinese one (\$7.6 billion against \$2.16 billion) (that year is a convenient start date as for this time it is already possible to obtain aggregate statistical data) (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2023) at the end of 2022, the situation changed significantly: turnover of foreign trade in China reached \$64.6 billion, exceeding the Russian one by 1.6 times. This situation is particularly symbolic for trade relations with Turkmenistan: back in 2000, the share of the People's Republic of China in total foreign trade of Turkmenistan did not exceed 4.1%, while by 2022 this figure rose to 42.8% due to the volume deliveries of natural gas through the Central Asia-China pipeline (State Statistics Committee of Turkmenistan, 2023). Structural analysis of trade flows, conducted based on national customs services data, reveals significant asymmetry in the nature of trade relations: Central Asian countries' exports to China consist 60-85% of raw materials, while imports from China are 65-85% finished industrial products and equipment, creating long-term technological dependence of regional countries on Chinese manufacturers.

According to the Eurasian Economic Commission (2023), trade with Russia shows a more diversified structure, however, significantly lags behind Chinese direction in terms of volume. Analysis of trade relations growth dynamics, based on World Trade Organization (WTO, 2023) data, shows that the average annual growth rate of regional countries' trade with China during the period under review was 18.2%, more than twice exceeding the corresponding indicator in trade with Russia (8.7%). It should be noted that official statistics do not reflect volumes of informal trade and re-exports through third countries, which, according to World Bank experts (2023), may add up to 20-30% to official trade turnover indicators, especially in the case of trade with China. The presented data indicate not only quantitative changes in trade flows but also a qualitative transformation of economic influence in the region, where China consistently strengthens its positions in all Central Asian countries, forming long-term mechanisms of economic dependence through the structure of trade relations and large-scale investment projects within the Belt and Road Initiative.

By 2023, the total volume of Chinese investments in Central Asian countries exceeded \$40 billion, with a significant portion of funds directed towards creating transport corridors, pipeline systems, and industrial facilities (Asian Develop-

ment Bank [ADB], 2024). One significant instance was the development of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, via which Turkmen gas is exported to China bypassing Russia (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2023). China has also been involved in investment in hydrocarbon field development in Kazakhstan, where Chinese companies currently account for around 25% of oil production (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies [KISS], 2023). Chinese investments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan focused on mining and energy, leading to these countries' long-lasting dependence on Chinese funds (Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting [CABAR], 2023).

### ***Transformation of Migration Processes***

The flow of labor migrants, which is a part of the socioeconomic configuration that has formed during the years of the USSR, has always been one of the most used tools of Russian economic and social influence in Central Asia, and a new stage of development began after the collapse of the USSR. Such a mechanism of influence is rooted in developed socio-economic connection, a common linguistic space, and labor migration channels created over many decades. In 2022, the flows of labor migrants' remittances from Russia to Central Asian countries were at an all-time high of \$16.5 billion to reach 31.3% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP (\$2.9 billion), 26.7% of Tajikistan's GDP (\$2.5 billion), and 11.6% of Uzbekistan's GDP (\$8.1 billion) (Central Bank of Russia, 2023). Some corroborating figures come from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (2023), which states that in 2022 there were more than 4.2 million labor migrants from the countries of Central Asia officially registered in Russia. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2023), almost every third family in Tajikistan and fourth in Kyrgyzstan has at least one family member working in Russia, which has traditionally ensured the stability of socio-economic and cultural influence of Russia in the region.

Nevertheless, the last few years show a clear tendency towards a diversification of migration flows and a long-term gradual erosion of Russia's monopoly on labour migration. According to data from the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2023), the geography of labor migration from the countries of Central Asia has expanded significantly: This is particularly true in South Korea (40% in the last five years to 180,000 people), Turkey (over 250,000 people) and the Persian Gulf countries where the number of Central Asian workers tripled over the past three years, reaching 300,000 people

(Asian Development Bank, 2023). Higher wage and better working conditions of these destinations compels migrants to compete directly with the traditional Russian direction.

An essential reason for the changing of migration patterns is the growing economic influence of China in the region. Over the last five years, Chinese investments within the Belt and Road Initiative have resulted in direct job creation of over 200,000 in Central Asian countries (Ministry of Commerce, 2023). By 2022, total Chinese direct investment to the region has amounted to \$45 billion in total (China Global Investment Tracker, 2023), further strengthening new economic growth and job making parts on the region herself. By contrast, the Russian model of extracting labor resources, while creating jobs directly in Central Asian countries, the Chinese model of economic influence may put into question the existence leeching remittances from Central Asia for many years, as in the long term, that may significantly reduce dependence of Central Asian states on labor migration to Russia.

Particularly transformational to migration trends are demographic and sociocultural changes. It is important to note that Gallup sociological studies (2023) shows that the migration preferences of the younger generation have noticeably changed: for migrants over 40 years old who paved the way abroad, Russia is still the priority destination for 70% of respondents, but among the 18-25 age group this figure has fallen to 45%. A portion of this trend is further cemented by China increasingly offering a regional stick in education: for the first time in 2021, the number of students from Central Asia attending Chinese universities surpassed those attending Russian ones (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2023). The process of diminishing the role of the Russian language in the region and active promotion of the Chinese language by means of the network of Confucius institutes creates long-term preliminarily conditions for reorientation of migration flows in new directions.

Consequently, the traditional role of labor migration as a pivotal instrument of Russian influence in Central Asia is experiencing significant transformations driven by an intricate combination of economic, social, and demographic factors. The emergence of competitive alternative migration destinations, substantial Chinese investment flows into the regional economy, and shifting preferences among younger generations establish conditions for the progressive diminution of this historically entrenched mechanism of Russian influence in Central Asia.

### ***Changes in Military-Political Influence***

In the security sphere, there is also an increase in Chinese presence in what has traditionally been considered a zone of Russian dominance. China has significantly expanded military-technical cooperation with regional countries, providing modern weapons and technologies. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2023), the volume of Chinese arms supplies to Central Asian countries grew from \$0.5 billion in 2010-2015 to \$2.8 billion in 2016-2023. China consistently expands the nomenclature of supplied weapons: from simple air defense systems and unmanned aerial vehicles to modern radar complexes and electronic warfare systems (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2023).

Military-technical cooperation with Kazakhstan is particularly indicative, where Chinese companies participate in modernizing air defense systems and creating joint ventures for unmanned systems production (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies [KISS], 2023). In Uzbekistan, Chinese specialists are involved in programs to modernize communication systems and armed forces control systems, with military-technical cooperation reaching \$500 million annually by 2023 (Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, 2023).

A qualitatively new stage in Chinese military presence in the region was the establishment of a military facility in Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region in 2016, which, despite its official classification as a «training center,» effectively represents a full-fledged military base with a permanent contingent of Chinese military personnel numbering up to 150 people (Standish & Sukhankin, 2023). According to satellite images published by The Washington Post in 2023, the facility's infrastructure includes radar systems, communication facilities, and capabilities for hosting aviation equipment, substantially exceeding stated anti-terrorist objectives.

China also actively develops military training programs for officers from Central Asian countries: while in 2010 about 200 officers from the region studied in Chinese military institutions, by 2023 this number exceeded 1,000 people (Chinese Ministry of National Defense, 2023). Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework, China initiated the creation of new security cooperation mechanisms, including the Regional Anti-Terrorist Center in Tashkent, where Chinese specialists play an increasingly significant role (Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], 2023).

The volume of joint military exercises under the SCO aegis increased from 3-4 per year in the early 2010s to 12-15 annual events by 2023, with the Chinese component in these exercises becoming increasingly substantial both in terms of forces and assets involved and level of technological equipment (Central Asian Security Observatory, 2023). China's economic leverage is increasingly being converted into military-political presence: analysis of military-technical cooperation agreements shows their close correlation with major infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. For example, the expansion of military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in 2022 (supply of air defense systems worth \$300 million) coincided with increased Chinese investments in the country's transport infrastructure (International Crisis Group, 2023).

Thus, there is a gradual transformation of the regional security architecture, where alongside traditional Russian presence, an increasingly significant Chinese component is forming, based on a combination of military-technical cooperation, direct military presence, and the use of economic leverage to achieve military-political objectives.

### ***Transformation of Educational Space***

Analysis of educational and cultural influence transformation in Central Asia demonstrates systematic strengthening of Chinese presence in a sphere traditionally considered a zone of Russian dominance. The number of Confucius Institutes rose from 8 in 2010 to 24 in 2023 according to ministries of education of regional countries (2023) and their activities encompass not only language training but various cultural and educational programs. Over the decade – between 2010 and 2023 – this reflected shifts in educational flows: around 12,000 students from Central Asia were studying in China in 2010, but ten years later this number exceeds 50,000 people and for the first time in history exceeds the corresponding figure for Russia (45,000) (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2023). This is especially evident in Kazakhstan, where the number of students who opted for Chinese universities has increased five times over the past 10 years, amounting to 18,000 people (Ministry of Education of Kazakhstan, 2023). Chinese educational influence policy is characterized by a systematic approach and significant financial support: more than 3,000 state grants are allocated annually for students from Central Asia, substantially exceeding Russian figures (about 1,500 grants) (China Scholarship Coun-

cil [CSC], 2023). The scholarship support program includes not only traditional academic specialties but also strategically important fields: engineering sciences, information technology, international relations, and management.

It is noteworthy that Chinese educational expansion is accompanied by active promotion of language and culture at all levels of education: from schools to universities. More than 80 Chinese language study centers operate in the region, and the number of schoolchildren studying Chinese as a second foreign language increased from 15,000 in 2010 to more than 100,000 in 2023 (Hanban Annual Report, 2023). In parallel, there is a decline in the role of the Russian language: according to sociological studies, the proportion of youth fluently speaking Russian has decreased by 15-20% over the past decade.

Targeted work with future elites takes on special significance: China implements special programs for children of high-ranking officials and businessmen from regional countries, providing them opportunities to study at prestigious Chinese universities with subsequent employment in joint projects. By 2023, more than 300 graduates of such programs have taken significant positions in government structures and businesses of Central Asian countries (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023).

This strategy forms a long-term basis for strengthening Chinese influence through creating a layer of loyal elites well-acquainted with Chinese culture, language, and value system. It is characteristic that China's educational expansion is carried out in parallel with economic penetration: many educational programs are directly linked to Belt and Road Initiative projects, ensuring personnel training for Chinese economic projects in the region. Thus, a gradual formation of a comprehensive system of cultural and educational influence is taking place, which in the long term may significantly change the traditional orientation of regional elites toward Russia.

### ***Russia's Response to Growing Chinese Presence in Central Asia***

Analysis of Russia's response to growing Chinese presence in Central Asia demonstrates the complex nature of measures taken while simultaneously showing limited available resources for their implementation. At the official diplomatic level, Russian leadership consistently maintains rhetoric about «mutually beneficial cooperation» and «conjugation of integration initiatives,» which was recorded

in the joint statement on conjugation of the EAEU and Belt and Road Initiative in 2015 (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2023).

However, Russia's practical actions indicate efforts to maintain its influence in the region through activation of traditional instruments of influence. In the military-political sphere, this manifests in intensification of CSTO activities: increase in joint exercises from 4-5 in 2015 to 12-15 annual events by 2023, expansion of military-technical cooperation programs, modernization of air defense systems in Central Asia (Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO], 2023).

Russia has attempted to strengthen the economic component of the EAEU, initiating an industrial cooperation program with funding of \$1.2 billion and creating mechanisms for preferential lending to joint projects through the Eurasian Development Bank (Eurasian Development Bank, 2023). In the educational sphere, the «Russian Language in Central Asia» program was launched with a budget of \$250 million, aimed at supporting Russian-language schools, teacher training, and creating digital educational platforms (Russian Ministry of Education, 2023). The number of state scholarships for students from regional countries was increased by 30%, reaching 1,500 places annually (Rossotrudnichestvo, 2023).

In the information sphere, Russian media activities intensified, RT channel broadcasting in regional languages expanded, and new Russian-language internet portals oriented toward Central Asian audiences were created (Russian Media Analysis Center, 2023). However, the effectiveness of these measures is significantly limited by Russia's economic capabilities, especially under Western sanctions.

It is notable that the volume of Russian investments in Central Asian economies decreased from \$4.7 billion in 2019 to \$3.1 billion in 2023, constituting only 7% of Chinese investments in the region (Central Bank of Russia, 2023). Financial constraints also affect humanitarian projects implementation: budgets of Russian cultural centers in regional countries decreased by an average of 40%, and the number of conducted events halved (Malashenko & Laruelle, 2023).

The situation is particularly indicative in economic integration: despite formal expansion of the EAEU, its real influence on economic processes in the region remains limited. The share of mutual trade among EAEU countries does not exceed 15% of their total foreign trade turnover, while major investment and infrastructure projects are imple-

mented with Chinese capital participation (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2023).

As a result, a paradoxical situation is observed: Russia's attempts to maintain its influence in the region through activation of traditional mechanisms face objective resource limitations, which in practice leads to further strengthening of Chinese presence in Central Asia.

## Discussion

Overall, analysis of the obtained results demonstrates a fundamental transformation in the nature of Russian-Chinese interaction in Central Asia, allowing for a new perspective on existing theoretical approaches to assessing this issue. The presented empirical data confirms the hypothesis about the formation of an asymmetric rivalry model, where behind the facade of declared strategic partnership, there is a consistent replacement of Russian influence with Chinese presence in key areas of regional interaction.

The obtained results significantly modify the position of «strategic partnership» concept supporters (A.D. Voskresensky, S.G. Luzyanin), demonstrating that the declared complementarity of Russian and Chinese interests in the region finds no practical confirmation. Statistical data on trade and economic relations dynamics convincingly show not just quantitative growth in Chinese presence, but a qualitative change in the economic balance in the region. The threefold excess of Chinese trade turnover over Russian (70 billion versus 21 billion dollars by 2023) and sevenfold gap in investment volumes indicate the formation of a new economic reality where Russia is losing its position as the leading economic partner of regional countries.

Meanwhile, empirical data confirms the argumentation of A.A. Kazantsev and I.D. Zvyagelskaya about the systemic nature of Russia's displacement from traditional spheres of influence. The transformation is particularly indicative in those areas historically considered zones of Russian dominance. In the security sphere, despite maintaining formal mechanisms of military-political cooperation through the CSTO, there is a qualitative strengthening of Chinese presence, confirmed by a fivefold increase in military-technical cooperation volumes and the appearance of first Chinese military facilities in the region.

The research results also significantly develop Bobo Lo's «axis of convenience» concept, demonstrating its limitations in the regional context. While at the global level there is indeed a pragmatic combination of cooperation and competition elements, in Central Asia a more complex interaction model is forming. Statistical data shows that official rhetoric about «conjugation» of integration initiatives does not transform into real coordination mechanisms: Chinese economic projects consistently replace and displace Russian presence, particularly noticeable in the energy sector and transport infrastructure.

## Conclusion

The conducted study of Russian-Chinese interaction transformation in Central Asia has enabled critical analysis of the relationship between official strategic partnership discourse and real dynamics of bilateral relations in the region. Comprehensive examination of empirical data in key areas of regional presence – economy, security, education, and migration – revealed substantial divergence between the declared nature of interaction and actual processes occurring in the region.

The research has established the formation of an asymmetric rivalry model, where behind the facade of official rhetoric about «comprehensive strategic partnership» and «conjugation of integration initiatives,» there is a consistent replacement of Russian influence with Chinese presence in traditional spheres of regional interaction. Meanwhile, the paradoxical nature of this transformation has been revealed: high level of Russia-China coordination at the global level combines with growing competition in Central Asia, where China's economic expansion and growing political influence create objective prerequisites for reviewing traditional mechanisms of Russian presence in the region.

