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## **SOME OBSTACLES OF BILETARAL BUSINESS RELATIONS BETWEEN KAZAKHSTAN AND CHINA**

The main goal of the article is to reassess and analyze difficulties and obstacles in the way of business relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China in the context of the international economic crisis. Kazakhstan and China are historically and geographically neighbors, and it is clear that we will enter into political, cultural, economic and military relations with a neighboring country, whether we want it or not. At present, Kazakhstan has such views as anti-Chinese sentiment, the "Chinese threat", and there are reasons for that. If we take into account our eternal neighborhood and close trade and economic relations, we should consider China, a country with huge economic potential, not only in terms of threats and fears, but also as a new opportunity for Kazakhstan, while maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the country. Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has established friendly and partnership relations with the People's Republic of China, having completely resolved the issue of the border between the two countries, and today has established relations as a new strategic partner. However, there are key problems between the two countries. We see that there are many political, legal, regulatory, cultural and ideological barriers to the development of business relations. This article can help us to understand some of them.

**Key words:** Republic of Kazakhstan, People's Republic of China, business relations, foreign policy.

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### **Қазақстан мен Қытай арасындағы екі жақты іскерлік қатынастардың кейбір қиыншылықтары**

Халықаралық экономикалық дағдарыс жағдайында Қазақстан Республикасы мен Қытай Халық Республикасы арасындағы іскерлік қатынастарды қайта бір бағалау және оның барысындағы қиыншылықтар мен кедергілерге сараптама жасау мақаланың негізгі мақсаты болып табылады. Қазақстан мен Қытай тарихи-географиялық көрші және біз қаласақ та, қаламасақ та көрші мемлекетпен саяси, мәдени, экономикалық және әскерлік қатынастарға түсетініміз анық. Қазіргі уақытта Қазақстанда антиқытайлық көңіл-күй, «қытай қауіпі» сияқты көзқарастар бар және ондай жағдайдың қалыптасуына негіз де жоқ емес. Егер біз мәңгілік көршілігімізді, біте қайнасқан сауда-экономикалық қарым-қатынастарымызды ескерсек, Қытайға тек қауіп пен үрей тұрғысынан ғана қарамай, керісінше бірінші кезекте мемлекеттің тұтастығы мен елдің егемендік мәртебесін сақтай отырып, алып экономикалық қуаты бар мемлекетті Қазақстан үшін жаңа мүмкіндіктер деп те қарастыруымыз керек. Қазақстан тәуелсіздік алғалы бері Қытай Халық Республикасымен достық, серіктестік қарым-қатынас орнатып, екі мемлекет ортасындағы шекара мәселесін толықтай шеше отырып, бүгінгі күні жаңа стратегиялық серіктес мәртебесінде байланыс орнатып отыр. Бірақ, екі мемлекет ортасында түйінді мәселелер де жоқ емес. Іскерлік қатынастарды дамыту барысында көптеген саяси, құқықтық-нормативтік, мәдени-дүниетанымдық кедергілердің бар екендігін көріп отырмыз. Мақала солардың негізгі себептерін түсінуге мүмкіндік береді.

**Түйін сөздер:** Қазақстан Республикасы, Қытай Халық Республикасы, іскерлік қатынастар, сыртқы саясат.

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### **Некоторые сложности двусторонних деловых отношений между Казахстаном и Китаем**

Основной целью статьи является переоценка и анализ трудностей и препятствий на пути деловых отношений между Республикой Казахстан и Китайской Народной Республикой в контексте международного экономического кризиса. Казахстан и Китай исторически и

географически являются соседями, и совершенно очевидно, что мы вступим в политические, культурные, экономические и военные отношения с соседней страной, хотим мы этого или нет. В настоящее время в Казахстане существуют такие взгляды, как антикитайское настроение, «китайская угроза», и на то есть свои причины. Если принять во внимание наше вечное соседство и тесные торгово-экономические отношения, мы должны рассматривать Китай, страну с огромным экономическим потенциалом, не только с точки зрения угроз и страхов, но и как новую возможность для Казахстана, сохраняя при этом целостность и суверенитет страны. С момента обретения независимости Казахстан установил дружественные и партнерские отношения с Китайской Народной Республикой, полностью решив вопрос о границе между двумя странами, и сегодня установил отношения в качестве нового стратегического партнера. Однако между двумя странами есть ключевые проблемы. Мы видим, что существует множество политических, правовых, нормативных, культурных и идеологических барьеров при развитии деловых отношений.

