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THE BIDEN WHITE HOUSE AND THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

The world anxiously waited for the results of the US presidential election in 2020, expecting a new direction by the new president and his White House's policy towards its friends and foes alike. Now President-elect Joe Biden and his administration will assume power on January 20, 2021, the White House's worldview and policy will most certainly either change or modify President Donald Trump's diplomatic, economic, and military engagements in the Central Asian countries. These and other issues will become critical concerns for policymakers and scholars of international relations for years to come.

This article explores the background of the US foreign policy in these Asian countries and presents an analysis and potential areas for engagement of the Biden administration in the Central Asian region. The modern dynamics of international realities requires a constant analysis of the ongoing changes for the operational calibration of internal and external management decisions for both regional and non-regional actors. As an international actor the US will have to be responsible to keep the world and regional balance in the region by trying to get its place in the region in the realities of Chinese – Russian dominance.

Key words. Central Asia, US, Joe Biden, White House, policy, geopolitics.

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Байден басшылығындағы Ақ үй және АҚШ-тың Орталық Азиядағы жаңа сыртқы саясаты

Бүкіл әлем 2020 жылғы Америка Құрама Штаттарындағы президенттік сайлауды асыға күтті, себебі жаңадан сайланған Президент АҚШ өзінің альянстары мен қарсыластарына бағытталған сыртқы саясатын түбегейлі өзгертеді деген үміт бар. Алайда, Джо Байденнің әкімшілігінен АҚШ пен Орталық Азияның қарым-қатынастарында нені күтуге болады және жаңа президент аймақтағы Дональд Трамптың саясатын қалай өзгерте алады деген сұрақтар саясаткерлер мен халықаралық қатынастар мамандарының арасында қызу талқыға түсуде.

Бұл мақала Америка Құрама Штаттарының Орталық Азияға қатысты соңғы онжылдықтағы сыртқы саясатын қарастырып, талдап және болашақ 4 жылдық Джо Байден президенттігіне болжам жасалынады. Халықаралық қатынастардың заманауи динамикасы аймақтық және халықаралық акторларда болып жатқан ішкі және сыртқы әкімшілік саяси шешімдерін талдап отыруды талап етеді. АҚШ әлемдік ойыншы ретінде аймақтық және әлемдік тепе-теңділікті сақтауға жауапкершілік ала отырып, осы аймақта Қытай – Ресей үстемдігіне төтеп беріп өз орнын табуға тырысады. Шын мәнінде, қазіргі уақытта Америка Құрама Штаттарының Орталық Азиядағы мүдделері АҚШ пен ҚХР арасындағы жаһандық қарама-қайшылықпен және Ауғанстандағы жағдаймен байланысты болып отырғандығы айқындалады.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия, АҚШ, Джо Байден, Ақ үй, саясат, геосаясат.

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Белый дом Байдена и новая внешняя политика в Центральной Азии

Мир с нетерпением ждал результатов президентских выборов в США в 2020 году, ожидая нового курса со стороны нового президента и политики Белого дома в отношении как своих друзей, так и врагов. Теперь избранный президент Джо Байден и его администрация придут

к власти 20 января 2021 года, мировоззрение и политика Белого дома наверняка изменят дипломатическую, экономическую и военную тактику президента Дональда Трампа в странах Центральной Азии. Эти и другие вопросы станут критически важными для политиков и исследователей международных отношений на долгие годы.

В этой статье исследуется предыстория внешней политики США в азиатских странах, а также представлен анализ и рассмотрены потенциальные области взаимодействия администрации Байдена в регионе Центральной Азии. В качестве международного игрока США должны будут нести ответственность за поддержание мирового и регионального баланса в регионе, пытаясь занять свое место в регионе в условиях китайско-российского доминирования. Фактически интересы США в Центральной Азии на данный момент связаны с глобальным противостоянием США и КНР и ситуацией в Афганистане.

Ключевые слова. Центральная Азия, США, Джо Байден, Белый дом, политика, геополитика.