The obtained results have significant implications for understanding the real dynamics of Russian-Chinese relations amid transformation of global international relations architecture, demonstrating the need for a more differentiated approach to analyzing various levels of bilateral interaction. The identified trends indicate the formation of a new geopolitical reality in Central Asia, where the declared strategic partnership between Russia and China increasingly takes on characteristics of the latter's actual dominance.

## References

- Borishpolets, K. P. (2020). Central Asia as a regional subsystem of international relations. *MGIMO Review of International Relations*, 13(4), 110-123.
- Central Bank of the Russian Federation. (2023). Statistics on cross-border transfers of individuals 2022. <https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/2022>
- China Scholarship Council. (2023). Annual report on international student statistics. <https://www.csc.edu.cn/reports>
- Collective Security Treaty Organization. (2023). CSTO activity report 2022. <https://www.odkb-csto.org/reports>
- Cooley, A., & Laruelle, M. (2021). The changing logic of Russian-Chinese competition in Central Asia. *World Politics Review*.
- Danilovich, M. V. (2023). China's economic presence in Central Asia: Analysis of trade and investment relations. *Far Eastern Affairs*, 51(1), 45-57.
- Eurasian Development Bank. (2023). EDB integration barometer (Report No. 2023/1). <https://eabr.org/analytics>
- Eurasian Economic Commission. (2023). EAEU statistical yearbook 2023. <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/statistics>
- Hanban. (2023). Confucius Institutes development report. <https://www.hanban.org/report/2023>
- International Labour Organization. (2023). Labour migration in Central Asia (ILO Publication No. 978-92-2-132741-5). <https://www.ilo.org/publications>
- International Organization for Migration. (2023). World migration report 2023 (IOM Publication No. 978-92-9068-914-7). <https://www.iom.int/reports>
- Lo, B. (2023). *A wary embrace: What the Russia-China relationship means for the world*. Oxford University Press.
- Lukin, A. V. (2023). SCO as a mechanism for Russian-Chinese coordination in Central Asia. *International Trends*, 21(2), 6-22.
- Luzyanin, S. G. (2022). Russia and China in Eurasia: Strategic partnership and regional challenges. *Outlines of Global Transformations*, 15(1), 123-137.
- Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. (2023). Statistical bulletin of China's outward foreign direct investment. <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/statistics>
- Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation. (2023). Report on the implementation of the «Russian language in Central Asia» program. <https://www.edu.gov.ru/reports>
- Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2023). Migration flows statistics 2022. <https://www.mvd.ru/statistics>
- Mochulsky, A. F. (2023). Asymmetric rivalry between Russia and China in Central Asia. *International Affairs*, 2023(3), 56-71.
- Pannier, B., & Li, M. (2023). The evolution of China's energy diplomacy in Central Asia. *Asian Survey*, 63(2), 276-299.
- Rosen, R., & Zhang, J. (2023). China's educational diplomacy in Central Asia. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 32(141), 456-472.
- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. (2023). SCO Secretary-General's annual report. <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents>
- Trenin, D. V. (2022). Russia and China in Central Asia: Between cooperation and competition. *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20(4), 112-126.
- UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2023). Global flow of tertiary-level students. <http://uis.unesco.org/statistics>
- Voskressenski, A. D. (2021). Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in the context of Eurasian integration. *Comparative Politics*, 12(2), 31-42.
- Wishnick, E. (2023). Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperation and competition in an era of connectivity. *Asian Security*, 19(2), 145-163.
- World Trade Organization. (2023). World trade statistical review 2023. <https://www.wto.org/statistics>
- Zvyagelskaya, I. D., & Kazantsev, A. A. (2022). Transformation of Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia. *World Economy and International Relations*, 66(3), 84-96.

### Information about author:

Gulzira Zhaxygulova – Ph.D., Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Education of the Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal University (Bolu, Turkey, E-mail: [gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr](mailto:gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr))

### Автор туралы мәлімет:

Гүлзирә Жақсығұлова – Ph.D., Болу Абант Иззет Байсал университетіндегі педагогика факультетінің қауымдастырылған профессоры (Болу қ., Түркия, E-mail: [gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr](mailto:gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr))

### Информация об авторе:

Гүлзирә Жаксығұлова – Ph.D., ассоциированный профессор факультета педагогики университета Болу Абант Иззет Байсал (г. Болу, Турция, E-mail: [gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr](mailto:gulzirazhaxygulova@ibu.edu.tr))

Previously sent November 5, 2024.

Accepted December 9, 2024.

**K.S. Mukhtarova**  **A.K. Paizova\*** 

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: paizova\_aidana@mail.ru

## STRATEGIC INSTRUMENTS OF SOFT POWER: THE EXPERIENCE OF GLOBAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA

This article examines the geopolitical influence of “soft power” on Central Asian countries. It analyzes the conceptual frameworks of “soft power” and “hard power” as tools used by states to influence economic, social, and political spheres. The study emphasizes the dynamic nature of these concepts and their relevance in the context of geoeconomic transformations. As well as it highlights important geoeconomic and geopolitical features of “soft power” employed by leading global players, including the European Union, Iran, China, Russia, the United States, Turkey, and Japan, towards Central Asian countries.

The article examines the key role played by instruments such as educational projects and grants, cultural diplomacy, and the provision of loans and other types of financial assistance. These tools are particularly important in the struggle for geopolitical influence, with non-governmental organizations, socio-cultural institutions, and charitable initiatives playing a leading role.

At the same time, the study recognizes the potential of “soft power” applied by Central Asian states themselves, especially Kazakhstan, which positions itself as a dynamically developing country in the post-Soviet region.

The article concludes with an analysis of the multifaceted nature of “soft power” and the difficulties in measuring it, as well as the challenges in assessing the influence of various actors. It emphasizes the dynamic nature of “soft power” and its evolution as a strategic tool for countries seeking to exert global influence. The study underscores the need for comprehensive approaches to understanding “soft power,” taking into account its historical, cultural, and political context.

Overall, the research contributes to the understanding of “soft power” as a key element in shaping modern geopolitics and highlights its relevance in the context of Central Asia’s strategic importance. It offers valuable insights into the complexities of interstate interactions and the ongoing struggle for influence in the region.

**Key words:** soft power, Central Asia, geopolitics, geoeconomics, influence, education, socio-cultural diplomacy.

К.С. Мухтарова, А.К. Паизова\*

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: paizova\_aidana@mail.ru

### «Жұмсақ күштің» стратегиялық құралдары: жаһандық акторлардың Орталық Азиядағы тәжірибесі

Бұл мақала Орталық Азия елдеріне «жұмсақ күштің» геосаяси ықпалын зерттейді. Ол «жұмсақ күш» және «қатты күш» тұжырымдамалық шеңберлерін мемлекеттердің экономикалық, әлеуметтік және саяси саласына ықпал ету құралдары ретінде талдайды. Зерттеу осы тұжырымдамалардың динамикалық сипатын және геэкономикалық трансформациялар контекстіндегі маңыздылығын атап өтеді. Сонымен қатар ол Еуропалық Одақ, Иран, Қытай, Ресей, Америка Құрама Штаттары, Түркия және Жапония сияқты жетекші жаһандық ойыншылардың Орталық Азия елдеріне қолданатын «жұмсақ күштің» маңызды геэкономикалық және геосаяси ерекшеліктерін көрсетеді.

Мақалада білім беру жобалары мен гранттар, мәдени дипломатия, несиелер мен басқа да қаржылық көмек түрлерін ұсыну сияқты құралдардың маңызды рөлі қарастырылады. Бұл құралдар геосаяси ықпал үшін күресте ерекше маңызды, мұнда үкіметтік емес ұйымдар, әлеуметтік-мәдени институттар мен қайырымдылық бастамалары жетекші рөл атқарады.

Сонымен қатар, зерттеу Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің, әсіресе посткеңестік аймақта серпінді дамып келе жатқан ел ретінде өзін көрсететін Қазақстанның қолданатын «жұмсақ күшінің» әлеуетін мойындайды.

Мақала «жұмсақ күштің» көп қырлы сипатын және оны өлшеудегі қиындықтарды, сондай-ақ әртүрлі актерлердің әсерін бағалаудағы қиындықтарды талдаумен аяқталады. Онда «жұмсақ күштің» динамикалық сипаты және оның жаһандық ықпал етуге ұмтылатын елдер үшін стратегиялық құрал ретінде дамуы атап көрсетіледі. Зерттеу «жұмсақ күшті» түсінуге кешенді

лық құрал ретінде дамуы атап көрсетіледі. Зерттеу «жұмсақ күшті» түсінуге кешенді тәсілдерді қолдану қажеттігін атап көрсетеді, оның тарихи, мәдени және саяси контекстін ескере отырып.

Жалпы алғанда, зерттеу қазіргі геосаясатты қалыптастырудағы негізгі элемент ретінде «жұмсақ күшті» түсінуге ықпал етеді және оның Орталық Азияның стратегиялық маңыздылығы контекстіндегі өзектілігін көрсетеді. Ол мемлекетаралық өзара іс-қимылдың күрделілігі және аймақтағы ықпал ету үшін жалғасып жатқан күрес туралы құнды түсініктер ұсынады.

**Түйін сөздер:** жұмсақ күш, Орталық Азия, геосаясат, геоэкономика, әсер, білім, әлеуметтік-мәдени дипломатия.

К.С. Мухтарова, А.К. Паизова\*

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: paizova\_aidana@mail.ru

### **Стратегические инструменты «мягкой силы»: опыт глобальных игроков в Центральной Азии**

Данная статья рассматривает геополитическое влияние «мягкой силы» на страны Центральной Азии. В ней анализируются концептуальные рамки «мягкой силы» и «жесткой силы» как инструментов, используемых государствами для влияния на экономическую, социальную и политическую сферы. Исследование подчеркивает динамичную природу этих понятий и их актуальность в контексте геоэкономических трансформаций. Также в статье выделяются важные геоэкономические и геополитические особенности «мягкой силы», применяемой ведущими мировыми игроками, включая Европейский Союз, Иран, Китай, Россию, Соединенные Штаты, Турцию и Японию, в отношении стран Центральной Азии.

В статье рассматривается ключевая роль, которую играют такие инструменты, как образовательные проекты и гранты, культурная дипломатия, а также предоставление кредитов и других видов финансовой помощи. Эти инструменты особенно важны в борьбе за геополитическое влияние, причем ведущую роль играют неправительственные организации, социально-культурные институты и благотворительные инициативы.

Одновременно, исследование признает потенциал «мягкой силы», применяемой самими государствами Центральной Азии, особенно Казахстаном, который позиционирует себя как динамично развивающуюся страну в постсоветском регионе.

Статья завершается анализом многогранного характера «мягкой силы» и сложностей ее измерения, а также сложностей оценки влияния различных акторов. В ней подчеркивается динамичный характер «мягкой силы» и ее эволюция как стратегического инструмента для стран, стремящихся оказывать глобальное влияние. Исследование подчеркивает необходимость применения комплексных подходов к пониманию «мягкой силы», учитывая ее исторический, культурный и политический контекст.

В общей совокупности, исследование вносит вклад в понимание «мягкой силы» как ключевого элемента в формировании современной геополитики и подчеркивает ее актуальность в контексте стратегического значения Центральной Азии. Оно предлагает ценные сведения о сложностях межгосударственного взаимодействия и продолжающейся борьбе за влияние в регионе.

**Ключевые слова:** мягкая сила, Центральная Азия, геополитика, геоэкономика, влияние, образование, социокультурная дипломатия.

### **Basic provisions**

By examining the geopolitical influence of “soft power” on Central Asian countries, the authors have concluded that this tool plays not just a passive role, but is an active factor that shapes regional politics and changes depending on the context. The authors’ hypothesis is that “soft power” is dynamic and relevant in the context of contemporary geoeconomic transformations, and its significance for Central Asia cannot be underestimated.

During their research, the authors have found that “soft power” is actively used by leading global players such as the EU, Iran, China, Russia, the

USA, Turkey, and Japan to strengthen their influence in the region and achieve their political goals. “Soft power” is implemented through various instruments: educational projects, cultural diplomacy, and financial aid. The execution of “soft power” strategies heavily relies on various civil society actors, including philanthropic organizations, cultural establishments, and NGOs, which serve as key instruments in this process.

The authors have also become convinced that “soft power” has significant potential in Central Asia itself. The countries of the region, particularly Kazakhstan, actively use “soft power”, positioning themselves as dynamically developing countries

and seeking to strengthen their influence in the post-Soviet space.

It is important to understand that “soft power” is not a static tool, but a complex and dynamic process of interaction, where both traditional tools (education, culture, finance) and more modern tools (technology, media, diplomacy) play a role. Therefore, the authors believe that “soft power” should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon, but as part of complex and multifaceted processes of interaction that actively shape the geopolitical landscape in Central Asia.

## Introduction

Currently, the Concept of “soft and hard power” is generating global interest among all countries and communities involved in the dynamically developing process of this phenomenon’s influence; this determines the relevance and necessity of studying it from the perspective of both theoretical and applied research questions.

Andreev (2023) emphasizes that this phenomenon requires the most comprehensive and deep rethinking, which implies the importance of studying its multilateral aspects, reflecting differences in political experience, mentality, traditions, historical experience, as well as in the institutional and technological capabilities of players in the international arena.

A special place in the presented study is occupied by various approaches aimed at studying the potential and volume of “soft and hard power” of key states as subjects of world politics, among which China, Iran, Russia, the USA, Turkey, and Japan should be named first. The analysis examines various “soft power” mechanisms employed internationally, with particular focus on how major powers outside the region exert their influence in Central Asian nations, which constitute the primary focus of this research.

The aim of the scientific article is the authors’ attempt to assess the nature and degree of implementation by global players of the most common approaches in the international practice of applying “soft and hard power”, which is due to the desire to form their own positive image in the process and result of using various instruments of influence on the Central Asian region. In addition, the authors of the article presented to readers comprehensively analyze the spheres and nature of positioning in Central Asian countries, where non-regional states implement strategic mechanisms, and as emphasized earlier, to expand and strengthen their geopolitical influence to a greater extent in the long term.

The scientific article examines expert opinions, analytical conclusions and recommendations of research groups and individual scientist-practitioners, as well as official documentation on social and political issues of “soft power” applied in the Central Asian region.

A fundamental conclusion of this study highlights the inherent difficulty in quantitatively assessing the impact magnitude of both “soft power” and “hard power” mechanisms, given their multidimensional nature and extensive spheres of influence. The challenge lies in precisely gauging the effectiveness of foreign states’ diverse influence instruments. The research emphasizes that when examining non-regional actors, their strategic relevance and significance within the region serve as crucial analytical criteria, particularly as these factors continuously evolve in response to transforming geopolitical dynamics.

The investigation’s methodology rests on multiple analytical pillars, encompassing theoretical foundations, temporal analysis across past and present contexts, and future projections. The research process combines systematic comparison, expert consultation, and structured analytical reasoning.

Key findings indicate that “soft power” operates as a dynamic framework, transforming in response to domestic conditions and international geopolitical developments. Its application methods demonstrate considerable adaptability, evolving alongside changing political strategies and external pressures affecting Central Asian nations.