**Ключевые слова:** Республика Казахстан, Китайская Народная Республика, деловые отношения, внешняя политика.

## Introduction

No country in the world is as suspicious as China. China is one of the most important economic partners of Kazakhstan; however, the cooperation between the authorities of the two countries is not transparent enough. The issue of Chinese economic expansion in Kazakhstan is being discussed more and more actively. Opponents of expansion speak of a threat to national security; defenders call it the Kazakh-Chinese partnership.

People with persistent stereotypes of Sinophobia view the influence of China on Kazakhstan as a desire to seize Kazakh land, eradicate Kazakh statehood, and incline the country's population toward the Chinese civilization. This group is acutely critical of Chinese projects in Kazakhstan, considering such cooperation as a betrayal of national interests.

The business community and youth perceive China as a modern, dynamically developing state. They see their neighborhood as a good opportunity for business development and getting a decent education. The presence of Chinese enterprises and investments is assessed by them as a positive fact of bilateral cooperation. The expansion of economic ties is welcomed as a factor in the dynamic development of Kazakhstan. In addition, China is considered by these people as a counterbalance (creating a balance) to the influence of other great powers - Russia and the United States.

In spite of this, Kazakhstan is probably the only post-Soviet republic where anti-Chinese sentiments are very strong, have rather deep roots and have been expressed in various protests. Incidents of this kind, when official protests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan are put forward, will kindle a bonfire of anti-Chinese sentiments in the republic.

“A meeting was held at the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan, Zhang Xiao, during which the Kazakh side protested against an article on the Chinese website [www.sohu.com](http://www.sohu.com) titled “Why Kazakhstan seeks to return to China,” the statement said Press Service of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The Chinese ambassador was told that the publication of such content does not correspond to the “eternal” spirit of a comprehensive strategic partnership reflected in the joint statement of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China, which was signed by the heads of state on September 11, 2019 (Akorda, 2019).

It is noteworthy that the protest notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which the department periodically presents to the Chinese side, do not negatively affect the development of relations between the two countries. If we are talking about the leadership of the two countries, then they pretend that nothing happened, and “unpleasant” topics in the negotiations do not rise. Neither the first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, nor the second, Kasym-Zhomart Tokaev, have ever raised the topic of provocative publications. Moreover, Nazarbayev in his article “When we are united - we are invincible” noted that over the years of his presidency he has resolved all territorial issues.

Chinese analyst Sheng Siyu believes that the Kazakh Foreign Ministry should pay less attention to individual publications in the Chinese press. “You do not need to believe that the entire press is controlled by the Central Committee of the CPC (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). Yes, such publications periodically appear in the Chinese Internet segment, but without the prompting of party authorities. I understand Kazakhstan’s painful

attitude to this topic, but there are a number of state agreements according to which the border has been drawn, the border remains unchanged, and there are no official Beijing statements on this subject. So the problem is far-fetched. Although, on the other hand, I am sincerely glad that the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan has no more important tasks than paying attention to such publications. In general, it would be nice to apologize to Beijing for the wave of sinophobia that we have observed in Kazakhstan recently,” said Sheng Siyu (Panphilova, 2019).

A Chinese analyst expressed the hope that the note of the Kazakh Foreign Ministry would not affect further cooperation between China and Kazakhstan.

Whatever it is, Kazakhstan and China are the eternal neighbor countries historically, geographically and also by destiny. In this case, we should not seek the disguised aggression toward each other; on the contrary we should look forward to find mutual beneficial cooperation. Experts believe that the influence of China on Kazakhstan should be thoroughly investigated, as it is multidimensional, has diverse contexts and history. From their point of view, this influence should be under vigilant control and be present only in those areas that can contribute to enhancing the functional power and economic well-being of Kazakhstan. Experts say that there should be equal cooperation and pragmatic interaction. And, of course, they advocate protecting national interests and constructively resolving bilateral problems, such as, for example, equitable sharing of transboundary water resources, environmental safety of ongoing joint projects, transparency of contracts and investment efficiency.

By the rule of Globalization, the business partnership is first and policy is second. Kazakhstani society likes or not China is the main business partner of Kazakhstan. We have to recognize it and try to make it as beneficial as possible. For that, we have to know each other very well.