Introduction

Central Asia has traditionally been considered a place of confrontations and conflicts between and among the great powers. At least it is how Central Asia has been viewed back in the nineteenth century in the Russian-British “Great Game” (Edward Ingram, 1982). In his seminal article in 1904, “Geographical Pivot of History” in *The Geographical Journal*, British geographer and strategist Halford John Mackinder put forward the Heartland Theory, which extended a geopolitical analysis (Mackinder, 1904). Professor Mackinder theorized as who governs the Eastern Europe he will command the Heartland; who governs the Heartland will command the World-Island; who governs the World-Island will command the world” (Mackinder, 1942). This insightful observation has increasingly become relevant, especially after the USSR collapse, which has brought the CA republics into the international stage as newly independent states.

Today, public opinion and economic diplomacy continue to push the idea that Central Asia or Eurasia is indeed a place for “flexing muscles” between the Russian initiated Eurasian Economic Union and China with its One Belt and One Road Initiative (Gaziza Shakhanova, Jeremy Garlick, 2020). Thus, Central Asia is now a contested zone in “flexing muscles” for both world and regional powers (Wang Dong, 2015).

The dynamics of geopolitics and geo-economics are controversial for two reasons. First, all world and regional powers occupy certain niches in the region, the result of which direct rivalry between and among them is not openly confrontational. Second, the Central Asian states are by no means passive actors; thus, they in many aspects set the rules of the game themselves. In addition, they are excellent at playing on the contradictions between and among external power-players.

The changing of american policies

In conducting US foreign policy, the Biden administration is widely viewed as refreshing but traditional in its American approach to great power politics. To highlight this importance, President Biden’s transition teams have started to assemble robust and experienced groups of people in the new Cabinet and the National Security Council positions. The new policy initiatives that the Biden White House would establish and its approaches to the Central Asian region will be of great importance to these countries in the coming four years and beyond. Those countries include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmen Republic, and Uzbekistan. The ways in which the Biden White House engage in these countries will play a vital role in the region’s ongoing economic and political growth as well as how the new administration navigates the escalating rivalry between great powers, especially Russia and China.

Since the collapse of the USSR, US foreign policy in CA 3 different stages can be distinguished in this background analysis. To begin with, from the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US had three needs:

Firstly, to secure the weapons of mass destruction acquired from the USSR;

Secondly, offer support the CA nations fortify and defend their recently procured sovereignty, freedom, and regional keenness within the occasion of a resurgence of Russian colonialism;

Thirdly, break the Russian imposing business model of pipeline frameworks and transit courses for Central Asian oil and gas as a ensure of the region’s freedom from Moscow.

The USA has unequivocally rejected a geopolitical approach to Central Asia in favour of a long-term approach of supporting the arrangement

of a main rule framework within the locale, a free market, and financial integration. In any case, in spite of the talk, US authority did not prioritize Central Asia in its outside arrangement plan (Rumer E., Sokolsky R., Stronski P. 2016). In reality, the USA endeavors to advance steadiness, security, financial thriving, and administration within the locale have been direct. The depicted approach can be called “US Policy in CA region 1.0”

Moment, after the terror attack of September 11, official Washington’s demeanor to CA region and the nature of participation with the states of the locale changed significantly: the arrangement of “US Policy 2.0” started. Surely, intrigued in seeking after a long-term strategy of political and financial change proceeded, but military and security contemplations came to the fore. The require for calculated back for the US military operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently reliance on getting to the region’s military framework, won over the craving to advance political and financial changes and regard for human rights. Washington started to connect more prominent significance to security participation with nations where it had military bases, and where it held favourable geopolitical positions for the Joined together States within the locale. The primary two stages of American relations with the independent nation-states of Central Asia are connected by a common subject: the national security interface of the United States that lay exterior its borders and Washington’s activities were the results of approaches, needs, and connections with the individual nations that encompassed the locale. When the nearness of US military units in Afghanistan started to scale down, Washington required to rethink its interface, build priorities, and connections within the locale when Russia’s preparation and its capacity to meddle within the inside undertakings of its neighbours started to extend. Other than the long-term objective of growing effect in Central Asia sought after by both Moscow and Beijing might raise the weights between them also, among the nations of CA region itself. The rivalry between the two actors the United States and Russia prompted the Central Asian states to endeavor to guarantee that the interest of the West within the issues of the locale is protected to contain the desire of China. All of these events provide the third stage and its context for US Central Asia Policy 3.0.