## Literature review

To date, numerous works have been written dedicated to the analysis of the global concept of the so-called “Soft Power” policy, revealing its goals and implementation directions. Among the many studies, attention should be paid to a number of scientific works and applied research (articles, reports, monographs) by international experts and organizations.

A multilateral review of the policy called “Soft Power” comes down to the interpretation and consideration of various approaches existing in world practice. Thus, the analysis of the conceptual apparatus and its characteristics are presented in this study by well-known foreign scholars-practitioners (Andreev, 2023; Nye, 2002, 2004, 2005; Garbuzarova, 2022; Lebedeva, 2014; Lebedeva & Faure, 2009).

Expert studies on this topic contain a country-specific approach, where well-known non-regional

players are clearly identified, actively participating in integration processes in Central Asian countries and declaring their preferences in organizing certain areas of influence. Among such studies, the works of Vlasov (2013), Naumkin et al. (2013), Fominykh (2010), and Garbuzarova (2022) are of scientific and practical interest and relevance.

While previous research has primarily focused on individual aspects of soft power or specific country cases, our study offers a comprehensive comparative analysis of multiple global actors' soft power strategies in Central Asia simultaneously. This research uniquely combines the examination of traditional soft power mechanisms with an analysis of their effectiveness in the specific cultural and political context of Central Asia, particularly focusing on how different external actors adapt their approaches to regional specificities. Furthermore, our study contributes to the existing literature by examining how Central Asian states themselves, especially Kazakhstan, have begun to develop and implement their own soft power strategies, an aspect that has received limited attention in previous research.

Research on Central Asian policy frameworks and regional interests spans multiple scholarly perspectives, from Nye's (2002, 2004, 2005) foundational work to recent contributions by Ibragimov (2023). These studies provide comprehensive insights into regional policy dynamics and implementation strategies.

A significant portion of the research examines how major international actors develop their geopolitical approaches in Central Asia. Special attention is paid to the EU's systematic development of socio-humanitarian cooperation with the region, marking distinct evolutionary stages in these relationships.

These scholarly works are connected by their shared focus on socio-cultural and political elements, examining them through the lens of global challenges and their role in reshaping the international system.

### **Description of materials and methods**

The research methodology employed a comprehensive qualitative approach focused on systematic document analysis and theoretical framework examination. The study design emphasized multiple analytical dimensions to thoroughly investigate the implementation and impact of soft power strategies in Central Asia.

The primary analytical framework relied on an extensive review of theoretical literature, beginning

with Nye's foundational works (2002, 2004, 2005) and extending to contemporary academic discourse on soft power dynamics in Central Asia published between 2010 and 2023. This theoretical foundation was complemented by detailed examination of official policy documents, strategic frameworks, and institutional reports from major global actors engaging with the region, including the European Union, Iran, China, Russia, the United States, Turkey, and Japan.

The methodological structure incorporated a systematic comparative analysis of different actors' soft power approaches, evaluating various instruments such as educational programs, cultural initiatives, and financial assistance mechanisms. By comparing different countries' approaches, we were able to discover unique features in how each state promotes its interests in the region without resorting to forceful methods.

The work was carried out in three steps. First, we gathered and sorted all available materials from primary sources. Then we conducted an in-depth study of how different countries try to win sympathies in the region, paying attention to the peculiarities of their actions. Finally, we brought together all the findings to see the big picture of how the situation with external influence is developing in Central Asia.

The research was based on Nye's concept, which helps understand how countries use different types of influence – from soft persuasion to hard pressure. This helped us create clear measurements for evaluating different approaches and systematically organize all the methods of influence being applied in Central Asia.

Such a comprehensive view allowed us not only to understand how different powers try to win over the countries of the region but also to grasp how difficult it is to measure the success of such attempts. Thanks to this, we were able to delve deeper into both the theory and practice of international relations in Central Asia, which provided a more complete understanding of the geopolitical processes taking place there.

### **Results**

#### *The concept and feature of the "Soft Power" policy*

Let us examine the essence of the "soft power" policy, whose potentialities elicit particular interest, specifically within the realm of scientific research practice.

The concept of “soft power” was practically first introduced by American political scientist Joseph Nye in his authored monograph “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power,” which was published in 1990. In this fundamental work, Nye defined “soft power” as a form of political power that allows achieving goals through the permanent use of distinctive manipulations of personal sympathy based on the voluntary desire of the soft power object itself (Ibragimov, 2023).

Nye’s (2002) work contains a clear comparative analysis of the author’s idea of “soft” and “hard” power, the fundamental difference between which can be visually demonstrated using a graphical representation (p. 9) – see Figure 1.

Note: The translation maintains the academic style and terminology of the original text. The references to Ibragimov (2023) and Nye (2002, p. 9) have been preserved as they appear in the original text, maintaining the integrity of the source citations.

| POWER                     |                                                                                    |                     |                            |                                  |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| The spectrum of behavior  | hard                                                                               |                     | soft                       |                                  |
|                           | Coercion                                                                           | Stimulation         | Definition of goal setting | The attractiveness               |
|                           |  |                     |                            |                                  |
|                           | The command method                                                                 |                     | Cooperation                |                                  |
| The most likely resources | Power methods, sanctions                                                           | Payments and bribes | Institutions               | Value, cultural attitudes, rules |

The figure is based on Nye (2002).

**Figure 1** – Comparison of «soft» and «hard» power

Figure 1 demonstrates the tools and actions of “soft power,” which include “language,” “culture,” and “public diplomacy.” Alongside this, the graph shows the tools of “hard power” as the opposite of “soft power,” including the concept of “coercion.” In simplified terms, according to Joseph Nye himself, the aforementioned definition can be described as when one country achieves policy implementation from other countries based on agreed desire. This approach can be called “cooperative” or “soft” power, which radically differs from the concept of “hard” or “command” power, designed to specifically direct other recipient countries (or donor countries – authors’ note) to do what the policy-bearing country imposes on them.

In other words, according to J. S. Nye’s conceptual position, “soft power” represents the attractiveness of certain aspects of policy, accompanied by the attractiveness of actions. In this approach, according to the above-mentioned concept, the attractiveness of the example (in this context, “an example of using soft power” – authors’ note) stands in contrast to compulsory measures and enforcement techniques, which constitute what is known as “hard power.”

Nye’s foundational research highlights that effective “soft power” implementation demands sub-

stantive and strategic activities beyond mere attractiveness. Though “soft” and “hard” power function as distinct forms of influence, Nye (2005) suggests that there is no clear dividing line between these approaches. He further elaborates on the delicate balance between legitimate soft power influence and manipulative methods.

Lebedeva’s (2014) analysis further develops this concept by positioning “hard” and “soft” power along a single continuum, suggesting these apparently opposing approaches exist on the same spectrum of influence rather than as isolated phenomena.

Another contemporary foreign researcher summarizes that the concept of “soft power” includes such a notion as the ability of socially organized actors in the public geopolitical environment to achieve their goals through persuasion and gaining sympathy from interacting participants in the process of political interactions.

This framing of the issue emerged at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, which reflected the evolution in that historical situation when “soft” power transformed from an auxiliary tool, which it had been for centuries, into a factor of strategic importance. At present, the concept of “soft power,” according to

Andreev (2023), is confidently becoming a key element of modern political thinking.


The core essence of “soft power” manifests through multiple defining elements: its nature as an evolving global phenomenon, its capacity to build regional support through ostensibly humanitarian aims (thereby enhancing extra-regional actors’ reputations), and its utilization of varied political influence tactics.

Lebedeva (2014) introduces a critical observation regarding “soft power” implementation: while

some actors with genuine “soft power” resources may choose not to utilize them, others lacking such capabilities might attempt to fabricate them through deceptive propaganda. However, she emphasizes that such manufactured attempts fall outside the true definition of “soft power.”

Let’s analyze the content of Figure 2 below – see Figure 2:

[Note: The text refers to a figure 2, which is not provided in the given excerpt. The analysis of this figure cannot be translated without the actual image.]



Compiled based on Panova (2011)

**Figure 2** – Features of the manifestation of the «soft power» policy

The academic literature on “Soft Power” is extensive, yet according to Panova (2011), many scholarly works tend to focus primarily on attractiveness while overlooking several other important dimensions of this concept.

Nye (2004) highlights a critical bias in “soft power” research, which predominantly focuses on particular states while neglecting the role of other state and non-state actors who also exercise “soft power” influence.

This dynamic inevitably leads to competition among entities deploying “soft power” strategies, with policy effectiveness contingent on the development and implementation of these approaches.

The intensity of “soft power” influence can vary significantly, producing different levels of impact

on target populations. This variation allows for multiple interpretations of effectiveness and reach.

A comprehensive analytical framework becomes essential when studying “soft power,” as it must account for the diverse range of actors and their varying degrees of influence.

The inherent heterogeneity of societies means that “soft power” cannot achieve universal appeal. Panova (2011) illustrates this through the example of medical education: Indian students are particularly drawn to Russian medical education programs due to their practical alignment with India’s health-care realities. The Russian approach to medical training is especially relevant for practitioners who will work in India’s rural and central regions, where access to advanced medical technology may be lim-

ited. However, this same educational system holds little attraction for students from the US or UK, where advanced medical technology is standard.

Furthermore, “soft power” initiatives can be categorized by their temporal objectives. Higher education typically serves long-term strategic goals, while mass media operations often target shorter-term outcomes. Additionally, states can simultaneously be both donors and recipients of “soft power” influence, creating complex webs of interaction where what appeals to one nation may hold little value for another.

## Discussion

### *«Soft power» in the Central Asian region*

The selection of Central Asian states as objects of «soft power» analysis is justified by several factors.

The region commands global attention due to its vast natural resource wealth, while its deep-rooted cultural traditions and historical legacy provide essential insights for “soft power” implementation strategies.

However, the regional landscape is complicated by multiple challenges: political instability, inter-ethnic tensions, Islamic radicalization, and narcotics trafficking. The influence of traditional clan and tribal structures further complicates conventional “soft power” deployment methods.

Nevertheless, the region remains strategically vital for numerous external powers, whose competing interests and objectives converge in Central Asia, making it a crucial arena for studying «soft power» dynamics.

To achieve a clear understanding of the goals and strategies of donor countries, let's consider the positions and influence on the Central Asian region of such key extra-regional players, in our view, as the European Union, Iran, China, Russia, the USA, Turkey, Japan, and others.

*The European Union.* The European Union's approach to soft power engagement in Central Asia has developed into a complex, multifaceted strategy that has undergone substantial transformation since these nations gained independence, as analyzed by Zhakiyanova (2023). This comprehensive approach manifests through the implementation of diverse projects that span multiple sectors, with particular emphasis on economic development initiatives and educational advancement programs.

The EU initially established its presence in Central Asia through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)

program, which served as the primary channel for European engagement in the region. This initiative created a foundation for sustained European influence by providing specialized technical support and expertise sharing.

The EU has since expanded its educational outreach through several prestigious academic programs. The evolution of these initiatives includes the Tempus program for modernizing higher education systems, followed by the Erasmus Mundus scholarship initiative, and currently the more comprehensive Erasmus Plus program. These educational frameworks have successfully established lasting academic partnerships and meaningful knowledge exchange between European and Central Asian educational institutions.

The EU's strategic position among other extra-regional actors has been strengthened through its consistent efforts to promote and expand its presence in Central Asia. According to Zhakiyanova's (2023) research, the European Union's regional approach rests on three fundamental pillars that distinguish it from other international actors: the strategic and systematic application of soft power mechanisms, its well-established historical democratic traditions, and its comprehensive framework for human rights advocacy.

The period following Central Asian independence has seen the European Union systematically developing bilateral relations in the socio-humanitarian sphere, resulting in today's stable and mature partnerships. This high-level diplomatic engagement is particularly evident in the proliferation of multilateral forums and dialogue platforms. Diplomatic interactions between the regions have taken various forms, including the “five plus one” meeting format and the special German direction of cooperation with Central Asia. Over recent years, more than eighty high-level meetings have been held, indicating the systematic nature and depth of these relationships. Recent studies show the European Parliament's particular interest in developing ties with Central Asian states in four key areas – education, science, culture, and tourism. These directions have proven themselves to be the most effective for strengthening long-term connections between the societies of both regions.

Germany has successfully developed its presence in Central Asia through soft power tools, giving primary attention to educational programs. The country has built a multi-level system of educational cooperation. In higher education, strong connections have been established between universities, enabling student and faculty exchanges, joint research, and

curriculum development. Such cooperation creates a solid foundation for long-term institutional relationships and knowledge exchange.

The German Academic Exchange Service serves as a key instrument of Germany's educational diplomacy in the region. This organization provides extensive opportunities for scholarships to students and researchers from Central Asia, funds academic projects, and supports German language learning. Thanks to this program, a community of Central Asian specialists maintaining close contacts with Germany has formed.

*Iran.* In the aftermath of Soviet dissolution, cultural ties between Iran and Central Asia underwent a remarkable transformation. Building on deep historical connections spanning millennia, Iran crafted a sophisticated strategy to rekindle relationships with its northern neighbors. This approach particularly emphasized their rich shared literary traditions, tapping into the profound legacy of Persian poetry and scholarly works that had historically flourished throughout these territories.

Language emerged as a cornerstone of this cultural bridge-building effort. Iranian institutions developed comprehensive initiatives that seamlessly blended language education, academic collaboration, and cultural programming. Such endeavors resonated particularly strongly in regions where Persian linguistic heritage had maintained deep historical significance. Iranian diplomatic outposts function as dynamic centers for these cultural initiatives. Their dedicated cultural departments orchestrate a wide spectrum of events – spanning intellectual forums to artistic exhibitions – while simultaneously providing vital backing to regional institutions focused on Iranian studies and Persian language instruction. Here the scope of this cultural engagement extends far beyond conventional exchange initiatives. Through careful emphasis on shared historical narratives and cultural reference points, Iran has established profound connections with Central Asian communities. These meticulously nurtured relationships shape regional dynamics and strengthen Iran's diplomatic influence across Central Asia.

This strategic approach illustrates the potential of leveraging historical and cultural bonds to forge genuine modern connections between societies. Through sustained commitment and emphasis on common heritage, Iran has established enduring pathways for cultural dialogue with its Central Asian neighbors, creating a robust foundation for continued regional engagement.

*China.* Central Asia has become an important focus of China's cultural outreach efforts in recent

years. The approach combines traditional cultural elements with modern media platforms, creating multiple channels for engagement with local populations. Through a carefully developed network, Chinese cultural content reaches audiences across the region in various forms – from books and films to digital media and online entertainment.

The distribution of these cultural materials follows a well-structured pattern, ensuring consistent presence across different platforms and formats. By sharing its cultural products through multiple channels, China has established a significant cultural footprint in Central Asian societies. This approach helps create familiarity with Chinese culture and perspectives among local audiences.

This cultural presence builds on broader engagement efforts, forming part of China's comprehensive strategy for developing relationships with Central Asian nations. The careful selection and distribution of cultural content helps shape understanding and perception of Chinese society and values throughout the region.

The strategy demonstrates how cultural engagement can serve as an effective tool for building meaningful connections between societies. Through sustained and systematic sharing of cultural materials, China has developed lasting channels for cultural dialogue with its Central Asian neighbors.

China's educational and cultural outreach in Central Asia is primarily channeled through its network of Confucius Institutes. These centers are strategically integrated into prominent regional universities, serving as comprehensive hubs for both language education and cultural engagement. The institutes facilitate extensive educational mobility programs, cultural activities, and scholarly partnerships, establishing enduring pathways for Sino-Central Asian cultural exchange and mutual understanding. Their role extends beyond traditional education to encompass broader cultural diplomacy objectives.