### Relevance

Since the 1991 when Kazakhstan and China have started their bilateral business relations, international news agencies, consultancies and academia have published news coverage, commentaries, reports, and research on the topic. Many of them are mere descriptions of known facts or presentations of opinions and commentaries published elsewhere; also today, we have had many research results, monographs of famous scholars and brainstormings of influential politicians. Even though, we cannot say that the academia circle has found an answer

for describing the main impediment of the business relations between these two countries. We still have had so many unanswered questions about this issue. Notwithstanding, we can underline some of the important research papers in our state point below.

We decided to gather them for two groups: Scholars and experts from Kazakhstan and scholars and experts from China. Obviously, in academia circle we have had of lot of other scholars from different countries with very interesting views, but first of all for the clear understanding of this topic we should rely on the opinion of first two groups.

Askar Nursha, Ph.D., Dean of the School of State and Public Policy and Law of Almaty Management University, said that Sinology in Kazakhstan is experiencing a crisis in the format of think-tanks, but this opens up new opportunities. Many Kazakh scholars who actively investigated the China issue “passed” through the state analytical structure and now find themselves in an independent field. Nursha believes that the advantage of the independence of Kazakhstan experts in that they can now write objectively becomes more interesting to readers. At the same time, under the conditions of underfunding, there is a possibility that China itself will begin to finance Kazakhstan scholars through various projects and grants (Nursha, 2015).

Political scientist, head of the “Mir Eurasii” Public Foundation, Eduard Poletaev, said there are few conflict experts among China experts. Since the Chinese agenda is also associated with conflicts and indignation of a certain part of the population, in his opinion, sinologists with a bias on conflictology are needed. According to Marat Shibutov, political analyst, head of Transparency Kazakhstan, in the next few years, Kazakhstan will begin to enter the PRC market for certain goods and this will create a need for knowledge of Chinese law, the economy, negotiation skills and concluding agreements with the Chinese. Then there will be a need and a possible “rise” of Kazakhstan Sinology (Poletaev, 2020).

We cannot say that Kazakhstani academia is not writing about our topic, but still it is not enough. These two countries should know very well each other. In addition, we can underline interesting overviews in the papers of the following experts and scholars: Laumulin M.T. “History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in World Orientalism” (Laumilin, 2015), Shaikhutdinov T.M. “China-US: G2 or the New Type of the Relationship between Major Powers” (Shaikhutdinov, 2014), Dosum Satbayev, Adil Kaukenov (Kaukenov, 2008), etc. Also, we can notice the impetuous efforts of the scholars at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. For instance,

Gubaidullina M., "Between China and India: energy dimension of Kazakhstan" (Gubaidullina, 2012), Kukeeva F.T., "The SREB project in Kazakhstan: opportunities and threats" (Kukeeva, 2019), Baizakova K.I. "Kazakhstan-China strategic partnership under the 'Belt and Road Initiative'" (Baizakova, 2020).

Second group of scholars have been investigating about Kazakhstan and China more widely than Kazakhstani experts. We can just emphasize some of them that we used during the writing our paper. Other ways we have to list them very long. Xing Guangcheng (2003), Guo Xuetang (2006), Sun Zhuangzhi (2015), Gan Junxian, Mao Yan (2016). From the research works of this group of authors we can find a very interesting state of view about the Chinese intention and concept of Chinese foreign policy.

### **Theoretical-methodological bases**

The methodological basis of the project is supposed to be a multidisciplinary approach based on the use of elements of different theories and methods.

In the case of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China it is obvious that every country wants to take more benefits through the keeping mutual recognition of national interest of each country. Realism is a straightforward approach to international relations, stating that all nations are working to increase their own power, and those countries that manage to hoard power most efficiently will thrive, as they can easily eclipse the achievements of less powerful nations. The theory further states that a nation's foremost interest should be self-preservation and that continually gaining power should always be a social, economic, and political imperative.

Director of the Institute for International and Regional Cooperation of Kazakhstan-German University, chairman of the board of the "One Belt – One Road" Expert Club, Doctor of Historical Sciences Bulat Sultanov said that the country needs highly specialized workers in China with very fluent Chinese language. Sultanov emphasized that it is safer for experts to write works on the history and culture of China. It is difficult to write about China's modern problems, because they can immediately "stick" the label of Sinophobia or Sinofilia. He called on political scientists and experts to be extremely careful and rely on the principles of Kazakhstani diplomacy - multi-vector, pragmatism and protection of national interests (IWPR, 2020).