The de facto rupture in the summer 2005 of the alliance between Washington and Tashkent—the largest city in Central Asia, which was the basis of USA policy during 2001-2004, led to the expulsion

of the American military base from Uzbekistan and contributed to the strengthening of Russian and Chinese positions in the region. Under these conditions, the US administration took a number of milding measures, which were followed by a comprehensive reassessment of the goals and priorities of regional policy (Socor, 2005). In July 2005, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, after which Kyrgyzstan leaders reported that their discuss base in Manas would proceed to operate, and the Tajik administration affirmed that it bolstered the US activities in Afghanistan and retained the rights to use the airspace for the anti-terrorist coalition (Socor, 2005).

In the fall of 2005 and the spring of 2006, Washington developed a new concept of policy directives in Central Asia. Its main ideological source was the works of Dr. Frederick Starr, an influential American expert on Central Asian issues (Star, 2005). He summed up that there was a formation of “Greater Central Asia,” a new region covering Afghanistan with the CA states. The formulating of this new opinion extended to the need for improving a regional US policy towards these countries.

Declaring its intention to support the states of CA “integrate with each other and with neighbors”, the US administration preferred to “ignore” the mechanisms of multilateral military-political and economic cooperation already operating in the region (Troitskiy, 2011). Thus, Washington and the NATO leadership in Brussels pointedly ignored the attempts of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a Russia-led military alliance of seven The United States too denied backing the draft settlement on the Free zone of Nuclear-Weapon in Central Asia as the record including an arrangement protecting the rights and commitments of the parties beneath the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Except that, official Washington tried to anticipate the nearness of UN agents at the marking ceremony of the arrangement on a nuclear-free zone. The US organization has too appeared skepticism almost the exercises and prospects of the Shanghai Participation Association (SCO)—a Eurasian political, financial and security union reported in 2001 in China. The US declared that it does not see “the concrete achievements” of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and does not completely get what this structure is doing in common (Troitskiy, 2011). When talking about almost financial improvement in Central Asia, American authorities did not indeed specify the existence⁶ of the Eurasian financial cooperation (Troitskiy, 2011).

American policy revisions

In the past years, the US government has formulated many bold concepts which were beneficial to the US and Central Asia and relations with these countries. During his visit to all five Central Asian capitals in November 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry outlined his vision of “Partners for the 21st Century” (Kerry, 2015).

There were in the plans:

Firstly, the thought of nonpartisanship from the competition of superpowers;

Secondly, the thought of turning the region into a source of energy power for the entire world;

Thirdly, the thought of a union within the worldwide “war on terror;”

Fourthly, the thought of association for the advancement of the region. All of these concepts given experiences into the current American national security interface that have changed habitually. The USA does not have close financial, political, and social ties with CA. In addition, the White House proceeds to decrease its military presence in Afghanistan and is active with emergencies in other regions. For these reasons, the United States ought to put its engagement with the region on a long-term, economical balance, reliable with current objectives and accessible assets. The USA does not have the same geographic focal points and noteworthy interface in Central Asia as Russia and China (Layne, 2002). Given these substances, White House ought to receive one of the long-range adjusting methodologies by utilizing its political, financial, and, in the event that essential, security devices to specifically act as an assistant to Central Asia and counteracted the geopolitical weight of its provoke neighbours. Altering from an inaccessible put might be a way to decrease the United States of the facilitated security burden by delegating to other countries the errand of keeping up the alter of control in unsteady regions.

In quintessence, this approach is comparable to the position taken by Russia and China after September 11, 2001, when Moscow and Beijing, in truth, depended on White House, that accepted the part of guarantor of security within the region. Any balancing act must be carefully calibrated to meet the needs of the CA republics, but not be overly committed to the USA, notably the role of the fire brigade in situations that do not require the White House’s active assistance.

Biden’s policy approach

As the Democratic Presidential Candidate, Joe Biden said ahead of the election that he

intends to “strengthen democracy” and “fight authoritarianism” in the world. What does this mean for the republics of Central Asian region? The USA is in the middle of the most consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since opening of the iron curtain. Although Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is over what comes next (Kurt M. Campbell, Jake Sullivan, 2019).

Since 2015, the “C5 + 1” cooperation format has been operating between the five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—and the USA. Since that period, the foreign ministries of the five Central Asian states and the US secretaries of state have met frequently to discuss relations between Central Asia and Washington. The C5 + 1 format was chosen during the presidency of Barack Obama. It continued with the Trump presidency, and in February 2020, the State Department presented Washington’s new strategy for Central Asia until 2025.