In its regional positioning, China deliberately cultivates an image as a peace-oriented nation, emphasizing its commitment to harmonious development and peaceful coexistence. This strategic narrative aligns with China's broader foreign policy objectives and its vision of regional development. Through this carefully constructed self-presentation, China seeks to establish itself as a reliable partner for Central Asian nations, emphasizing mutual benefit and shared development goals while promoting stability and cooperation in the region.

*Russia.* Russia's approach to Central Asia experienced a significant shift and deepening of diplomatic ties as it entered the twenty-first century,

signaling a new era in regional relations. (Garbuzarova, 2022). This transformation manifested through a sophisticated deployment of soft power mechanisms, with particular emphasis on humanitarian and informational channels of influence, representing a significant evolution in Russia's regional approach.

The institutionalization of Russia's soft power projection materialized through the establishment of several strategically significant organizations. The Russian World Foundation and the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund emerged as key institutional pillars, charged with the dual mandate of promoting Russian linguistic and cultural interests while advancing comprehensive public diplomacy initiatives. The institutional landscape of Russia's regional engagement was significantly enhanced in 2008 through the creation of Rossotrudnichestvo. This new federal agency was established by presidential decree with dual objectives: to develop humanitarian cooperation initiatives and to strengthen connections with Russian-speaking communities across Central Asia.

Russia's foreign policy underwent a strategic evolution as it incorporated soft power elements, adapting these concepts to align with its regional goals. A defining moment in this process was the release of Russia's 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, which specially recognized the strategic importance of Central Asia. This document placed particular emphasis on maintaining regional stability, especially given the security considerations related to Afghanistan. The strategic significance of Central Asia in Russian foreign policy receives substantial corroboration through numerous policy documents and scholarly analyses (Lebedeva, 2014), with contemporary research highlighting the multifaceted nature of Russian influence in the region. This influence encompasses cultural and linguistic elements that carry equal weight with economic and military-political instruments in advancing Russian interests (Naumkin et al., 2013, p. 48).

Russia's soft power projection operates through a sophisticated network of channels, with particular emphasis on educational initiatives and cultural programs. The establishment of Russian-language educational institutions across Central Asia represents a cornerstone of this strategy, exemplified by institutions such as the Pushkin School in Turkmenistan and specialized schools in Kyrgyzstan. These educational initiatives are complemented by substantial scholarship programs and academic grants, creating sustainable pathways for students from the region to study at Russian institutions.

The impact of Russia's soft power approach can be measured through increasing youth participation in Russian-led initiatives, particularly within CIS Interparliamentary Assembly activities and Eurasian integration frameworks. According to Garbuzarova (2022), Russia has successfully maintained its position in the region's information landscape since the post-Soviet period, effectively transmitting its cultural perspectives and value systems throughout Central Asian societies.

Russia's strategic deployment of soft power demonstrates its profound grasp of Central Asia's unique cultural and historical context. This deep-rooted understanding enables Russia to craft and implement sophisticated approaches to maintaining its regional influence while advancing its broader strategic goals in the region.


*USA.* The implementation of soft power strategies in Central Asia takes place amid intense international competition, where multiple global powers are actively pursuing their regional interests. Each major actor – from Western powers like the United States and European Union to Asian players such as China, Japan, Iran, and Turkey – deploys various soft power instruments to advance their strategic objectives in the region.

[Note: The text refers to a figure 3, which is not provided in the given excerpt. The analysis of this figure cannot be translated without the actual image.]

The early 2000s marked a crucial shift in American soft power implementation, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. As Lebedeva (2014) observes, this period saw an enhanced focus on soft power strategies, particularly aimed at improving America's image among Muslim populations worldwide.

During the 1990s, America's involvement in Central Asia was primarily characterized by economic support through USAID programs. According to Garbuzarova (2022), this approach combined financial assistance with the promotion of democratic values, utilizing a wide-ranging network of educational organizations, NGOs, and academic exchange initiatives.

Western institutional presence in the region has been substantial, with both American and European organizations playing significant roles. Vlasov (2013) documents the active participation of various institutions, from the Soros Foundation and IREX to German organizations like the Adenauer Foundation, Ebert Foundation, Goethe Institute, and DAAD, all contributing to soft power projection through their grant programs.



Note: compiled by the authors

**Figure 3** – The main actors in the «soft power» policy in Central Asia

The American soft power approach in Central Asia places significant emphasis on education, incorporating multiple elements: from language training and academic exchanges to faculty development and educational consulting. USAID's influence extends into various sectors, including public health (with specific focus on AIDS and tuberculosis control), democracy building, human rights, environmental conservation, and economic advancement programs.

A key development in educational partnerships was the creation of the Kazakh-American University (KAU), which represents a successful fusion of American and Kazakhstani educational approaches. The spread of American cultural presence in the region operates through various established channels. Different institutions work together – from dedicated resource hubs and embassy cultural sections to networks of libraries providing access to materials and information. Additionally, volunteer organizations maintain ongoing programs in certain countries, with particularly active engagement in the Kyrgyz Republic.

*Turkey.* The foundation of Turkish engagement with Central Asia builds on centuries-old bonds uniting these peoples through shared Turkic heritage, cultural traditions, and linguistic family ties. This natural affinity supports broad regional cooperation, backed by multibillion-dollar investments and development programs shaped by Turkey's own modernization path since the 1920s – an experience

particularly relevant for Central Asian nations seeking to balance tradition with progress.

Turkish influence operates through several key institutions working in coordination. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) manages infrastructure and development projects worth hundreds of millions annually. TURKSOY organizes major cultural festivals, arts exhibitions, and literary exchanges across the region. The Parliamentary Assembly (TurkPA) facilitates regular meetings between lawmakers on issues from trade to security. Together, these bodies create multiple channels for sustained engagement between Turkey and Central Asian societies.

In the educational sphere, Turkish presence is particularly visible through a network of schools and universities established since the 1990s. The Turkish-Kazakh partnership illustrates this well – by 2023, they jointly operated dozens of educational institutions, from primary schools to research centers. Religious cooperation has also expanded, with the Diyanet Foundation supporting the construction of over 40 mosques and maintaining numerous educational programs that combine religious studies with modern curriculum.

This strategic approach leverages historical connections while serving contemporary interests. Annual trade volumes between Turkey and Central Asian states have grown significantly, exceeding \$10 billion in recent years. Cultural programs reach millions through language courses, student

exchanges, and media partnerships. These concrete initiatives demonstrate how Turkey has transformed traditional bonds into practical modern relationships throughout Central Asia.

The strategy shows how deep historical ties can evolve into meaningful present-day cooperation when supported by substantial institutional frameworks and resources. However, this influence operates within a complex regional environment where multiple powers – from China to Russia to Western nations – also seek to maintain their presence and pursue their interests.

*Japan.* Japan's engagement with Central Asia represents a distinctive model of soft power projection, characterized by its emphasis on economic development paradigms and humanitarian cooperation within a multilateral framework. The nation's approach to regional influence is particularly notable in its cultural diplomacy initiatives, encompassing targeted investments in cultural and educational programming designed to enhance its regional presence.

A key component of Japan's soft power strategy involves the systematic promotion of Japanese linguistic and cultural elements throughout Central Asia. This cultural diplomacy serves the dual purpose of strengthening Japan's regional image while facilitating deeper cross-cultural understanding.

According to Usmonov and Inagaki (2021), Japan's interaction with Central Asian states has been predominantly structured around financial support mechanisms, specifically through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) framework, complemented by technical cooperation initiatives. However, their research indicates that Japan's overall regional impact has been constrained by significant geographic limitations. The substantial physical distance separating Japan from Central Asian territories presents considerable logistical challenges, particularly in the context of resource trade relationships. While Japanese commercial entities have demonstrated interest in Central Asian natural resources, the complexities and costs associated with long-distance transportation have rendered such economic partnerships less economically viable compared to arrangements with geographically proximate nations.

This complex interplay of cultural diplomacy, economic assistance, and geographical constraints characterizes Japan's nuanced approach to developing its presence in Central Asia, reflecting a carefully calibrated strategy that acknowledges both opportunities and limitations in regional engagement.

## Conclusion

The theoretical significance of the research lies in its contribution to the scientific understanding of the "soft power" phenomenon. In addition to the widely known concept of J. Nye, the scientific article presents other alternative opinions and assessments, as well as scientific and practical conclusions of researchers and organizations. The authors believe that the practical significance of the "Soft Power" Concept is determined by the demands of the current geoeconomic and geopolitical situation in the world.

The development of alternative interpretations of "soft power," based on the development of historical experience and the influence of global players, determines the multiplicity of "soft power" models, which are more extensively considered by the authors within the framework of the socio-humanitarian aspects of the research.

The formation and dissemination of "soft power" is a special global process, which is associated with many factors that shape and fill the Concept of "soft power." The key factors are the history of the development of a country with its socio-humanitarian conditions of formation; the state of that society at a particular moment, its culture, traditions, and mentality.

According to the authors' analysis, Central Asia emerges as one of the most attractive regions for soft power implementation, based on three fundamental criteria they identify:

The primary criterion emphasizes Central Asia's significance for numerous global actors, predominantly due to its abundant natural resources. The second criterion acknowledges the region's distinctive feature of possessing ancient cultures and traditions, where ignorance of these elements by extra-regional states implementing soft power policies can lead to outcomes contrary to their intended objectives. The third criterion recognizes the region's complexity, characterized by global challenges including: political stability issues within Central Asian states, interethnic conflicts, radical Islamic trends, drug trafficking, and the presence of established relationships heavily influenced by clan and inter-tribal dynamics, which complicates traditional soft power implementation mechanisms.

The authors' core research provides a detailed examination of the geoeconomic soft power policies directed toward Central Asian countries by major global powers: the European Union, Iran, China, Russia, the United States, Turkey, and Japan. They present these powers' socio-humanitarian strate-

gic aspects as simultaneously universal in certain aspects while exhibiting specific characteristics unique to each extra-regional actor.

Their research analyzes the implementation pathways of soft power policies by these aforementioned states, focusing on methods that increasingly impact positive perception and authority within so-

cio-humanitarian interactions and international relations on the global stage.

The authors particularly highlight that Central Asian states themselves are actively employing soft power potential, with Kazakhstan identified as especially proactive in this direction among post-Soviet nations.

## References

- Андреев, И. А. (2023). Феномен «мягкой» силы: концептуальные, институциональные и технологические аспекты [Электронный ресурс]. [https://www.rudn.ru/storage/media/science\\_dissertation/e7254a9e-6a62-4d96-a000-694fcc9aef70/vV2rTjp2Lx18uIBXuCx10ca6iwwouY6s6Rayjhd.pdf](https://www.rudn.ru/storage/media/science_dissertation/e7254a9e-6a62-4d96-a000-694fcc9aef70/vV2rTjp2Lx18uIBXuCx10ca6iwwouY6s6Rayjhd.pdf)
- Fominykh, A. (2010). Projecting “soft power”: American and Russian public diplomacy in post-Soviet Central Asia. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 13(3), 73-86.
- Гарбузарова, Е. Г. (2022). Центральная Азия в условиях трансформации мирового порядка [Автореферат докторской диссертации]. Москва.
- Ибрагимов, Ж. Ю. (2023). Мягкая сила Южной Кореи и Японии: привлекательность и потенциал в Центральной Азии. *Молодой ученый*, 22(469), 365-368. <https://moluch.ru/archive/469/103384/>
- Лебедева, М. М. (2014). «Мягкая сила» в отношении Центральной Азии: участники и их действия. *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*, 2(35), 47-55. <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-2-35-47-55>
- Лебедева, М. М., & Фор, Ж. (2009). Высшее образование как потенциал «мягкой силы» России. *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*, 6, 200-205.
- Наумкин, В. В. и др. (2013). Интересы России в Центральной Азии: содержание, перспективы, ограничители. *Российский совет по международным делам*, 10. [http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC\\_Central\\_Asia.pdf](http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC_Central_Asia.pdf)
- Nye, J. S. (2002). *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*. Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J. (2004). Soft power and higher education. *EDUCAUSE*. <http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/FFP0502S.pdf>
- Nye, J. (2005). Soft power matters in Asia. *The Japan Times*.
- Панова, Е. П. (2011). Высшее образование как потенциал «мягкой силы» государства. *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*, 2(15), 157-161.
- Usmonov, F., & Inagaki, F. (2021). The Japanese policy of “soft power” and its specifics in Central Asia. *CA&C Press AB*. <https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.03>
- Власов, А. (2013). Россия и Центральная Азия: упущенные возможности и новые перспективы. *Российский совет по международным делам*. [http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id\\_4=1392#top](http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1392#top)
- Жакиянова, А. М. (2023). Академическая мобильность как инструмент мягкой силы в системе международных отношений в XXI веке [Автореферат докторской диссертации]. [https://dissovet.ablaikhan.kz/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/27.11\\_%D0%BF%](https://dissovet.ablaikhan.kz/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/27.11_%D0%BF%)

## References

- Andreev, I. A. (2023). Fenomen “myagkoy” sily: kontseptual'nye, institutsional'nye i tekhnologicheskie aspekty [The phenomenon of “soft” power: conceptual, institutional and technological aspects]. [https://www.rudn.ru/storage/media/science\\_dissertation/e7254a9e-6a62-4d96-a000-694fcc9aef70/vV2rTjp2Lx18uIBXuCx10ca6iwwouY6s6Rayjhd.pdf](https://www.rudn.ru/storage/media/science_dissertation/e7254a9e-6a62-4d96-a000-694fcc9aef70/vV2rTjp2Lx18uIBXuCx10ca6iwwouY6s6Rayjhd.pdf)
- Fominykh, A. (2010). Projecting “soft power”: American and Russian public diplomacy in post-Soviet Central Asia. *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 13(3), 73-86.
- Garbuzarova, E. G. (2022). Tsentral'naya Aziya v usloviyakh transformatsii mirovogo poryadka [Central Asia in the context of the transformation of the world order] [Abstract of doctoral dissertation]. Moscow.
- Ibragimov, J. Y. (2023). Myagkaya sila Yuzhnoy Korei i Yaponii: privlekatel'nost' i potentsial v Tsentral'noy Azii [The soft power of South Korea and Japan: Attractiveness and potential in Central Asia]. *Molodoy uchenyy*, 22(469), 365-368. <https://moluch.ru/archive/469/103384/>
- Lebedeva, M. M. (2014). “Myagkaya sila” v otnoshenii Tsentral'noy Azii: uchastniki i ikh deystviya [“Soft power” in relation to Central Asia: Participants and their actions]. *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 2(35), 47-55. <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-2-35-47-55>
- Lebedeva, M. M., & Faure, J. (2009). Vysshee obrazovanie kak potentsial “myagkoy sily” Rossii [Higher education as the potential of Russia's “soft power”]. *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*, 6, 200-205.
- Naumkin, V. V., et al. (2013). Interesy Rossii v Tsentral'noy Azii: sodержanie, perspektivy, ogranichiteli [Russia's interests in Central Asia: Content, prospects, constraints]. *Rossiyskiy sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam*, 10. [http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC\\_Central\\_Asia.pdf](http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC_Central_Asia.pdf)
- Nye, J. S. (2002). *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*. Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J. (2004). Soft power and higher education. *EDUCAUSE*. <http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/FFP0502S.pdf>

Nye, J. (2005). Soft power matters in Asia. The Japan Times.