Also, for Kazakhstan and China it is important their mutual recognition of each other. Kazakhstan should keep the principle of "One China"; China should keep the integrity and inseparability of the Kazakhstan's entire territory. In this case we attempt to use the theory of recognition and reciprocity. It can help us fairly estimate the concept of bilateral relations between these two countries.

This research paper relies mainly on the qualitative method of data analysis in identifying the different variables of the study from the related literature review. The same method was also used in the data collection, where the descriptive method has been utilized mainly in order to describe the variables of the study, while holding a comparison between such variables. The principle of objectivity in the study of the current economic crisis in international relations, the systematic approach to the study of international relations as a theoretical and methodological basis, the historical-analytical method aimed at studying the foreign policy and economic relations of states, the diversity of data and information required the use of sorting methods.

### **Discussion**

*Do Kazakhstan and China know each other enough?* China is changing along the way. Any static characteristics against it do not work. Celestial Empire does not construct an ideal project: it adapts and forms its reality based on relevance. Many Kazakhstani experts complained that there is no real project, no understanding of what the Silk Road Economic Belt is. It was very Chinese.

The Silk Road Economic Belt is what you think about it and how you implement it. What you need in this area, we are ready to include everything here. For example, Kazakhstan would like to modernize its economy? Yes, this is part of the Silk Road. Would you like to build new roads? Yes, this is part of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Would you like to create a digital Kazakhstan? Yes, this is part of the Silk Road. "

The Chinese's flexibility is quite effective: it's not Putin's idea to restore a common historical destiny. The United States wanted to impose its liberal concept on Kazakhstan. China has a completely different approach. It implies independence, consistency and autonomy of participation. The Chinese are ready to create the product that is convenient for the partner. The imperialism of China is different from the imperialism of Russia and the West, which promote their formats. China reckons

with the formats of others, but incorporates them into its China sphere and carefully processes them.

On the one hand, Chinese approach is attractive and seems beneficial; on the other hand, Kazakhstani society feels economic and political expansion of China. Dosym Satpayev, Director of the Risk Assessment Group, lists six reasons for anti-Chinese mood in Kazakhstan. We want to announce and comment for some of them. He underlines the opacity of the economic relationship between Kazakhstan and China. Many of the signed treaties and agreements between the two countries were not publicly presented to the general public (Satbayev, 2019).

The Government of Kazakhstan announces grandiose plans to attract 51 enterprises. But at the same time there is no information about this business anywhere.

This desire, on the one hand, to get Chinese investment and technology, and on the other, the attempts to be very good, white and clean, surprises us. If there really is a question to create new jobs, then you just need to talk about it honestly, and discuss openly. And having received a social protest, we begin to go back. If the state began to speak honestly with its citizens, to explain, everyone would benefit from it. We don't have such a culture of honest conversation with our own population.

Next one of the anti-Chinese mood in Kazakhstan by D. Satbayev is a high level of distrust of the citizens of Kazakhstan to what the authorities are doing and saying, including regarding cooperation with China. At the same time, a significant risk is that a high level of corruption among Kazakhstani officials may prevail over upholding state interests in relations with any foreign investor (Satbayev, 2019).

The Forbes.com published the article called "Bad for Business? China's Corruption Isn't Getting Any Better despite Government Crackdowns" in March, 2018. In this article author mentioned that Chinese President Xi Jinping has called corruption the ruling Communist Party's biggest threat and vowed a "sweeping victory" over the problem. Graft in the world's second-largest economy has manifested as casino junkets, blow-out banquets and suspected collaboration with stock traders. Stopping it has been a key point for Xi, who got clearance Sunday to serve indefinitely in the country's highest office. But the country's corruption rankings in world surveys suggest that China has become chronically stuck mid-way between very high and very low scores for levels of graft. That's because of, and despite, five years of stepped-up crackdowns

against thousands of public officials since Xi took power in 2012 (Jennings, 2018). It shows us not only in Kazakhstan the corruption is obstacle either in China it is. It can be the one of the main reason of misunderstanding between each other.