The US plan is aimed at strengthening the independence of Central Asian countries, reducing the threat of terrorism in the region, expanding relations between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, and improving the humanrights situation. In addition, Washington’s plan until 2025 provides for the equalization of the influence of neighboring countries in the region. It has all the reasons to believe that the new occupant of the White House will not fundamentally change US policy towards Central Asia.

According to some incoming Biden officials and others, the C5 + 1 format with the USA and Central Asian republics will remain under Biden as Trump’s policy will continue (Kurt M. Campbell, Jake Sullivan, 2019). In fact, the C5 + 1 format was adopted during the Obama presidency, when Biden was vice president, and before that as one of the most active senators in foreign policy establishment, this platform will most likely remain under the Biden presidency.

The Biden administration will primarily fight the coronavirus in the country and will return to a number of international agreements from which Trump has withdrawn, such as the Paris Climate Change treaty. It is difficult to predict that the US interests in CA will increase, decrease, or radically change due to these prevailing circumstances. During his presidential campaign, candidate Biden said that he would work to stop the spread of the coronavirus in the country and reunite a society torn

apart by racism. As president, he plans to return to the Paris agreement on climate change, from which Trump withdrew, to strengthen democracy and to fight authoritarianism in the world, including in Central Asia. However, according to some observers, Biden's words about the fight against authoritarianism will not greatly affect Central Asia given Washington's economic interests in the region (Asautai, 2020).

Inconvenient truth and making exceptions

All Democratic presidents talk about the fight against authoritarianism. This is a reoccurring feature of American political philosophy; however, one should not forget that Democrats are also quite pragmatic and realistic in their approach to foreign policy when it is convenient. When candidate Biden talks about the fight against authoritarianism, he of course means Russia and other countries that, from a geopolitical point of view, pose a danger to the USA. For instance, he does not really mean the same for Belarus and China.

US interests in Central Asia were declining even under President Obama. The only country in Central Asia that has always more or less attracted Washington's attention is Kazakhstan, and for one simple reason: large American oil and gas companies are present here. Therefore, Kazakhstan has traditionally been the number one economic partner for the United States. For example, the size of investments that came into Kazakhstan after the collapse of USSR is almost \$53 billion (Official information resource of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, 2020).

This is a large amount of money compared to the investments that were directed to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan combined. It was the oil and gas emphasis that the United States placed on Kazakhstan that has always been the key consideration. Regardless of who occupied the White House, all presidents have practically built more or less normal relations with the authoritarian leadership of Kazakhstan. This is the economic realism that Washington cannot resist over its democratic idealism. If authoritarianism ensures the stability of business contracts for an American oil and gas company, US foreign policy is a subset of corporate policy and political campaign strategy.

Professor Dosym Satpayev, respected political commentator in CA and the head of the Risk Assessment Group, thinks "the United States mostoften begins to rely on some kind of democratic values when it comes to trying to neutralize a serious

geopolitical adversary, and when it comes to states that are not too large, not too large, which do not pose serious threats to the United States, then in this regard, the White House is beginning to look at it with tolerance" (Asautai, 2020). For example, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are states with tougher authoritarian regimes and human rights violations, but even with such records the United States maintains bilateral relations.

Even in such environment, Uzbekistan will soon compete with Kazakhstan to gain American attention. For the USA, Uzbekistan is a profoundly serious actor in CA region. In 2020, the Uzbekistan foreign affairs minister visited the United States to promote Uzbekistan and to attract American investment. In that year, the Uzbek administration hosted an important defense meeting of the leaders of the armed forces of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan with the commanders of the US armed forces (Azattyq, 2020). An Equally important point of interest is that the envoy of President Trump got Uzbekistan involved in a negotiated settlement with the Taliban of Afghanistan. The United States later acknowledged that Washington had entered into an agreement for a truce with the Taliban and that Uzbekistan was actively helping in this process. When the Taliban representatives arrived in Tashkent, the American negotiators worked very closely with the Uzbeks on the Afghan issue. For the USA, the war in Afghanistan—the longest conflict in American history is still a paramount national security interest.

For Kazakhstan, it is not geographically close to Afghanistan and it does not have a shared border. Considering foreign investments for the United States, Kazakhstan is a priority player in Central Asia's oil and gas endowments. In terms of military-political situations, Uzbekistan comes to the fore.