Panova, E. P. (2011). Vysshee obrazovanie kak potentsial “myagkoy sily” gosudarstva [Higher education as the potential of the “soft power” of the state]. Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, 2(15), 157-161.

Usmonov, F., & Inagaki, F. (2021). The Japanese policy of “soft power” and its specifics in Central Asia. CA&C Press AB. <https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.03>

Vlasov, A. (2013). Rossiya i Tsentral'naya Aziya: upushchennye vozmozhnosti i novye perspektivy [Russia and Central Asia: Missed opportunities and new prospects]. Rossiyskiy sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam. [http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id\\_4=1392#top](http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1392#top)

Zhakiyanova, A. M. (2023). Akademicheskaya mobil'nost' kak instrument myagkoy sily v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy v XXI veke [Academic mobility as a tool of soft power in the system of international relations in the XXI century] [Abstract of doctoral dissertation]. [https://dissovet.ablaikhan.kz/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/27.11\\_%D0%BF%](https://dissovet.ablaikhan.kz/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/27.11_%D0%BF%)

**Information about authors:**

Mukhtarova Karlygash Saparovna – Doctor of Economics, Professor at the Faculty of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: [karlusha777mukhtarova@gmail.com](mailto:karlusha777mukhtarova@gmail.com))

Paizova Aidana Kanatkyzy – 2nd year PhD student at the Faculty of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: [paizova\\_aidana@mail.ru](mailto:paizova_aidana@mail.ru))

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

Мухтарова Карлыгаш Сапаровна – экономика ғылымдарының докторы, Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің халықаралық қатынастар факультетінің профессоры (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: [karlusha777mukhtarova@gmail.com](mailto:karlusha777mukhtarova@gmail.com))

Паизова Айдана Қанатқызы – Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің халықаралық қатынастар факультетінің 2-курс докторанты (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, E-mail: [paizova\\_aidana@mail.ru](mailto:paizova_aidana@mail.ru))

**Информация об авторах:**

Мухтарова Карлыгаш Сапаровна – доктор экономических наук, профессор факультета международных отношений Казахского национального университета имени аль-Фараби (г. Алматы, Казахстан, E-mail: [karlusha777mukhtarova@gmail.com](mailto:karlusha777mukhtarova@gmail.com))

Паизова Айдана Қанатқызы – докторант 2-курса факультета международных отношений Казахского национального университета имени аль-Фараби (г. Алматы, Казахстан, e-mail: [paizova\\_aidana@mail.ru](mailto:paizova_aidana@mail.ru))

Previously sent May 28, 2024.

Re-registered September 27, 2024.

Accepted December 5, 2024.

**Ә.А. Болат<sup>1\*</sup>** , **Ш.А. Саймова<sup>2</sup>** <sup>1</sup> І. Жансүгіров атындағы Жетісу университеті, Талдықорған қ., Қазақстан<sup>2</sup> ҚР Жоғарғы сот жанындағы сот төрелігі академиясы, Астана қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: alibekblato@mail.ru

## **ҚАРУСЫЗДАНУ ҚАҒИДАСЫН ЖҮЗЕГЕ АСЫРУДАҒЫ «ЖАҒАНДЫҚ НӨЛ» КОНЦЕПЦИЯСЫНЫҢ ҚҰҚЫҚ ҚОЛДАНУДЫҢ ҚАЗІРГІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

Бұл ғылыми мақалада қарусыздану қағидасын жүзеге асырудағы «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының құқық қолданудағы қазіргі мәселелері талданады. Зерттеудің мақсаты – ядролық қарудан толық бас тартуға бағытталған «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқықтық кедергілерді анықтау және оларды шешу жолдарын ұсыну. Зерттеу барысында халықаралық құқықтағы қарусыздану қағидаларының теориялық және практикалық аспектілері қарастырылды. Негізгі идея – ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру үшін халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіру қажеттілігі. Жұмыстың ғылыми және практикалық маңыздылығы қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге бағытталған ұсыныстарды әзірлеумен байланысты. Зерттеуде талдау, салыстырмалы құқықтық әдіс, тарихи және жүйелік талдау әдістері қолданылды. Негізгі нәтижелер ретінде халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың толық орындалмауы, ядролық державалардың ұстанымы, тексеру механизмдерінің жеткіліксіздігі және саяси еріктің жетіспеушілігі сияқты мәселелер анықталды. Зерттеу қорытындылары қарусыздану саласындағы құқық қолданудың жетілдірілуіне үлес қосады. Жұмыстың нәтижелері халықаралық ұйымдар мен мемлекеттердің қарусыздану саясатын қалыптастыруда практикалық маңызға ие. Практикалық мәні – ұсынылған шараларды іске асыру арқылы ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға ықпал ету.

**Түйін сөздер:** Жаһандық нөл, қарусыздану, құқыққолдану, концепция, халықаралық қауіпсіздік, ядролық шеттету, қаруды жою, халықаралық қатынастар.

A. Bolat<sup>1\*</sup>, Sh. Saimova<sup>2</sup><sup>1</sup>Zhetysu University, Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan<sup>2</sup>Academy of Justice under the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: alibekblato@mail.ru

### **Actual Issues of Law Enforcement of the «Global Zero» Concept in the Implementation of the Disarmament Principle**

In this scientific article, current issues of legal application in the implementation of the “Global Zero” concept within the principle of disarmament are analyzed. The aim of the study is to identify legal obstacles in the realization of the “Global Zero” concept aimed at complete nuclear disarmament and to propose ways to overcome them. During the research, theoretical and practical aspects of disarmament principles in international law were examined. The main idea is the necessity to improve the international legal system to create a world free of nuclear weapons. The scientific and practical significance of the work is associated with developing proposals aimed at accelerating the disarmament process. The study employed methods such as analysis, comparative legal method, historical, and systemic analysis. The main results identified issues like incomplete implementation of international legal norms, the stance of nuclear powers, insufficiency of control mechanisms, and lack of political will. The conclusions of the study contribute to the improvement of legal application in the field of disarmament. The results have practical significance for forming disarmament policies of international organizations and states. The practical value lies in facilitating the creation of a world free from nuclear weapons through the implementation of the proposed measures.

**Key words:** global zero, disarmament, law enforcement, concept, international security, nuclear disarmament, disarmament, international relations.

Ә.А. Болат<sup>1\*</sup>, Ш.А. Саймова<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Жетысуский университет им. И. Жансугурова, г. Талдыкорган, Казахстан

<sup>2</sup>Академия правосудия при Верховном Суде РК, г. Астана, Казахстан

\*e-mail: alibekblato@mail.ru

### Актуальные вопросы правоприменения концепции «глобальный ноль» при осуществлении принципа разоружения

В данной научной статье анализируются текущие проблемы правоприменения в реализации концепции «Глобальный ноль» в контексте принципа разоружения. Цель исследования — выявить правовые препятствия в реализации концепции «Глобальный ноль», направленной на полный отказ от ядерного оружия, и предложить пути их решения. В ходе исследования рассмотрены теоретические и практические аспекты принципов разоружения в международном праве. Основная идея заключается в необходимости совершенствования международной правовой системы для создания мира, свободного от ядерного оружия. Научная и практическая значимость работы связана с разработкой предложений, направленных на ускорение процесса разоружения. В исследовании применялись методы анализа, сравнительно-правовой, исторический и системный анализ. В качестве основных результатов выявлены такие проблемы, как неполное выполнение международно-правовых норм, позиция ядерных держав, недостаточность механизмов контроля и недостаток политической воли. Выводы исследования вносят вклад в совершенствование правоприменения в области разоружения. Результаты работы имеют практическую значимость для формирования политики разоружения международными организациями и государствами. Практическая ценность заключается в содействии созданию мира, свободного от ядерного оружия, посредством реализации предложенных мер.

**Ключевые слова:** глобальный ноль, разоружение, правоохранительная деятельность, концепция, международная безопасность, ядерное разоружение, разоружение, международные отношения.

#### Кіріспе

Қазіргі әлемде халықаралық қауіпсіздік пен тұрақтылық мәселелері адамзаттың негізгі назарында тұр. Ядролық қарудың таралуы, оны қолдану қауіпі және жаппай қырып-жою қаруларының дамуы әлемдік қауымдастықтың басты мәселелерінің бірі болып табылады. Ядролық қарудың жойқын күші мен оның қолданылуының салдары адамзат тарихында бұрын-соңды болмаған апаттарға әкелуі мүмкін екендігі белгілі (Cirincione, 2007). Осыған байланысты қарусыздану қағидасын жүзеге асыру және ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру қажеттілігі туындайды.

«Жаһандық нөл» концепциясы ядролық қарудан толық бас тартуды көздейтін бастама болып табылады. Бұл концепция халықаралық құқықтың қарусыздану саласындағы негізгі бағыттарының бірі ретінде танылып отыр (Perkovich & Acton, 2009). Тақырыпты таңдаудың негіздемесі ядролық қарудың адамзатқа төндіретін қауіп-қатерін азайтуға бағытталған құқықтық тетіктерді зерттеу қажеттілігімен байланысты.

Өткен ғасырдың екінші жартысынан бастап халықаралық қауымдастық ядролық қаруды таратпау және қарусыздану мәселелеріне үлкен көңіл бөлуде (Blix, 2006). Ядролық қаруды таратпау туралы шарт (ЯҚТШ), Ядролық сынақ-

тарға жалпы тыйым салу шарты (ЯСЖТСШ) сияқты халықаралық келісімдер қабылданды. Дегенмен, бұл келісімдер ядролық қарудың толықтай жойылуына қол жеткізе алмады. Ядролық державалардың өз қаруларын сақтап қалуы, кейбір мемлекеттердің ядролық қаруға үмтылуы және халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың орындалмауы қарусыздану процесін тежеп отыр (Tannenwald, 2007).

Атақты саясаткерлер мен ғалымдар, мысалы, Генри Киссинджер, Уильям Перри, Джордж Шульц және Сэм Нанн сияқты тұлғалар ядролық қарусыз әлем құру қажеттілігі туралы пікірлерін білдірді (Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, & Nunn, 2007). Олар өз мақалаларында ядролық қарудың адамзатқа төндіретін қауіп-қатерін атап өтті және «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын қолдады.

Дегенмен, қазіргі уақытта «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың көптеген мәселелері бар. Ядролық державалардың саяси еріктерінің әртүрлілігі, халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың жетілмеуі, тексеру механизмдерінің жеткіліксіздігі сияқты факторлар бұл процесті қиындатады (Dhanapala, 2010). Осыған байланысты осы тақырыпты зерттеу өзекті болып табылады.

Ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру мәселесі қазіргі халықаралық қатынастардың бас-

ты міндеттерінің бірі болып табылады (Blix, 2006). Ядролық қарудың таралуы халықаралық қауіпсіздікке тікелей қауіп төндіреді. Солтүстік Кореяның ядролық бағдарламасы, Иранның ядролық қызметі сияқты оқиғалар әлемдік қауымдастықтың назарын аударып отыр (Meier, 2013). Бұл жағдайлар ядролық қарудың таралуын болдырмау және қарусыздану процесін жеделдету қажеттілігін көрсетеді.

Сонымен қатар, халықаралық терроризмнің таралуы, экстремистік топтардың ядролық материалдарға қол жеткізу мүмкіндігі сияқты қауіптер ядролық қаруды жоюдың маңыздылығын арттырады (Cirincione, 2007). Ядролық қарудың террористік ұйымдардың қолына түсуі адамзат үшін орны толмас апаттарға әкелуі мүмкін.

«Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының өзектілігі осы мәселелерді шешуге бағытталғандығында жатыр (Perkovich & Acton, 2009). Бұл концепция ядролық қаруды толықтай жою арқылы әлемдік қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етуге ұмтылады. Алайда, қазіргі уақытта бұл концепцияны жүзеге асыруда көптеген құқықтық және саяси кедергілер бар. Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығының жетіспеушілігі, ядролық державалардың ұстанымдары, тексеру механизмдерінің әлсіздігі сияқты мәселелер концепцияның іске асырылуын қиындатады (Dhanapala, 2010).

Зерттеу тақырыбының актуальділігі мынада: халықаралық құқықтағы қарусыздану қағидасын жүзеге асырудағы «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелерін анықтау және оларды шешу жолдарын ұсыну қажеттілігі туындап отыр. Бұл мәселелерді зерттеу халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіруге, қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге және ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға ықпал етеді.

Зерттеудің теориялық маңыздылығы халықаралық құқық саласындағы қарусыздану мәселелерін тереңірек түсінуге мүмкіндік береді. «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының құқықтық негіздерін, оның халықаралық құқық жүйесіндегі орнын анықтау арқылы осы саладағы ғылыми білімдерді толықтырады (Blix, 2006).

Практикалық маңыздылығы зерттеу нәтижелерін халықаралық ұйымдардың, мемлекеттердің қарусыздану саясатын қалыптастыруда қолдануға болады. Ұсынылған шаралар ядролық қаруды таратпау режимін нығайтуға, тексеру механизмдерін жетілдіруге, мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімді арттыруға бағытталған (Dhanapala, 2010). Бұл шаралар ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру процесін жеделдетуге ықпал етеді.

Қазіргі уақытта қарусыздану қағидасын жүзеге асыруда бірқатар проблемалық жағдайлар бар. Ядролық державалардың ядролық қаруды ұлттық қауіпсіздіктің маңызды элементі ретінде сақтау ұстанымы қарусыздану процесін тежейді (Tannenwald, 2007). Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың барлық мемлекеттер тарапынан орындалмауы, кейбір мемлекеттердің ядролық қаруға ұмтылуы ядролық қарудың таралу қаупін арттырады (Meier, 2013).

Сонымен қатар, халықаралық тексеру механизмдерінің жеткіліксіздігі ядролық қызметті тиімді бақылауға мүмкіндік бермейді (Blix, 2006). Саяси еріктің жетіспеушілігі, мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімсіздік, аймақтық қақтығыстар қарусыздану процесіне кері әсер етеді (Dhanapala, 2010).

Осы мәселелерді шешу үшін «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелерін кешенді зерттеу қажет. Бұл зерттеу халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіруге, қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге және ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға ықпал етеді (Perkovich & Acton, 2009).

Сонымен қатар, Қазақстан Республикасының ядролық қарудан бас тарту тәжірибесін зерттеу және оны басқа мемлекеттерге үлгі ретінде көрсету маңызды. Қазақстанның бұл тәжірибесі қарусыздану процесінде оң нәтижелерге қол жеткізуге мүмкіндік береді (Syrgybayev, 2016).

Осылайша, «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелерін зерттеу қазіргі заманның өзекті мәселелерінің бірі болып табылады. Бұл зерттеу халықаралық құқық саласындағы ғылыми білімдерді толықтырып қана қоймай, қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге, ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға ықпал етеді.

### Әдістер мен қолданылған материалдар

Бұл зерттеуде халықаралық құқықтық актілер, ғылыми әдебиеттер және статистикалық деректер қолданылды. Негізгі халықаралық құқықтық актілер ретінде Ядролық қаруды таратпау туралы шарт (ЯҚТШ), Ядролық сынақтарға жалпы тыйым салу шарты (ЯСЖТСШ) және Ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шарты (ЯҚТШ) қарастырылды. Статистикалық мәліметтер Халықаралық атом энергиясы агенттігінің (МАГАТЭ) және басқа халықаралық ұйымдардың ресми дереккөздерінен алынды.