However, the Chinese business has its own specifics, which distinguishes it from Western companies. In particular, most Chinese companies are directly or indirectly associated with the state, which provides them with serious political and financial support, considering Chinese business as part of their policy to strengthen China's geopolitical and geo-economic positions in the world. At the same time, Chinese business is more adaptable to corruption schemes in other countries, which explains its rather active penetration into the economies of poor and most often corrupt countries in Africa and Asia.

Another key reason of anti-Chinese mood in Kazakhstan by D. Satpayev is the presence of a negative precedent in Central Asia: China has the first major debtors in the person of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is also taking a loan from China. Maybe it is not so crucial as we realized, but unclear information about Kazakhstan debt in front of China has been rising sinophobia in society.

A successful and wealthy neighbor is always disliked, this is a mentality, –We have a good attitude to the United Arab Emirates, to America, to Europe - to those who are far away.

The problem is not in China. First of all, we must change ourselves so that the view from the Wall is not so hostile. We should try to dialogue, create bridges of understanding, business communication.

We know China very poorly. We are forming a transformed idea of our eastern neighbor. There should be systematic work in relation to China, a systematic vision of the opportunities and threats emanating from this country. Kazakhstan itself does not understand what it want from China. What is convenient for Kazakhstan, what does Kazakhstan need? What are the national interests of Kazakhstan in the Chinese case? Self-awareness is the problem!

The farther from the Chinese border, to the West of our country, the higher the level of Sinophobia. People from areas on the border with China, in any case, understand what role China plays in the life of Kazakhstan and the region in particular. In those regions, the attitude towards China is calmer and, one might say, more friendly. There are, of course, a number of factors, but remoteness from China also affects. in the East, East Kazakhstan, in Semey they said: "We eat Chinese products, wear Chinese things - why should we not love China?" In the West, they

generally argue differently, the image of China is perceived differently.

Expert Aidar Amarebaev talks about his participation in a press tour of Chinese enterprises in Kazakhstan. Journalists write a lot that mainly Chinese workers work in Chinese enterprises. This is not so, he refutes. The political scientist visited Kostanay, visited the Sary-Arka Auto workshop, a logistics center, reached the Aizuy agro-industrial company in the North Kazakhstan region, visited the Atyrau Refinery, evaluated the production capacities of the CASPIBITUMAKtau plant, and ended up at the former Shymkent "ШЫМКЕНТНЕФТЕОРГСИНТЕЗЕ". He emphasizes that everywhere, in principle, work Kazakh workers.

Very strict legislation restricts the involvement of Chinese workers here in Kazakhstan. A head of the Aiju company offered a very pragmatic explanation to Mr. Amrebaev: "Why should I hire a Chinese employee, bring him here, equip his housing, solve food problems, answer for him? It's all very expensive. It's easier for me to hire a local employee who for a penny will work at this enterprise. I will make more profit." (Minulin, 2018).

It is clear that in Kazakhstan more sinophobia than sinophilia. But nothing is endless and in the case of last changes in international economic and political situation sinophilia is arising and strengthening in Kazakhstani society.

The change in attitude towards the China was recorded by experts. Chinese historian expert Ruslan Izimov noted in 2016 that it is becoming more and more positive: Beijing is perceived as a reliable economic partner, has no political claims to the countries of Central Asia, and does not require democratization from them. "Today, China is positively viewed not only by politicians, elites, but also by citizens," he argued.

It is clear that for China, our republic is only one of the puzzles in the global game related to strengthening its economic and political positions. The investment policy of China in Kazakhstan is no different from the investment policy in other countries and regions of the world, whether it is Africa, Latin America or the Middle East. It is always based on the rigid upholding of the national and economic interests of the PRC. Moreover, the main task of Kazakhstan is to extract more advantages than disadvantages from the neighborhood with China.

To a large extent, this depends on a clearly developed strategy for cooperation with China in the short, medium and long term, taking into account all possible problems and benefits. And in order

to increase public confidence in the state policy of cooperation between Kazakhstan and China, it is necessary first to conduct a public and transparent audit of those treaties and agreements signed with China that cause the greatest suspicion among citizens in terms of identifying risks for national interests of Kazakhstan.

#### ***Important business areas for cooperation.***

Cooperation in the oil and gas sector is the main priority of bilateral relations between Nur-Sultan and Beijing.