Economic interests over democratic values

Among many considerations in all this, the first focus of national interests of the Biden White House was placed on the pre-election announcements of "tough foreign policy" against China and Russia, for which the latter will most likely turn out to be the main enemy of the United States (Iskanderova, 2020).

At the same time, in relations to China, the Biden administration may announce the easing of economic sanctions. Even if this happens, it is unlikely to translate into friendship between Washington and Beijing. The dimensions of pressure will simply change from economics to the politics of human rights.

Moreover, US congressional leaders believe that the threat is not Russia, but China. In terms of military power, economic strength, and the general Chinese presence in all regions of the world, a large portion of Chinese investments goes to Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are China's largest debtor-nations.

Trump's policy was primarily aimed at developing the economy and domestic interests of the USA. President Biden, on the other hand, has always been focused on processes taking place outside the United States, which, in principle, is characteristic of the politics of the Democrats. Obviously, the focus of the new US president will be on Central Asia. According to Kazakhstani political scientists (like Professor Satpayev and others), the stake will be made on the development of interstate relations with the countries of CA region on the basis of the multilateral platform C5+1, and the negotiating agenda between the USA with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan will return to the categories traditional for Democrats (Azattyq. 2020). In the field of security, the Afghan direction of reduced US military presence may be realized; however, the fight against terrorism, radicalism, and drug and arms trafficking will continue. In the humanitarian sphere, there expects a turn towards a moralizing position and special attention to regimes that respect human rights and freedoms. This means that various NGOs and non-profit organizations will again become the mouthpiece of the "western truth" in Central Asia, for which the Biden administration would support.

According to Professor Odd Arne Westad at Yale University, the United States has two main traditional rivalries in Central Asia: China and Russia (Odd Arne Westad, 2020). China's priority is its economic rise so that the Chinese nation becomes stronger domestically. The second is to establish China as the predominant power within much of Asia, including Central Asia. Its policies elsewhere, so far, are largely strategic. Furthermore, the renowned Yale professor writes in the Foreign Affairs magazine that this process has been aided by "the weakness of Russia, the long malaise of Japan, and the waywardness of US foreign policy" (Odd Arne Westad, 2020). However, these factors were not responsible alone; China's behavior is driven mainly by domestic factors.

Blaming Chinese expansionism on the American mistakes, as the State Department's report does, is not just self-centered and therefore faulty but also analytically dangerous, Professor Westad argues (Odd Arne Westad, 2020).

Given these complicated issues, the second important question is whether the relations between Russian Federation and the United States has any meaning for Central Asia. It may seem that such questions are a legacy of the Cold War that slyly ignores the new reality on the ground. Both the RF and the USA see that their influence in the world in general and in the Central Asian region are steadily declining. In this regard, another question arises: are American and Russian relations still conclusive for the CA region?

In the foreign politics of Russia and the United States, Central Asia occupies a different place. The United States assigns Central Asia a secondary role. Regardless of what US officials may state publicly, the region is of little relevance to US national security interests. For Washington, it is important only for its relations with other countries: Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. A striking example of this low status is the work of the Bureau of Central Asian Affairs in the US Department of State, which is focused more on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India than on Central Asia. During the period when it was worsening of relations with the US in 2014 because of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: "As for Ukraine. It is vitally important for us, and in America, issues regarding Ukraine were resolved at the technical level (Putin, 2014). The same words can also be applied to Central Asia: unlike the United States, Moscow's interests in the region are vital.

American role and interests in central asia

The USA was one of the primary states to support the gaining of independence of five CA countries, and has worked closely over the past three decades to maintain the security, development, and prosperity of each of these countries. Central Asia has always been a strategic and trade crossroads for civilizations between Europe and Asia. The main strategic interest of the United States in this region is to create a more stable and prosperous Central Asia, which can freely pursue political, economic, and security interests with various partners on its own terms:

- a) linking to world markets and open to international investment;
- b) having strong democratic institutions;
- c) upholding the rule of law and respects human rights. A stable and secure CA region contributes directly to US efforts to combat terrorism, help assistance to regional stability, enhance energy

security, and enhance economic prosperity in the region and beyond.

To this end, the United States has provided more than \$9 billion in direct assistance to support peace and security, democratic reform and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs (Global Public Affairs, 2020).