Зерттеу барысында талдау, синтез, салыстырмалы-құқықтық, тарихи және жүйелік талдау әдістері қолданылды. Талдау және синтез әдістері арқылы халықаралық құқықтық актілер мен ғылыми әдебиеттердің мазмұны зерттеліп, негізгі тұжырымдар жасалды. Салыстырмалы-құқықтық әдіс әртүрлі мемлекеттердің қарусыздану саласындағы заңнамаларын салыстыруға мүмкіндік берді. Тарихи әдіс қарусыздану қозғалысының даму эволюциясын түсінуге көмектесті. Жүйелік талдау әдісі «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының халықаралық құқық жүйесіндегі орнын анықтауға бағытталды. Алдымен тақырыпқа қатысты әдебиеттер мен құқықтық актілер жинақталып, жүйеленді. Халықаралық шарттардың мәтіндері мұқият талданып, олардың қарусыздану процесіндегі рөлі бағаланды. Мемлекеттердің қарусыздану саласындағы ұстанымдары мен саясаттары зерттелді. Алынған мәліметтерді талдау арқылы «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелері айқындалып, оларды шешу жолдары ұсынылды.

### Әдебиеттерге шолу

Қарусыздану және «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясы бойынша шетелдік авторлардың көптеген еңбектері бар, олар ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру мәселелерін жан-жақты қарастырады. Бұл бөлімде осы тақырып бойынша жазылған негізгі және жаңа еңбектер талданып, олардың ғылыми үлестері мен зерттеудегі бос орындары анықталады.

Перкович пен Актонның еңбегі ядролық қарудан толық бас тартудың мүмкіндіктері мен кедергілерін талдайды. Авторлар ядролық қаруды жою үшін халықаралық ынтымақтастықтың маңыздылығын атап өтеді және ядролық державалардың саяси ерігін арттыру қажеттігін көрсетеді. Олар қарусыздану процесінде сенімді нығайту шараларының рөлін ерекше атап өтеді (Perkovich, G., & Acton, J. M. 2009). Танненвальд ядролық қаруды қолдануға қарсы халықаралық нормаларды зерттейді. Ол ядролық қаруды қолдану «табуы» халықаралық қатынастарда маңызды рөл атқаратынын көрсетеді және бұл табуды нығайту қажеттігін атап өтеді. Автор ядролық қаруды қолданбау мәдениетін қалыптастырудың маңыздылығын айқындайды (Tannenwald, N. 2007).

Дханапала Ядролық қаруды таратпау туралы шарттың (ЯҚТШ) көпжақты дипломатиядағы рөлін ашады. Автор ЯҚТШ-ның

тиімділігін арттыру жолдарын ұсынады және мемлекеттердің міндеттемелерін орындау маңыздылығын көрсетеді. Ол қарусыздану процесінде көпжақты дипломатияның ықпалын талдайды (Dhanapala, J. 2010). Маунт АҚШ-тың ядролық қару жүйесін жаңарту мәселелерін қарастырады. Автор ядролық қаруды сақтап қалудың себептерін талдайды және бұл саясаттың қарусыздану процесіне әсерін көрсетеді. Ол ядролық қаруды жаңарту мен қарусыздану арасындағы қайшылықтарды ашады (Mount, A. 2019). Миан мен Уэр ядролық қару қаупінің қайта артуы және қарусыздану қажеттілігі туралы жазады. Олар ядролық қарудың таралуының жаңа қауіптерін көрсетіп, қарусыздану процесін жеделдету қажеттігін атап өтеді. Авторлар ядролық қарудың гуманитарлық салдарын талдайды (Mian, Z., & Ware, A. 2018). Рауф ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру үшін қажетті тексеру механизмдерін талдайды. Ол тексеру тетіктерінің жетілдірілуі қарусыздану процесінің тиімділігі үшін маңызды екенін көрсетеді. Автор халықаралық бақылау жүйелерін күшейту қажеттілігін атап өтеді (Rauf, T. 2017). Бликс жаппай қырып-жою қаруларын жою мәселелерін қарастырады. Ол халықаралық құқықтық құралдарды нығайту және тексеру механизмдерін жетілдіру қажеттігін көрсетеді. Автор қарусыздану процесінде халықаралық ұйымдардың рөлін талдайды (Blix, H. 2006).

Мейер Иранның ядролық бағдарламасын шешудегі Еуропаның күш-жігерін талдайды. Автор санкциялар мен дипломатияның шектеулерін көрсетіп, қарусыздану процесіндегі қиындықтарды атап өтеді. Ол ядролық дағдарыстарды шешуде көпжақты келіссөздердің маңыздылығын көрсетеді (Meier, O. 2013). Соков АҚШ пен Ресей арасындағы қару-жаракты бақылау келісімдерінің болашағын талдайды. Ол екі елдің арасындағы келіссөздердің тоқтап қалуы қарусыздану процесіне кері әсер ететінін көрсетеді. Автор стратегиялық тұрақтылықты сақтау қажеттігін атап өтеді (Sokov, N. 2020). Фин Ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шартының (ЯҚТШ) қарусыздануға жаңа жол ашатынын көрсетеді. Автор шарттың қабылдануы ядролық қаруды заңсыз деп тануға мүмкіндік беретінін атап өтеді. Ол ядролық қаруды моральдық жағынан қабылдамау маңыздылығын көрсетеді (Fihn, B. 2017). Сиринчионе ядролық қарудың тарихы мен болашағын талдайды. Ол ядролық қаруды бақылаудың халықаралық механизмдерін күшейту қажеттігін көрсетеді. Автор ядролық қарудың таралуын болдырмау үшін жаһан-

дық ынтымақтастықтың маңыздылығын атап өтеді (Cirincione, J. 2007).

Кассенова Қазақстанның ядролық саясатын зерттейді. Ол Қазақстанның ядролық қарудан бас тарту тәжірибесін және оның халықаралық қауіпсіздікке қосқан үлесін көрсетеді. Автор Қазақстанның қарусыздану процесіндегі рөлін талдайды (Kassenova, T. 2014). Сауэр АҚШ-тың Трамп әкімшілігінің ядролық қаруға қатысты саясатын талдайды. Ол бұл саясаттың қарусыздану процесіне әсерін көрсетеді. Автор ядролық қаруды жоюдағы саяси еріктің маңыздылығын атап өтеді (Sauer, T. 2019). Саган ядролық қарудың таралуының себептерін зерттейді. Ол мемлекеттердің ядролық қаруға ұмтылуының факторларын талдайды. Автор ядролық қаруды таратпау режимін нығайту қажеттігін көрсетеді (Sagan, S. D. 2011). Уильямс пен Форд ЯҚТШ-ның 50 жылдығына орай оның қазіргі жағдайын талдайды. Олар шарттың жетістіктері мен кемшіліктерін көрсетіп, оны жетілдіру жолдарын ұсынады. Авторлар шарттың болашақтағы перспективаларын бағалайды (Williams, H., & Ford, C. A. 2018).

Жоғарыда аталған еңбектер қарусыздану және «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясы бойынша маңызды мәселелерді талдайды. Авторлар ядролық қарудың таралуының қауіптілігін көрсетіп, қарусыздану процесінің кедергілерін талдайды. Perkovich пен Acton (2009) халықаралық ынтымақтастықтың маңыздылығын атап өтіп, ядролық державалардың саяси ерігін арттыру қажеттігін көрсетеді. Tannenwald (2007) ядролық қаруды қолданбау «табуын» нығайту арқылы ядролық қарудың рөлін төмендетуді ұсынады. Dhanapala (2010) ЯҚТШ-ның тиімділігін арттыру үшін көпжақты дипломатияның маңыздылығын көрсетеді. Rauf (2017) тексеру механизмдерін жетілдіру қажеттігін атап өтіп, ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру үшін сенімді бақылау жүйелерін қалыптастыруды ұсынады. Fihn (2017) ЯҚТШ-ның қабылдануы ядролық қаруды заңсыз деп тануға мүмкіндік беретінін көрсетіп, қарусыздану процесіне жаңа серпін беретініне сенімді. Sokov (2020) АҚШ пен Ресей арасындағы қару-жарақты бақылау келісімдерінің болашағына назар аударады. Ол стратегиялық тұрақтылықты сақтау үшін келіссөздерді жалғастырудың маңыздылығын атап өтеді. Sauer (2019) ядролық қаруды жоюдағы саяси еріктің жетіспеушілігін көрсетеді.

Жоғарыда аталған еңбектерде қарусыздану процесінің жалпы мәселелері қарастырылғанымен, «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге

асырудағы құқық қолданудың нақты мәселелері терең зерттелмеген. Атап айтқанда:

- Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығының жетіспеушілігі: Ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шартының барлық мемлекеттер тарапынан қабылданбауы және ядролық державалардың шартқа қосылудан бас тартуының құқықтық салдары толық талданбаған.

- Ядролық державалардың құқықтық міндеттемелері: Ядролық державалардың қарусыздану бойынша құқықтық міндеттемелерін күшейту және олардың жауапкершілігін арттыру мәселелері жеткіліксіз зерттелген.

- Тексеру механизмдерінің құқықтық негіздері: Тексеру тетіктерінің халықаралық құқықтағы орнын және олардың тиімділігін арттыру жолдарын құқықтық тұрғыдан талдау қажеттілігі бар.

- Құқық қолданудың практикалық мәселелері: Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың ұлттық деңгейде жүзеге асырылуы және бұл процестегі қиындықтар аз зерттелген.

Осылайша, біздің зерттеуіміз осы бос орындарды толтыруға бағытталған. Біз «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелерін анықтап, оларды шешу жолдарын ұсынамыз. Атап айтқанда:

- Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығын қамтамасыз ету жолдарын талдаймыз.

- Ядролық державалардың құқықтық міндеттемелерін күшейту үшін ұсыныстар береміз.

- Тексеру механизмдерінің құқықтық негіздерін жетілдіру жолдарын ұсынамыз.

- Құқық қолданудың практикалық мәселелерін анықтап, оларды шешу тетіктерін ұсынамыз.

Бұл зерттеу қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге және ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға ықпал етеді. Сонымен қатар, ол халықаралық құқық саласындағы ғылыми білімдерді толықтырып, практикалық ұсыныстар арқылы мемлекеттер мен халықаралық ұйымдардың қарусыздану саясатын қалыптастыруда пайдалы бола алады.

## Нәтижелер мен талқылау

«Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының құқықтық негіздерін талдау. Зерттеу барысында «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының халықаралық құқықтық негіздері жан-жақты зерттелді. Бұл концепция ядролық қарудан толық бас тартуды және ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруды мақсат етеді. Халықаралық құқықта бұл мақсатқа жету

үшін негізгі құрал ретінде Ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шарты (ЯҚТШ) қарастырылады, ол 2017 жылы қабылданды және 2021 жылы күшіне енді (United Nations, 2017).

ЯҚТШ ядролық қаруды жасауға, иеленуге, сақтауға, сынауға, қолдануға және оны қолдану қаупін төндіруге толықтай тыйым салады. Бұл шарт ядролық қаруды толықтай жоюға бағытталған алғашқы халықаралық құқықтық акт болып табылады (ICAN, 2017). Алайда, ядролық державалар бұл шартқа қосылмаған, бұл оның тиімділігін шектейді. Бұл мемлекеттер шарттың қауіпсіздік саласындағы мүдделеріне сәйкес келмейтінін мәлімдейді (Mount, 2019).

Құқық қолданудағы қазіргі мәселелердің талдауы:

- Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығының жетіспеушілігі. Зерттеу көрсеткендей, ядролық қарусыздану саласындағы халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығы жетіспейді. ЯҚТШ-ға 86 мемлекет қол қойып, 55 мемлекет ратификациялағанымен, ядролық қаруы бар мемлекеттер және олардың одақтастары шартқа қосылмаған (ICAN, 2021). Бұл жағдай халықаралық құқықтық режимнің әлсіздігін көрсетеді және ядролық қарудың таралу қаупін арттырады.

- Ядролық державалардың ұстанымы. Ядролық державалар ядролық қаруды ұлттық қауіпсіздіктің негізгі элементі ретінде сақтап қалуда. АҚШ, Ресей, Қытай, Франция және Ұлыбритания ядролық қаруды стратегиялық ұстап тұру құралы деп санайды (Nuclear Posture Review, 2018). Бұл мемлекеттер ЯҚТШ-ға қосылудан бас тартып, ядролық қаруды жоюға бағытталған нақты қадамдар жасауда баяу әрекет етуде. Бұл «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асыруды қиындатады.

- Тексеру механизмдерінің жеткіліксіздігі. Халықаралық тексеру механизмдері барлық мемлекеттердің ядролық қызметін тиімді бақылауға мүмкіндік бермейді. МАГАТЭ-нің өкілеттігі кейбір жағдайларда шектеулі, ал мемлекеттер тексерулерге толықтай ашық болмауы мүмкін (IAEA, 2019). Сонымен қатар, ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шартының тексеру механизмдері әлі толықтай қалыптаспаған, бұл ядролық қарудың жасырын дамуын болдырмауға кедергі келтіреді (Rauf, 2017).

- Саяси еріктің жетіспеушілігі. Кейбір мемлекеттерде ядролық қарусыздануға бағытталған саяси ерік жетіспейді. Ядролық қаруды ұлттық мүдделерін қорғау құралы ретінде қарастыратын мемлекеттер қарусыздану процесіне қаты-

суда белсенді емес (Mount, 2019). Бұл жағдай халықаралық қауымдастықтың бірлескен әрекеттерін тежейді.

Мәселелерді шешу жолдарының талқылауы бойынша келесі аспектілерді атап айтқан жөн:

- Халықаралық құқықтық нормаларды нығайту. Зерттеу нәтижелері көрсеткендей, халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығын қамтамасыз ету қажет. Бұл үшін барлық мемлекеттердің ЯҚТШ-ға қосылуын ынталандыру керек. Мысалы, дипломатиялық күш-жігерді арттыру арқылы ядролық державаларды шартқа қосуға бағытталған іс-шаралар ұйымдастыру қажет (Fihn, 2017). Сонымен қатар, Ядролық қаруды таратпау туралы шарттың (ЯҚТШ) шеңберінде қарусыздануға бағытталған нақты міндеттемелерді күшейту маңызды.

- Тексеру механизмдерін күшейту. МАГАТЭ-нің өкілеттігін кеңейту және тексеру механизмдерін жетілдіру маңызды. Бұл ұйымның инспекция жүргізу мүмкіндіктерін арттыру, мемлекеттердің ядролық қызметі туралы ақпарат алмасу жүйесін жетілдіру қажет (IAEA, 2019). ЯҚТШ шеңберінде тексеру механизмдерін нақтылау және оларды тиімді іске асыру тетіктерін дамыту қажет (Rauf, 2017).

- Сенімді нығайту шаралары. Мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімді арттыру үшін дипломатиялық диалогты дамыту қажет. Ядролық державалар арасында тұрақты келіссөздер жүргізу, ашықтықты қамтамасыз ету, бірлескен қауіпсіздік бастамаларын іске асыру сенімді нығайтуға ықпал етеді (Mian & Ware, 2018). Бұл шаралар қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге мүмкіндік береді.

- БҰҰ-ның рөлін арттыру. БҰҰ қарусыздану мәселелерінде үйлестіруші рөл атқара алады. Ұйымның шеңберінде арнайы комитеттер мен жұмыс топтарын құру арқылы қарусыздану процесін тиімді басқаруға болады (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2020). Сонымен қатар, БҰҰ-ның резолюциялары арқылы мемлекеттерге қарусыздану бойынша міндеттемелерді жүктеуге болады.