Its recovery began back in 1997, when the Agreement on cooperation in the field of oil and gas between the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan and CNPC was signed, as well as the Agreement on the construction of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China. Major acquisitions in the oil and gas sector were made by Chinese corporations (CNPC, Sinopec Engineering, CITIC Group) later, in the wake of the economic crisis (Popov, 2012).

Kazakhstan considers the rapprochement with China as a way to move away from Russia's monopoly on the transportation of Central Asian hydrocarbons and reduce dependence on Western multinationals, which are actively developing Kazakhstan's resources since the 1990s. last century. Also, some representatives of the Kazakh establishment expect that in the future the republic will be able to become a convenient corridor for the transit of energy from Iran to China, although many experts are skeptical about this possibility.

For China, which has set a goal to diversify its sources of raw materials, Central Asia is of interest as one of several reserve raw material bases, along with deposits in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Russia, as well as projects to increase its own production. Compared to the countries of the Near and Middle East, which account for more than half of China's oil imports, Central Asia has limited opportunities.

In spite of the falling oil prices that reach less than 1\$ per barrel cooperation in the oil and gas sector is the main priority of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China. Oilprice.com announced that oil prices crashed through zero, closing out the day at -\$37 per barrel, an unprecedented meltdown (Cunningham, 2020). Nevertheless, we do believe that oil price will go up very soon when world economy will recover step by step after crisis of COVID-19 and Kazakhstan get own benefits from it.

In addition to the oil and gas sector, China has shown considerable interest in such a sector of Kazakhstan's economy as metal mining. In 2010,

the State Development Bank of China provided a loan of \$ 2.7 billion to the Kazakh copper giant “Kazakhmys” for the development of the Bozshakol deposit and intends to allocate a loan of \$ 1.5 billion for the development of the “Aktogay” mine. The latter is one of the largest undeveloped deposits in the world with a content of copper and by-products of 5 million tons (Popov, 2012).

In general, Beijing is most interested in the extractive industries of Kazakhstan, which open up access to the natural resources of the republic. However, unlike some other countries of the region, Nur-Sultan has the opportunity to more insistently demand from the PRC investments in the non-primary sector and the localization of production on its territory. The result of the efforts of the country's leadership undertaken in this direction was the inclusion on the agenda of the Kazakh-Chinese cooperation of such projects as the construction of the “Moinak” hydroelectric station, a gas chemical complex in the Atyrau region, a bitumen plant in Aktau, the high-speed Nur-Sultan-Almaty road, etc.

The second major area of Chinese economic policy in Kazakhstan is the creation of large-scale infrastructure facilities necessary for the export of raw materials and stimulating trade ties. The rapid development of infrastructure has contributed to making Kazakhstan the main trading partner of China in the region. But COVID-19 pandemic has already changed all situation. Certainly, both countries are ready to continue the cooperation on high level, but condition for this will not be same.

In this case, we have to think about digitalization of the business. Indisputably, China is our non-alternative technology partner (or the cost of the alternative is very high), and Kazakhstan business is primarily interested in this partnership.

## Conclusion

The accessible strategic documents of China and the very logic of the development of international relations suggest that Beijing will strive to increase its presence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia as a whole. This is also indicated by announced plans to increase mutual trade turnover, throughput of cross-border infrastructure and Chinese credit lines.

Kazakhstan should be one of the main geostrategic partners of China in Central Asia. Beijing does understand it and has a strong tension to keep good condition of bilateral and multi-lateral relations with Kazakhstan. The historical mission of Kazakhstan is being as the main section of the huge artery of the Great Silk Road. In ancient and Middle Ages, endless wars went for control over the infrastructure of the Great Silk Road. When Silk Road is important and essential, every participant of this huge system should understand about the security and peace along the New Silk Road.

Kazakhstan is only one of the puzzles in the global game related to strengthening its economic and political positions of China. The investment policy of China in Kazakhstan is no different from the investment policy in other countries and regions of the world, whether it is Africa, Latin America or the Middle East. It is always based on the rigid upholding of the national and economic interests of the PRC. Moreover, the main task of Kazakhstan is to extract more advantages than disadvantages from the neighborhood with China. Foremost, we should not forget about the principles of Kazakhstani diplomacy - multi-vector, pragmatism and protection of national interests.

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