Equally important, under the leadership of the USA, the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, and the ADB have provided more than \$50 billion in loans, borrowings, and technical assistance to support the region's development (Global Public Affairs, 2020). Meanwhile, the US private sector has invested more than \$31 billion in businesses in the region, creating thousands of local jobs and building human potential (Global Public Affairs, 2020).

Finally, the US had forged strong nation-to-nation ties with each of the Central Asian countries, including through direct funding of over 40,000 educational and professional exchanges. Many Central Asians have immigrated to various American cities and now form energetic and dynamic diasporas that maintain deep ties to their home countries.

Make america great again?

Since the previous White House Strategy for CA was approved in 2015, new presidents in the region have created new opportunities for reform-oriented improvement, inter-regional linkages and cooperation, and greater engagement with the United States (Borisov, 2020). In particular, new governments in the region have pledged a deeper commitment to political and economic reform, including through bilateral cooperation with the United States. In addition, improved interregional linkages and a growing understanding of the value of cooperation as a regional group have expanded the potential for engaging with the US through the C5 + 1 platform.

Efforts by Central Asian states to increase foreign investment and attract American business are raising the wish of Central Asian presidents to follow rule of law reforms and comply with international norms. The United States has funded more than 70 projects across Central Asia (Global Public Affairs, 2020) that defend and preserve the Central Asia's unique cultural and traditional artefacts, traditions, and archaeological sites for the future.

The new US Strategy for Central Asia assumes that some of the persistent factors from the previous strategy regarding key developments in the region will be maintained: domestic and cross-border terrorism will remain a major security problem,

and CA states will proceed to confront dangers to steadiness such as radical extremism, drug trafficking, and disinformation.

There are some basic principles underpinning this new strategy. Central Asia could be a geostrategic region imperative to the national security interface of the United States, notwithstanding the level of US action in Afghanistan. The United States needs to pay particular attention to cooperation in areas where it has a comparative advantage, in particular by encouraging private sector activity and transparency in public policies and regulatory regimes that promote compliance with international standards, including environmental safeguards and labor rights protection. When reform advance is uneven, the United States ought to, in coordination with like-minded accomplices, offer concrete help to overcome these obstacles, while explaining the benefits of complying with international norms and laws. After the victory of Joe Biden in the US presidential elections, the entire world is beginning to expect the inevitable change in American foreign policy.

It is difficult to say just how positively it will affect the situation in the world in common and in Central Asia in particular. One is certain that President Trump's transactional diplomacy in the genre of American military-industrial complex and isolationism will be thoroughly redefined by the new policy architects of the White House's National Security Council.

The future Washington dispositions would surely make the think-tank and academic communities to postulate the prospects of a new Biden foreign policy doctrine. In this regard, how will the new foreign policy play on global contradictions and set them in the Central Asian context? What diplomatic contours for Central Asia does the renewed administration in Washington promise? Do the old Democrats, who can be called excellent students of political continuity or the alumni of President Obama, return to power in the United States with new ideas? Or is it a coincidence that Joe Biden, at the end of his "victory speech" directly referred to the 12-year-old management directive formulated by the previous Democratic President Barack Obama? These questions are at the forefront of the testing grounds for the Biden-Harris foreign policy approaches to address and to restore the pre-Trump benchmarks set in the 2015 National Security Strategy (National Security Strategy, 2015). When applied to Central Asia, the region was given a modest place among the geographic priorities of Washington's foreign policy. In a 2015 document, the CA region is on the agenda once in the context of the

tasks of balancing American strategic partnerships in Pacific and South Asia.

The current practice of the Central Asian context of American foreign policy will also appeal to the regional approaches that were developed during the tenure of Secretary of State John Kerry under President Obama. The stake on the improvement of inter-state relationship with the states of CA region on the basis of a multilateral platform between the foreign ministers C5 + 1 and thenegotiating agenda with the USA and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will return to the traditional categories for Democrats who are now in-charge of the White House and both the

House and Senate of the US Congress. The expected focus of Washington policies includes the areas of economic, political, security, and environmental concerns that target in attracting and supporting Western investments in the most marginalized sectors of Central Asia.

These include the development of green energy with the construction of wind turbines or solar energy platforms, and the fight against terrorism and radicalism as well as illegal drug and arms trafficking. Not limited to these but human rights considerations are on the table for President Biden to “Make America Great Again” in the true sense of American Way.

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