Қазақстан ядролық қарудан бас тарту арқылы қарусыздану процесіне маңызды үлес қосты. 2019 жылы Қазақстан ЯҚТШ-ға қол қойып, оны ратификациялады (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 2019). Бұл елдің ядролық қарусыздануға деген ұмтылысы және халықаралық қауіпсіздікке қосқан үлесі жоғары бағаланады.

Қазақстанның бұл қадамы халықаралық қауымдастықта үлгі ретінде қабылданады. Ел ядролық қаруды таратпау режимінің нығаюы-

на және Орталық Азияда ядролық қарудан азат аймақ құруға ықпал етті (Kassenova, 2014). Бұл аймақтық қауіпсіздікті арттыруға және қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге мүмкіндік берді.

Алдыңғы зерттеулерде ядролық қарусызданудың жалпы мәселелері қарастырылды. Мысалы, Mount (2019) ядролық қарудың ұлттық қауіпсіздік саясатындағы рөлін талдады, бірақ құқықтық тетіктердің жетілдірілуі туралы нақты ұсыныстар аз болды. Mian & Ware (2018) ядролық қаруды жоюдың моральдық және құқықтық негіздерін зерттеді, алайда тексеру механизмдерінің мәселелеріне терең тоқталмады.

Бұл зерттеу «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың нақты мәселелерін анықтап, оларды шешу жолдарын ұсынумен ерекшеленеді. Сонымен қатар, Қазақстанның тәжірибесін талдау арқылы қарусыздану процесінде нақты мысалдар келтірілді.

Зерттеу нәтижелерін қорытындылайтын болсақ:

- Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығының жетіспеушілігі ядролық қарудың таралу қаупін арттырады. Барлық мемлекеттердің ЯҚТШ-ға қосылуын қамтамасыз ету қажет.

- Ядролық державалардың ұстанымы қарусыздану процесін тежейді. Олардың ядролық қаруды стратегиялық құрал ретінде сақтап қалуы «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асыруға кедергі келтіреді.

- Тексеру механизмдерінің жеткіліксіздігі ядролық қызметті тиімді бақылауға мүмкіндік бермейді. МАГАТЭ-нің өкілеттігін кеңейту және тексерулердің тиімділігін арттыру қажет.

- Саяси еріктің жетіспеушілігі халықаралық қауымдастықтың бірлескен әрекеттерін тежейді. Мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімді нығайту шаралары қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге ықпал етеді.

Негізгі тұжырымдар:

- Халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіру: Қарусыздану саласындағы халықаралық құқықтық нормаларды нығайту және олардың әмбебаптығын қамтамасыз ету маңызды.

- Мемлекеттердің саяси ерігін арттыру: Ядролық қарусыздануға бағытталған саяси ерікті қалыптастыру арқылы мемлекеттердің қарусыздану процесіне белсенді қатысуын қамтамасыз ету қажет.

- Сенімді нығайту шараларын дамыту: Мемлекеттер арасындағы дипломатиялық диалогты дамыту, ашықтықты қамтамасыз ету және бірлескен қауіпсіздік бастамаларын іске асыру арқылы сенімді нығайту маңызды.

- Халықаралық ұйымдардың рөлін күшейту: БҰҰ және МАГАТЭ сияқты халықаралық ұйымдардың қарусыздану процесіндегі үйлестіруші рөлін арттыру қажет.

Зерттеу нәтижелері көрсеткендей, «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асыру ұзақ мерзімді және күрделі процесс болып табылады. Алайда, халықаралық қауымдастықтың бірлескен күш-жігері, құқықтық тетіктердің жетілдірілуі және саяси еріктің қалыптасуы арқылы ядролық қарудан азат әлем құру мүмкіндігі бар.

Технологиялық дамудың қарқындылығы жаңа қауіптерді тудырады, сондықтан қарусыздану саласындағы құқықтық тетіктерді үнемі жетілдіру қажет. Сонымен қатар, ядролық энергетиканы бейбіт мақсатта пайдалану мәселелеріне ерекше назар аудару керек (Sokov, 2020).

Бұл зерттеу негізінен халықаралық құқықтық аспектілерге және мемлекеттердің саяси ұстанымдарына көңіл бөлді. Болашақ зерттеулерде әлеуметтік-экономикалық факторларды, қоғамдық пікірді және ядролық қарусызданудың аймақтық ерекшеліктерін тереңірек зерттеу ұсынылады.

«Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелерін анықтау және талдау арқылы қарусыздану процесінің негізгі кедергілері анықталды. Зерттеу нәтижелері халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіру, тексеру механизмдерін күшейту және мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімді нығайту қажеттілігін көрсетті.

Қазақстанның ядролық қарудан бас тарту тәжірибесі қарусыздану процесінде оң нәтижелерге қол жеткізуге болатынын дәлелдейді. Бұл тәжірибе басқа мемлекеттерге үлгі бола алады және халықаралық қауымдастықтың ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға ұмтылысын нығайтады.

## Қорытынды

Бұл зерттеудің негізгі мақсаты — қарусыздану қағидасын жүзеге асырудағы «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясының құқық қолданудағы қазіргі мәселелерін кешенді зерттеу және оларды шешу жолдарын ұсыну болды. Осы мақсатқа жету үшін талдау, салыстырмалы-құқықтық, тарихи және жүйелік талдау сияқты ғылыми зерттеу әдістері қолданылды. Халықаралық құқықтық актілер, ғылыми әдебиеттер және статистикалық деректер зерттеу материалдары ретінде пайдаланылды.

Зерттеу барысында келесі негізгі нәтижелерге қол жеткізілді:

- Халықаралық құқықтық нормалардың әмбебаптығының жетіспеушілігі анықталды. Ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шартына (ЯҚТШ) ядролық державалардың және олардың одақтастарының қосылмауы халықаралық құқықтық режимнің тиімділігін шектейді.

- Ядролық державалардың ұстанымы қарусыздану процесіне кедергі келтіреді. Олар ядролық қаруды ұлттық қауіпсіздіктің негізгі элементі ретінде сақтап қалуда.

- Тексеру механизмдерінің жеткіліксіздігі ядролық қызметті тиімді бақылауға мүмкіндік бермейді. МАГАТЭ-нің өкілеттігін кеңейту және тексеру механизмдерін жетілдіру қажеттілігі айқындалды.

- Саяси еріктің жетіспеушілігі халықаралық қауымдастықтың бірлескен әрекеттерін тежейді. Мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімді нығайту шараларының маңыздылығы көрсетілді.

Зерттеу нәтижелері «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы негізгі құқықтық және саяси кедергілерді анықтап, оларды шешу жолдарын ұсынуға мүмкіндік берді. Негізгі қорытындылар төмендегідей:

- Халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіру қажет. Бұл үшін ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шартының әмбебаптығын қамтамасыз ету және ядролық державалардың шартқа қосылуын ынталандыру маңызды.

- Мемлекеттердің саяси ерігін арттыру арқылы қарусыздану процесін жеделдетуге болады. Ядролық державалардың ядролық қаруды ұлттық қауіпсіздік құралы ретінде қарастыруынан бас тартуы қажет.

- Тексеру механизмдерін күшейту қарусыздану процесінің тиімділігін арттырады. МАГАТЭ-нің өкілеттігін кеңейту және халықаралық тексерулердің тиімділігін қамтамасыз ету маңызды.

- Сенімді нығайту шараларын дамыту мемлекеттер арасындағы ынтымақтастықты арттырады. Дипломатиялық диалогты дамыту, ашықтықты қамтамасыз ету және бірлескен қауіпсіздік бастамаларын іске асыру қажет.

Зерттеу нәтижелері қарусыздану саласындағы халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіруде практикалық маңызға ие. Ұсынылған шаралар мен тетіктер халықаралық ұйымдар мен мемлекеттердің қарусыздану саясатын қалыптастыруда қолданылуы мүмкін.

Атап айтқанда:

- Халықаралық ұйымдарға (БҰҰ, МАГАТЭ) ұсыныстар берілді, олар қарусыздану процесінде үйлестіруші рөлін күшейте алады. Жаңа келісімдер мен хаттамаларды әзірлеу арқылы халықаралық құқықтық нормаларды нығайтуға ықпал ету мүмкіндігі бар.

- Мемлекеттерге ядролық қаруды тыйым салу шарттарына қосылу және оларды ратификациялау ұсынылады. Ядролық державалардың саяси ерігін арттыру үшін дипломатиялық күшжігерді арттыру маңызды.

- Ғылыми қауымдастыққа қарусыздану саласындағы зерттеулерді жалғастыру және құқықтық тетіктерді жетілдіру бойынша ұсыныстар жасау қажеттілігі көрсетілді.

Зерттеудің ғылыми білімге қосқан үлесі – Зерттеу «Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың нақты мәселелерін анықтап, оларды шешу жолдарын ұсыну арқылы ғылыми білімді толықтырды. Бұл жұмыс халықаралық құқық саласындағы қарусыздану мәселелерін тереңірек түсінуге мүмкіндік берді және осы бағыттағы болашақ зерттеулерге негіз қалады.

Болашақ зерттеулер мен қолдану мүмкіндіктері. Болашақта қарусыздану саласындағы зерттеулерді келесі бағыттарда жалғастыру ұсынылады:

- Аймақтық ерекшеліктерді зерттеу: Ядролық қарусызданудың аймақтық деңгейдегі мәселелерін және шешу жолдарын талдау.

- Әлеуметтік-экономикалық факторларды зерттеу: Қарусызданудың мемлекеттердің әлеуметтік-экономикалық дамуына әсерін зерттеу.

- Қоғамдық пікірді зерттеу: Қоғамның ядролық қарусыздануға көзқарасын және оны қалыптастыру жолдарын анықтау.

- Технологиялық даму мен қауіпсіздік: Жаңа технологиялардың қарусыздану процесіне әсерін зерттеу және оларды бақылау тетіктерін әзірлеу.

«Жаһандық нөл» концепциясын жүзеге асырудағы құқық қолданудың қазіргі мәселелерін зерттеу арқылы қарусыздану процесінің негізгі кедергілері анықталды және оларды шешу жолдары ұсынылды. Зерттеу нәтижелері халықаралық құқықтық жүйені жетілдіруге, тексеру механизмдерін күшейтуге және мемлекеттер арасындағы сенімді нығайтуға ықпал етеді. Бұл шаралар ядролық қарудан азат әлем құруға мүмкіндік береді және халықаралық қауіпсіздікті арттырады.

## Әдебиеттер

- Blix H. (2006). *Oruzhiye terrora: osvobozhdeniye mira ot yadernogo, biologicheskogo i khimicheskogo oruzhiya* [Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms]. Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. – 227 p.
- Cirincione J. (2007). *Ugroza vzryva: istoriya i budushcheye yadernogo oruzhiya* [Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons]. New York: Columbia University Press. – 232 p.
- Dhanapala J. (2010). *Mnogostoronnyaya diplomatiya i DNYAO: vzglyad iznutri* [Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account]. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. – 190 p.
- Meier O. (2013). *Yevropeyskiye usiliya po razresheniyu iranskogo yadernogo krizisa: predely prinuditel'noy diplomatii* [European efforts to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis: The limits of coercive diplomacy]. *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 14(3), – pp. 403–428.
- Perkovich G., Acton, J. (2009). *Otmena yadernogo oruzhiya: debaty* [Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate]. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. – 337 p.
- Shultz, G. P., Perry, W. J., Kissinger, H. A., Nunn, S. (2007). *Mir, svobodnyy ot yadernogo oruzhiya* [A World Free of Nuclear Weapons]. *The Wall Street Journal* // <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636>
- Syrgybayev T. A. (2016). *Yadrolyq qarudy taratpau zhane Qazaqstannyn sayasaty* [Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Kazakhstan's Policy]. – Almaty: KazNU. – 330 p
- Tannenwald N. (1999). *Yadernoye tabu: Soyedinennyye Shtaty i normativnaya osnova neispol'zovaniya yadernogo oruzhiya* [The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use]. *International Organization*, 53(3), 433–468. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601286>
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). (2017). *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* // [https://www.icanw.org/the\\_treaty](https://www.icanw.org/the_treaty)
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). (2021). *Signature and Ratification Status* // [https://www.icanw.org/signature\\_and\\_ratification\\_status](https://www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (2019). *IAEA Annual Report 2019*. Vienna: IAEA // <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2019/gc64-5.pdf>
- Kassenova T. (2014). *Yadernyye ambitsii Kazakhstana* [Kazakhstan's Nuclear Ambitions]. *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 21 (3-4), pp. 377–393. // <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2024.2354951>
- Mian Z., Ware A. (2018). *Vozobnovleniye yadernykh ugroz i neotlozhnost' yadernogo razoruzheniya* [Renewed Nuclear Threats and the Urgency of Nuclear Disarmament]. *Global Governance*, Vol. 24 (3), pp. 411–417 // <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02403010>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2019). *Kazakhstan ratifitsiroval Dogovor o zapreshchenii yadernogo oruzhiya* [Kazakhstan Ratifies the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons] // <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/kazakhstan-ratifies-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons>
- Mount A. (2019). *Modernizatsiya yadernoy triady SSHA: obosnovaniye neobkhodimosti novoy MBR* [Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Triad: The Rationale for a New ICBM]. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 42 (1), pp. 171–186 // <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590050>
- Rauf T. (2017). *Trebovaniya k proverke dlya mira bez yadernogo oruzhiya* [Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World]. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). pp. 491-504 // <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c12sIII.pdf>
- Sokov N. (2020). *Novyy SNV i daleye: budushcheye kontrolya nad vooruzheniyami mezhdru SSHA i Rossiye* [New START and Beyond: The Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control]. *Arms Control Today*, vol. 50 (1), pp. 14–19 // <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/features/new-start-beyond-future-us-russian-arms-control>
- United Nations (2017). *Dogovor o zapreshchenii yadernogo oruzhiya* [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons]. New York: United Nations // [https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2011-03%20AM/Ch\\_XXVI\\_9.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2011-03%20AM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf)
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), (2020). *Obespecheniye nashego obshchego budushchego: povestka dnya po razoruzheniyu* [Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament]. New York: United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda/>

## References

- Blix H. (2006). *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*. Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. – 227 p.
- Cirincione J. (2007). *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Columbia University Press. – 232 p.
- Dhanapala J. (2010). *Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. – 190 p.
- Meier O. (2013). *European efforts to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis: The limits of coercive diplomacy*. *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 14(3), – pp. 403–428.
- Perkovich G., Acton, J. (2009). *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. – 337 p.

- Shultz, G. P., Perry, W. J., Kissinger, H. A., Nunn, S. (2007). A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. The Wall Street Journal // <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636>
- Syrgybayev T. A. (2016). Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Kazakhstan's Policy. – Almaty: KazNU. – 330 p
- Tannenwald N. (1999). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. International Organization, 53(3), 433–468. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601286>
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). (2017). Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons // [https://www.icanw.org/the\\_treaty](https://www.icanw.org/the_treaty)
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). (2021). Signature and Ratification Status // [https://www.icanw.org/signature\\_and\\_ratification\\_status](https://www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (2019). IAEA Annual Report 2019. Vienna: IAEA // <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2019/gc64-5.pdf>
- Kassenova T. (2014). Kazakhstan's Nuclear Ambitions. The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21 (3-4), pp. 377–393. // <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2024.2354951>
- Mian Z., Ware A. (2018). Renewed Nuclear Threats and the Urgency of Nuclear Disarmament. Global Governance, Vol. 24 (3), pp. 411–417 // <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02403010>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2019). Kazakhstan Ratifies the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons // <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/kazakhstan-ratifies-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons>
- Mount A. (2019). Modernizing the U.S. Nuclear Triad: The Rationale for a New ICBM. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 42 (1), pp. 171–186 // <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590050>
- Rauf T. (2017). Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). pp. 491–504 // <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c12sIII.pdf>
- Sokov N. (2020). New START and Beyond: The Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control. Arms Control Today, vol. 50 (1), pp. 14–19 // <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/features/new-start-beyond-future-us-russian-arms-control>
- United Nations (2017). Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. New York: United Nations // [https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2011-03%20AM/Ch\\_XXVI\\_9.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2011-03%20AM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf)
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), (2020). Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament. New York: United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda/>

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

Болат Әлібек Алмазұлы (корреспондент автор) – І. Жансүгіров атындағы Жетісу университетіндегі құқық және экономика факультетінің аға оқытушысы (Талдықорған қ., Қазақстан, E-mail: [a.bolat.edu@gmail.com](mailto:a.bolat.edu@gmail.com))

Саймова Шолпан Алтынбековна – ҚР Президенті Әкімшілігінің «Парламентаризм институты» мемлекеттік заңнама және мемлекеттік басқару орталығының бастығы (Астана қ., Қазақстан, E-mail: [saimova85@gmail.com](mailto:saimova85@gmail.com))

**Сведения об авторах:**

Болат Алибек Алмазович (корреспондент автор) – старший преподаватель факультета права и экономики Жетысуского университета имени И. Жансугурова (г. Талдықорған, Казахстан, E-mail: [a.bolat.edu@gmail.com](mailto:a.bolat.edu@gmail.com))

Саймова Шолпан Алтынбековна – руководитель Центра публичного законодательства и государственного управления Института Парламентаризма при УДП РК (г. Астана, Казахстан, E-mail: [saimova85@gmail.com](mailto:saimova85@gmail.com))

**Information about authors:**

Alibek Bolat (corresponding author) – Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law and Economics of the Zhetysu University (Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan, E-mail: [a.bolat.edu@gmail.com](mailto:a.bolat.edu@gmail.com))

Sholpan Saimova – Head of the Center for Public Legislation and Public Administration of the Institute of Parliamentarism under the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana, Kazakhstan, E-mail: [saimova85@gmail.com](mailto:saimova85@gmail.com))

Алғаш жіберілді: 13 қазан, 2024 ж.

Қайта тіркелді: 4 қараша, 2024 ж.

Қабылданды: 11 желтоқсан, 2024 ж.

---

## АВТОРЛАРҒА АРНАЛҒАН АҚПАРАТ

«ҚазҰУ. Халықаралық қатынастар және халықаралық құқық сериясында» материалдарды жариялау Open Journal System арқылы, онлайн жіберу жүйесі және сараптамалық бағалауды қолдану арқылы жүзеге асырылады.

### Мақалаға қойылатын талаптар

- Редакциялық коллегия журналдың ғылыми бағыттары бойынша бұрын жарияланбаған мақалаларды қабылдайды. Мақала журналдың функционал сайтына жүктеу арқылы ҒАНА (Open Journal System) электронды форматта (doc, .docx, .rtf форматында) қабылданады.

- Шрифт кеглі – 12 (аңдатпа, кілт сөздер, әдебиеттер тізімі - 10, кесте мәтіні – 9-11), шрифт – Times New Roman, мәтін беттің ені бойынша тегістеу арқылы теріледі, аралығы – бір, абзац бойынша шегініс – 0,8 см, шеттері: үстіңгі және астыңғы – 2 см, сол және оң жақ – 2 см.

- Сурет, кесте, графика, диаграмма және т.б. мәтін ішінде нөмір және атаумен белгіленеді. (Мысалы, 1 - сурет – Сурет атауы). Суреттердің, таблица, графика мен диаграммалардың саны мақала көлемінің 20% -нан (кейбір жағдайда 30%) артық болмауы керек.

- Мақала көлемі (атауы, авторлар бойынша ақпарат, аңдатпа, түйін сөз, әдебиеттер тізімін қоспағанда) әлеуметтік және гуманитарлық бағытта 3 000 сөзден кем, 7 000 сөзден артық емес болуы шарт.

- Авторлар жіберіліп отырған мақаланың/қолжазбаның бұрын соңды еш жерде жарияланбағаны, мақалада/қолжазбада басқа жұмыстардың мәтіндеріне сілтемесіз алынған кірме фрагменттердің жоқ екендігі туралы Open Journal System жүйесіндегі ілеспе хатта МІНДЕТТІ түрде жазу керек.

### Мақала құрылымы:

#### *Бірінші бет:*

- Бірінші жол – FTAMP нөмірі (ерекше жағдайда ЭОЖ), мәтін беттің сол жақ шетімен тегістеледі, қаралау шрифт.

- Мақала атауы (Тақырып) мақаланың мәні мен мазмұнын көрсетіп, оқырманның назарын аудару керек. Тақырып қысқа әрі ақпараттық, жаргондар мен аббревиатурасыз жазылуы тиіс. Тақырыптың орташа ұзындығы 5-7 сөз (кей жағдайда 10-12 сөз). Мақаланың тақырыбы орыс, қазақ және ағылшын тілдерінде берілуі керек. Тақырып қаралау шрифтті кіші әріптермен, беттің ортасымен тегістеледі.

- Мақала автор(лар)ы – аты-жөнінің бірінші әріптері және тегі, жұмыс істейтін орны (аффилиация), қала, мемлекет, email – орыс, қазақ және ағылшын тілдерінде жазылады. Авторлар туралы ақпарат қалыпты шрифтті кіші әріптермен жазылып, беттің ортасында тегістеледі.

- Аңдатпа көлемі 150 сөз орыс, қазақ, ағылшын тілдерінде жазылады.

- Түйін сөздер/сөз тіркестері – орыс, қазақ, ағылшын тілдерінде 3-5 сөз аралығында.

#### *Келесі бет (жаңа бет):*

- Кіріспе келесіде берілген негізгі элементтерден тұрады:

- Таңдалған тақырыптың негіздемесі; тақырып өзектілігі мен зерттеу проблемалары. Таңдалған тақырыптың негіздемесінде алдыңғы зерттеушілердің тәжірибелері негізінде проблемалық жағдайдың (зерттеу жұмыстарының жоқтығы, жаңа зерттеу нысанының пайда болғаны және т.б.). бар екендігі айтылады. Тақырыптың өзектілігі аталған зерттеу нысанының қойылған сұрақтарға толық жауаптардың болмаған жағдайда, тақырыптың теориялық және практикалық маңыздылығы арқылы дәлелденіп жалпыға ортақ мүдде арқылы анықталады.

- Жұмыстың нысанын, пәнін, мақсаттарын, міндеттерін, тәсілдерін, әдістер, гипотезасын анықтау. Зерттеудің мақсаты тезисті дәлелдеумен, яғни зерттеу тақырыбын автор таңдаған аспектімен көрсетумен байланысты.

- Материал мен әдістер - материалдар мен жұмыс барысының сипаттамасынан, сондай-ақ қолданылатын әдістердің толық сипаттамасынан тұруы керек

- Әдебиеттерге шолу жасау бөлімінде - зерттеу тақырыбы бойынша ағылшын тілінде шетелдік авторлардың іргелі және жаңа еңбектер (кемінде 15 жұмыс), оларды ғылыми үлесі тұрғысынан талдау, сондай-ақ сіздің мақалаңызда толықтырылған зерттеу кемшіліктері беріледі.

- 
- Жұмысқа қатысы жоқ көптеген сілтемелердің болуы немесе сіздің жетістіктеріңіз туралы, алдыңғы жұмыстарыңызды көрсететін сілтемелерді қосуға **БОЛМАЙДЫ**.
  - Нәтижелер мен Талқылау бөлімінде сіздің зерттеу нәтижелеріңізді талдауы және талқылауы беріледі. Зерттеу барысында алынған нәтижелер туралы қорытынды беру арқылы негізгі мәні айқындалады. Бұл мақаланың маңызды бөлімдерінің бірі болып саналады. Онда жұмысыңыздың нәтижелерінің талдауы және алдыңғы жұмыстармен, талдаулармен және тұжырымдамаларымен салыстыру арқылы сәйкес нәтижелерді талқылау беріледі.
  - Қорытынды, тұжырымдама – жұмыстың осы кезеңдегі нәтижелерін жалпылау және қорытындылау; автор алға қойған тұжырымның растығын және алынған нәтижелерді ескере отырып, ғылыми білімнің өзгеруі туралы автордың қорытындысын растау. Қорытынды абстрактілі болмауы керек, оларды ұсыныстарды немесе одан әрі жасалатын жұмысты сипаттай отырып белгілі бір ғылыми саладағы зерттеу нәтижелерін жалпылау үшін қолдану керек.
  - Пайдаланылған әдебиеттер тізімі немесе библиографиялық тізім кем дегенде әлеуметтік және гуманитарлық бағыттарға 15 атаулардан тұрады, ал ағылшын тіліндегі жалпы атаулар саны 50% -дан кем болмауы керек. Егер сілтемелер тізімінде кириллицада берілген еңбектер болса, сілтемелер тізімін екі нұсқада ұсыну қажет: біріншісі - түпнұсқада, екіншісі - романизацияланған алфавитте (транслитерация). Әлеуметтік және гуманитарлық бағытта романизацияланған әдебиеттер тізімін, ағылшын тіліндегі (басқа шет тіліндегі) дереккөздер рәсімдеу стилі - American Psychological Association (<http://www.apastyle.org/>).

---

## INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Submissions to the International Relations and International Law Journal are made using Open Journal System, the online submission and peer review system.

### MANUSCRIPT REQUIREMENTS:

- The Editorial Board accepts previously unpublished articles in research areas of the journal. The paper should be submitted in electronic format (in .doc, .docx, .rtf) ONLY by submitting it through the function (Open Journal System) at the journal's website
- Font size -12 (abstract, keywords, references - 10, table text - 9-11), font -Times New Roman, alignment - text width, spacing - single, paragraph indentation - 0.8 cm, margins: top and bottom – 2 cm, left and right – 2 cm.
- Figures, tables, graphs, diagrams, etc. are presented directly in the text, indicating the number and title (for example, Figure 1 – The name of the figure). The number of figures, tables, graphs and diagrams should not exceed 20% of total volume of the article (in some cases up to 30%).
- The volume of the article (excluding title, information about authors, abstract, keywords, references) should be at least 3,000 words and not exceed 7,000 words for social and humanitarian areas, and 1,500-7,000 words for natural science and technical areas.
- Authors must indicate in the cover letter in the Open Journal System that the submitted article/manuscript has not been published anywhere before, and that the article does not contain borrowed text fragments from other papers without referencing them.

### The structure of the article:

#### *First page:*

- The first line is the IRSTI (Interstate rubricator of scientific and technical information number) (in exceptional cases, UDC), alignment is left, the font is bold.
- The title of the article (Title) should reflect the essence and content of the article and attract the reader's attention. The name should be short, informative and not contain any jargon or abbreviations. The optimal length of the title is 5-7 words (in some cases 10-12 words). The title of the article should be presented in Russian, Kazakh and English. The title of the article is presented in bold, lowercase letters, and alignment is centered.
- Author (s) of the article – Initials and surname, place of work (affiliation), city, country, email – in Russian, Kazakh and English. Information about authors is presented in an ordinary font in lowercase letters, alignment is centered.
- Abstract of at least 150 words in Russian, Kazakh and English
- Keywords are words/collocations - 3-5 words in Russian, Kazakh and English.

#### *Next page (new):*

- Introduction consists of the following main elements:
- Justification for the topic chosen; relevance of topic or problem. The chosen topics should be based on the description of our predecessors' experience and report a problem to solve (lack of any research, the emergence of a new object, etc.). The relevance of the topic is due to general interest to the research object with a lack of comprehensive answers on relevant questions, which is proved by the theoretical or practical importance of the topic.
- Defining the object, subject, goals, objectives, methods, approaches, hypothesis, and meaning of your work. The purpose of the study is related to proof of thesis, that is presentation of the research subject in the aspect chosen by the author.
- Materials and Methods should consist of a description of materials and progress of work, as well as a full description of methods used.
- The literature review section should cover fundamental and new papers on the subject under study by foreign authors in English (at least 15 references), analysis of these works from the point of view of their scientific contribution, as well as gaps in research that authors supplement in their article.
- It is UNACCEPTABLE to have a lot of links that are not related to research, or inappropriate judgments about your own achievements, links to your previous work.
- In the Results and Discussion section, authors can analyze and discuss the results of their research. Conclusions on results obtained in the course of study are presented, the main essence is revealed. In addition, this is one of the most important sections of the article. It is necessary to analyze the results of research and discuss relevant results in comparison with previous work, analyses and conclusions.
- The conclusions section covers the generalization and summing up of work at this stage; truth confirmation of statements put forward, expressed by the author, and the author's conclusion about change in scientific knowledge, taking into account the results obtained. Conclusions should not be abstract, they should be used to summarize the results of research in a particular research area, with a description of proposals or opportunities for further work.
- The list of references consists of at least 15 titles for socio-humanitarian areas. A total number of titles in English should be at least 50%. If there are references presented in Cyrillic in the list of references, it is necessary to present the list of references in two versions: first - in the original language, second – in the Romanized alphabet (transliteration).
- Style of the Romanized list of references, as well as sources in English (another foreign language) for social and humanitarian areas - American Psychological Association (<http://www.apastyle.org/>).

---

## МАЗМҰНЫ – CONTENTS – СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

| 1-бөлім<br>Халықаралық қатынастар<br>және дипломатияның<br>өзекті мәселелері                                                                        | Section 1<br>Contemporary problems<br>of international relations<br>and diplomacy  | Раздел 1<br>Актуальные проблемы<br>международных отношений<br>и дипломатии |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Tumanshiyev D.A., Issova L.T., Abduali M.A.</i><br>The Geopolitical Significance of Kazakhstan's Uranium Reserves in the Global Security .....   |                                                                                    | 4                                                                          |
| <i>Zhumatay G.B., Yskak A.S.</i><br>Key Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism and Their Impact on Turkey's Foreign Policy .....                         |                                                                                    | 14                                                                         |
| <i>Marác László</i><br>Hungary and Dutch Fencing Diplomacy after the First World War .....                                                          |                                                                                    | 25                                                                         |
| 2-бөлім<br>Аймақтану және<br>халықаралық құқықтың<br>өзекті мәселелері                                                                              | Section 2<br>Contemporary problems<br>of regional studies<br>and international law | Раздел 2<br>Актуальные вопросы<br>регионоведения<br>и международного права |
| <i>Zhaxygulova G.</i><br>Transformation of Russian-Chinese Interaction in Central Asia: from Strategic Partnership to Asymmetric Rivalry .....      |                                                                                    | 36                                                                         |
| <i>Mukhtarova K.S., Paizova A.K.</i><br>Strategic Instruments of Soft Power: the Experience of Global Actors in Central Asia.....                   |                                                                                    | 47                                                                         |
| <i>Болат Ә.А., Саймова Ш.А.</i><br>Қарусыздану қағидасын жүзеге асырудағы «жаһандық нөл» концепциясының құқық қолданудың қазіргі<br>мәселелері..... |                                                                                    | 60                                                                         |
| Авторларға арналған ақпарат.....                                                                                                                    |                                                                                    | 70                                                                         |